Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 573 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2bcc1d0aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
+/*
+ * Gather (Read) entire SSL3 records from socket into buffer.
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "ssl3prot.h"
+
+struct ssl2GatherStr {
+    /* true when ssl3_GatherData encounters an SSLv2 handshake */
+    PRBool isV2;
+
+    /* number of bytes of padding appended to the message content */
+    PRUint8 padding;
+};
+
+typedef struct ssl2GatherStr ssl2Gather;
+
+/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_InitGather(sslGather *gs)
+{
+    SECStatus status;
+
+    gs->state = GS_INIT;
+    gs->writeOffset = 0;
+    gs->readOffset = 0;
+    gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
+    gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
+    status = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, 4096);
+    return status;
+}
+
+/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
+void
+ssl3_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs)
+{
+    if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */
+        PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space);
+        PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf);
+        PORT_Free(gs->dtlsPacket.buf);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a given buffer is likely an SSLv3 record header.  */
+PRBool
+ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(const unsigned char *buf)
+{
+    /* Even if this was a V2 record header we couldn't possibly parse it
+     * correctly as the second bit denotes a vaguely-defined security escape. */
+    if (buf[0] & 0x40) {
+        return PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    /* Check for a typical V3 record header. */
+    return (PRBool)(buf[0] >= content_change_cipher_spec &&
+                    buf[0] <= content_application_data &&
+                    buf[1] == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to read in an entire SSL3 record.
+ * Blocks here for blocking sockets, otherwise returns -1 with
+ *  PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR when socket would block.
+ *
+ * returns  1 if received a complete SSL3 record.
+ * returns  0 if recv returns EOF
+ * returns -1 if recv returns < 0
+ *  (The error value may have already been set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *
+ * Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
+ *
+ * The Gather state machine has 3 states:  GS_INIT, GS_HEADER, GS_DATA.
+ * GS_HEADER: waiting for the 5-byte SSL3 record header to come in.
+ * GS_DATA:   waiting for the body of the SSL3 record   to come in.
+ *
+ * This loop returns when either
+ *      (a) an error or EOF occurs,
+ *  (b) PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR,
+ *  (c) data (entire SSL3 record) has been received.
+ */
+static int
+ssl3_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags, ssl2Gather *ssl2gs)
+{
+    unsigned char *bp;
+    unsigned char *lbp;
+    int nb;
+    int err;
+    int rv = 1;
+    PRUint8 v2HdrLength = 0;
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+    if (gs->state == GS_INIT) {
+        gs->state = GS_HEADER;
+        gs->remainder = ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders ? 2 : 5;
+        gs->offset = 0;
+        gs->writeOffset = 0;
+        gs->readOffset = 0;
+        gs->inbuf.len = 0;
+    }
+
+    lbp = gs->inbuf.buf;
+    for (;;) {
+        SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder));
+        bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? lbp : gs->hdr) + gs->offset;
+        nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags);
+
+        if (nb > 0) {
+            PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb));
+        } else if (nb == 0) {
+            /* EOF */
+            SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            rv = 0;
+            break;
+        } else /* if (nb < 0) */ {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+                     PR_GetError()));
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        PORT_Assert((unsigned int)nb <= gs->remainder);
+        if ((unsigned int)nb > gs->remainder) {
+            /* ssl_DefRecv is misbehaving!  this error is fatal to SSL. */
+            gs->state = GS_INIT; /* so we don't crash next time */
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        gs->offset += nb;
+        gs->remainder -= nb;
+        if (gs->state == GS_DATA)
+            gs->inbuf.len += nb;
+
+        /* if there's more to go, read some more. */
+        if (gs->remainder > 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* have received entire record header, or entire record. */
+        switch (gs->state) {
+            case GS_HEADER:
+                /* Check for SSLv2 handshakes. Always assume SSLv3 on clients,
+                 * support SSLv2 handshakes only when ssl2gs != NULL. */
+                if (!ssl2gs || ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(gs->hdr)) {
+                    /* Should have a non-SSLv2 record header in gs->hdr. Extract
+                     * the length of the following encrypted data, and then
+                     * read in the rest of the record into gs->inbuf. */
+                    if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) {
+                        PRUint16 len = (gs->hdr[0] << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
+                        if (!(len & 0x8000)) {
+                            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: incorrectly formatted header"));
+                            SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+                            gs->state = GS_INIT;
+                            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+                            return SECFailure;
+                        }
+                        gs->remainder = len & ~0x8000;
+                    } else {
+                        gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[3] << 8) | gs->hdr[4];
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    /* Probably an SSLv2 record header. No need to handle any
+                     * security escapes (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) as we wouldn't get
+                     * here if one was set. See ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(). */
+                    gs->remainder = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
+                    ssl2gs->isV2 = PR_TRUE;
+                    v2HdrLength = 2;
+
+                    /* Is it a 3-byte header with padding? */
+                    if (!(gs->hdr[0] & 0x80)) {
+                        ssl2gs->padding = gs->hdr[2];
+                        v2HdrLength++;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                /* This is the max length for an encrypted SSLv3+ fragment. */
+                if (!v2HdrLength &&
+                    gs->remainder > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) {
+                    SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+                    gs->state = GS_INIT;
+                    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+                    return SECFailure;
+                }
+
+                gs->state = GS_DATA;
+                gs->offset = 0;
+                gs->inbuf.len = 0;
+
+                if (gs->remainder > gs->inbuf.space) {
+                    err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->inbuf, gs->remainder);
+                    if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
+                        return err;
+                    }
+                    lbp = gs->inbuf.buf;
+                }
+
+                /* When we encounter an SSLv2 hello we've read 2 or 3 bytes too
+                 * many into the gs->hdr[] buffer. Copy them over into inbuf so
+                 * that we can properly process the hello record later. */
+                if (v2HdrLength) {
+                    gs->inbuf.len = 5 - v2HdrLength;
+                    PORT_Memcpy(lbp, gs->hdr + v2HdrLength, gs->inbuf.len);
+                    gs->remainder -= gs->inbuf.len;
+                    lbp += gs->inbuf.len;
+                }
+
+                break; /* End this case.  Continue around the loop. */
+
+            case GS_DATA:
+                /*
+                ** SSL3 record has been completely received.
+                */
+                SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got record of %d bytes",
+                             SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->inbuf.len));
+                gs->state = GS_INIT;
+                return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read in an entire DTLS record.
+ *
+ * Blocks here for blocking sockets, otherwise returns -1 with
+ *  PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR when socket would block.
+ *
+ * This is simpler than SSL because we are reading on a datagram socket
+ * and datagrams must contain >=1 complete records.
+ *
+ * returns  1 if received a complete DTLS record.
+ * returns  0 if recv returns EOF
+ * returns -1 if recv returns < 0
+ *  (The error value may have already been set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *
+ * Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
+ *
+ * This loop returns when either
+ *      (a) an error or EOF occurs,
+ *  (b) PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR,
+ *  (c) data (entire DTLS record) has been received.
+ */
+static int
+dtls_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
+{
+    int nb;
+    int err;
+    int rv = 1;
+
+    SSL_TRC(30, ("dtls_GatherData"));
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+
+    gs->state = GS_HEADER;
+    gs->offset = 0;
+
+    if (gs->dtlsPacketOffset == gs->dtlsPacket.len) { /* No data left */
+        gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
+        gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
+
+        /* Resize to the maximum possible size so we can fit a full datagram */
+        /* This is the max fragment length for an encrypted fragment
+        ** plus the size of the record header.
+        ** This magic constant is copied from ssl3_GatherData, with 5 changed
+        ** to 13 (the size of the record header).
+        */
+        if (gs->dtlsPacket.space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048 + 13) {
+            err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->dtlsPacket,
+                                 MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048 + 13);
+            if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
+                return err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* recv() needs to read a full datagram at a time */
+        nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, gs->dtlsPacket.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.space, flags);
+
+        if (nb > 0) {
+            PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", gs->dtlsPacket.buf, nb));
+        } else if (nb == 0) {
+            /* EOF */
+            SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            rv = 0;
+            return rv;
+        } else /* if (nb < 0) */ {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+                     PR_GetError()));
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            return rv;
+        }
+
+        gs->dtlsPacket.len = nb;
+    }
+
+    /* At this point we should have >=1 complete records lined up in
+     * dtlsPacket. Read off the header.
+     */
+    if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < 13) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet "
+                 "too short to contain header",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+        gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
+        gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        return rv;
+    }
+    memcpy(gs->hdr, gs->dtlsPacket.buf + gs->dtlsPacketOffset, 13);
+    gs->dtlsPacketOffset += 13;
+
+    /* Have received SSL3 record header in gs->hdr. */
+    gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[11] << 8) | gs->hdr[12];
+
+    if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < gs->remainder) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet too short "
+                 "to contain rest of body",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+        gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
+        gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        return rv;
+    }
+
+    /* OK, we have at least one complete packet, copy into inbuf */
+    if (gs->remainder > gs->inbuf.space) {
+        err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->inbuf, gs->remainder);
+        if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
+            return err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    memcpy(gs->inbuf.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.buf + gs->dtlsPacketOffset,
+           gs->remainder);
+    gs->inbuf.len = gs->remainder;
+    gs->offset = gs->remainder;
+    gs->dtlsPacketOffset += gs->remainder;
+    gs->state = GS_INIT;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Gather in a record and when complete, Handle that record.
+ * Repeat this until the handshake is complete,
+ * or until application data is available.
+ *
+ * Returns  1 when the handshake is completed without error, or
+ *                 application data is available.
+ * Returns  0 if ssl3_GatherData hits EOF.
+ * Returns -1 on read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error.
+ * Returns -2 on SECWouldBlock return from ssl3_HandleRecord.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake       in sslcon.c,
+ *    and from SSL_ForceHandshake in sslsecur.c
+ *    and from ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord below (<- DoRecv in sslsecur.c).
+ *
+ * Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
+ */
+int
+ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
+{
+    int rv;
+    SSL3Ciphertext cText;
+    PRBool keepGoing = PR_TRUE;
+
+    SSL_TRC(30, ("ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake"));
+
+    /* ssl3_HandleRecord may end up eventually calling ssl_FinishHandshake,
+     * which requires the 1stHandshakeLock, which must be acquired before the
+     * RecvBufLock.
+     */
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+
+    do {
+        PRBool handleRecordNow = PR_FALSE;
+
+        ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+        /* Without this, we may end up wrongly reporting
+         * SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_* errors if we receive any records from the
+         * peer while we are waiting to be restarted.
+         */
+        if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
+            ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+            PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+            return (int)SECFailure;
+        }
+
+        /* Treat an empty msgState like a NULL msgState. (Most of the time
+         * when ssl3_HandleHandshake returns SECWouldBlock, it leaves
+         * behind a non-NULL but zero-length msgState).
+         * Test: async_cert_restart_server_sends_hello_request_first_in_separate_record
+         */
+        if (ss->ssl3.hs.msgState.buf) {
+            if (ss->ssl3.hs.msgState.len == 0) {
+                ss->ssl3.hs.msgState.buf = NULL;
+            } else {
+                handleRecordNow = PR_TRUE;
+            }
+        }
+
+        ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+        if (handleRecordNow) {
+            /* ssl3_HandleHandshake previously returned SECWouldBlock and the
+             * as-yet-unprocessed plaintext of that previous handshake record.
+             * We need to process it now before we overwrite it with the next
+             * handshake record.
+             */
+            rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, NULL, &ss->gs.buf);
+        } else {
+            /* State for SSLv2 client hello support. */
+            ssl2Gather ssl2gs = { PR_FALSE, 0 };
+            ssl2Gather *ssl2gs_ptr = NULL;
+
+            /* If we're a server and waiting for a client hello, accept v2. */
+            if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello) {
+                ssl2gs_ptr = &ssl2gs;
+            }
+
+            /* bring in the next sslv3 record. */
+            if (ss->recvdCloseNotify) {
+                /* RFC 5246 Section 7.2.1:
+                 *   Any data received after a closure alert is ignored.
+                 */
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+                /* If we're a server waiting for a ClientHello then pass
+                 * ssl2gs to support SSLv2 ClientHello messages. */
+                rv = ssl3_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags, ssl2gs_ptr);
+            } else {
+                rv = dtls_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags);
+
+                /* If we got a would block error, that means that no data was
+                 * available, so we check the timer to see if it's time to
+                 * retransmit */
+                if (rv == SECFailure &&
+                    (PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)) {
+                    dtls_CheckTimer(ss);
+                    /* Restore the error in case something succeeded */
+                    PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (rv <= 0) {
+                return rv;
+            }
+
+            if (ssl2gs.isV2) {
+                rv = ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(ss, ss->gs.inbuf.buf,
+                                              ss->gs.inbuf.len,
+                                              ssl2gs.padding);
+                if (rv < 0) {
+                    return rv;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* decipher it, and handle it if it's a handshake.
+                 * If it's application data, ss->gs.buf will not be empty upon return.
+                 * If it's a change cipher spec, alert, or handshake message,
+                 * ss->gs.buf.len will be 0 when ssl3_HandleRecord returns SECSuccess.
+                 */
+                if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) {
+                    cText.type = content_application_data;
+                    cText.version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+                } else {
+                    cText.type = (SSL3ContentType)ss->gs.hdr[0];
+                    cText.version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2];
+                }
+
+                if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+                    sslSequenceNumber seq_num;
+
+                    cText.version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(cText.version);
+                    /* DTLS sequence number */
+                    PORT_Memcpy(&seq_num, &ss->gs.hdr[3], sizeof(seq_num));
+                    cText.seq_num = PR_ntohll(seq_num);
+                }
+
+                cText.buf = &ss->gs.inbuf;
+                rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, &cText, &ss->gs.buf);
+            }
+        }
+        if (rv < 0) {
+            return ss->recvdCloseNotify ? 0 : rv;
+        }
+        if (ss->gs.buf.len > 0) {
+            /* We have application data to return to the application. This
+             * prioritizes returning application data to the application over
+             * completing any renegotiation handshake we may be doing.
+             */
+            PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
+            PORT_Assert(cText.type == content_application_data);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        PORT_Assert(keepGoing);
+        ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+        if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) {
+            /* We are done with the current handshake so stop trying to
+             * handshake. Note that it would be safe to test ss->firstHsDone
+             * instead of ss->ssl3.hs.ws. By testing ss->ssl3.hs.ws instead,
+             * we prioritize completing a renegotiation handshake over sending
+             * application data.
+             */
+            PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
+            PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
+            keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
+        } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart) {
+            /* Prioritize sending application data over trying to complete
+             * the handshake if we're false starting.
+             *
+             * If we were to do this check at the beginning of the loop instead
+             * of here, then this function would become be a no-op after
+             * receiving the ServerHelloDone in the false start case, and we
+             * would never complete the handshake.
+             */
+            PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
+
+            if (ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) {
+                keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
+            } else {
+                ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+            }
+        }
+        ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+    } while (keepGoing);
+
+    /* Service the DTLS timer so that the holddown timer eventually fires. */
+    if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+        dtls_CheckTimer(ss);
+    }
+    ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
+    ss->gs.writeOffset = ss->gs.buf.len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Repeatedly gather in a record and when complete, Handle that record.
+ * Repeat this until some application data is received.
+ *
+ * Returns  1 when application data is available.
+ * Returns  0 if ssl3_GatherData hits EOF.
+ * Returns -1 on read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error.
+ * Returns -2 on SECWouldBlock return from ssl3_HandleRecord.
+ *
+ * Called from DoRecv in sslsecur.c
+ * Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
+ */
+int
+ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
+{
+    int rv;
+
+    /* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake requires both of these locks. */
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+
+    do {
+        rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, flags);
+    } while (rv > 0 && ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
+
+    return rv;
+}