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author | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
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committer | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
commit | 5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch) | |
tree | 10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c | |
parent | 49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff) | |
download | UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.gz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.lz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.xz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.zip |
Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c | 292 |
1 files changed, 292 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5b5f672f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#include "cert.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "ocsp.h" + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +CERTCertificate * +SSL_PeerCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in PeerCertificate", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return 0; + } + if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->sec.peerCert) { + return CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + } + return 0; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +CERTCertList * +SSL_PeerCertificateChain(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + CERTCertList *chain = NULL; + CERTCertificate *cert; + ssl3CertNode *cur; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in PeerCertificateChain", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return NULL; + } + if (!ss->opt.useSecurity || !ss->sec.peerCert) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return NULL; + } + chain = CERT_NewCertList(); + if (!chain) { + return NULL; + } + cert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (CERT_AddCertToListTail(chain, cert) != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + for (cur = ss->ssl3.peerCertChain; cur; cur = cur->next) { + cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cur->cert); + if (CERT_AddCertToListTail(chain, cert) != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + return chain; + +loser: + CERT_DestroyCertList(chain); + return NULL; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +CERTCertificate * +SSL_LocalCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in PeerCertificate", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return NULL; + } + if (ss->opt.useSecurity) { + if (ss->sec.localCert) { + return CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + } + if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.ci.sid->localCert) { + return CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->localCert); + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +SECStatus +SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1, + char **ip, char **sp) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SecurityStatus", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (cp) + *cp = 0; + if (kp0) + *kp0 = 0; + if (kp1) + *kp1 = 0; + if (ip) + *ip = 0; + if (sp) + *sp = 0; + if (op) { + *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF; + } + + if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) { + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *bulkCipherDef; + PRBool isDes = PR_FALSE; + + bulkCipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def); + if (cp) { + *cp = PORT_Strdup(bulkCipherDef->short_name); + } + if (PORT_Strstr(bulkCipherDef->short_name, "DES")) { + isDes = PR_TRUE; + } + + if (kp0) { + *kp0 = bulkCipherDef->key_size * 8; + if (isDes) + *kp0 = (*kp0 * 7) / 8; + } + if (kp1) { + *kp1 = bulkCipherDef->secret_key_size * 8; + if (isDes) + *kp1 = (*kp1 * 7) / 8; + } + if (op) { + if (bulkCipherDef->key_size == 0) { + *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF; + } else if (bulkCipherDef->secret_key_size * 8 < 90) { + *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_LOW; + } else { + *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_HIGH; + } + } + + if (ip || sp) { + CERTCertificate *cert; + + cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + if (cert) { + if (ip) { + *ip = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer); + } + if (sp) { + *sp = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject); + } + } else { + if (ip) { + *ip = PORT_Strdup("no certificate"); + } + if (sp) { + *sp = PORT_Strdup("no certificate"); + } + } + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +SECStatus +SSL_AuthCertificateHook(PRFileDesc *s, SSLAuthCertificate func, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(s); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in AuthCertificateHook", + SSL_GETPID(), s)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->authCertificate = func; + ss->authCertificateArg = arg; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +SECStatus +SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(PRFileDesc *s, SSLGetClientAuthData func, + void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(s); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in GetClientAuthDataHook", + SSL_GETPID(), s)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->getClientAuthData = func; + ss->getClientAuthDataArg = arg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(PRFileDesc *s, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(s); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in GetClientAuthDataHook", + SSL_GETPID(), s)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->pkcs11PinArg = arg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This is the "default" authCert callback function. It is called when a + * certificate message is received from the peer and the local application + * has not registered an authCert callback function. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_AuthCertificate(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checkSig, PRBool isServer) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertDBHandle *handle; + sslSocket *ss; + SECCertUsage certUsage; + const char *hostname = NULL; + PRTime now = PR_Now(); + SECItemArray *certStatusArray; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + PORT_Assert(ss != NULL); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + + handle = (CERTCertDBHandle *)arg; + certStatusArray = &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus; + + if (certStatusArray->len) { + PORT_SetError(0); + if (CERT_CacheOCSPResponseFromSideChannel(handle, ss->sec.peerCert, now, + &certStatusArray->items[0], + ss->pkcs11PinArg) != + SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(PR_GetError() != 0); + } + } + + /* this may seem backwards, but isn't. */ + certUsage = isServer ? certUsageSSLClient : certUsageSSLServer; + + rv = CERT_VerifyCert(handle, ss->sec.peerCert, checkSig, certUsage, + now, ss->pkcs11PinArg, NULL); + + if (rv != SECSuccess || isServer) + return rv; + + /* cert is OK. This is the client side of an SSL connection. + * Now check the name field in the cert against the desired hostname. + * NB: This is our only defense against Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks! + */ + hostname = ss->url; + if (hostname && hostname[0]) + rv = CERT_VerifyCertName(ss->sec.peerCert, hostname); + else + rv = SECFailure; + if (rv != SECSuccess) + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN); + + return rv; +} |