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author | wolfbeast <mcwerewolf@gmail.com> | 2018-06-06 21:27:04 +0200 |
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committer | wolfbeast <mcwerewolf@gmail.com> | 2018-06-06 21:27:04 +0200 |
commit | 4a71b30364a4b6d1eaf16fcfdc8e873e6697f293 (patch) | |
tree | a47014077c14579249859ad34afcc5a8f2f0730a /security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c | |
parent | d7da72799521386c110dbba73b1e483b00a0a56a (diff) | |
parent | 2dad0ec41d0b69c0a815012e6ea4bdde81b2875b (diff) | |
download | UXP-4a71b30364a4b6d1eaf16fcfdc8e873e6697f293.tar UXP-4a71b30364a4b6d1eaf16fcfdc8e873e6697f293.tar.gz UXP-4a71b30364a4b6d1eaf16fcfdc8e873e6697f293.tar.lz UXP-4a71b30364a4b6d1eaf16fcfdc8e873e6697f293.tar.xz UXP-4a71b30364a4b6d1eaf16fcfdc8e873e6697f293.zip |
Merge branch 'NSS-335'
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c | 4622 |
1 files changed, 2052 insertions, 2570 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c index 5cbe2bd09..61878ae99 100644 --- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c @@ -34,14 +34,13 @@ #include "blapi.h" #include <stdio.h> -#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB -#include "zlib.h" -#endif static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot); -static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms); -static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, + PK11SymKey **msp); +static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss, + PK11SymKey *masterSecret); static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss); static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss); static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); @@ -51,27 +50,28 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss); static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss); static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *suites, - SECItem *comps, - sslSessionID *sid); + sslSessionID *sid, + const PRUint8 *msg, + unsigned int len); static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, int *retErrCode); static SECStatus ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, - PRUint32 length, - SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr); + PRUint32 length); static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); -static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, - int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, - int inputLen); - static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType); static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash); PRBool ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); -#define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */ -#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000 +const PRUint8 ssl_hello_retry_random[] = { + 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11, + 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91, + 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E, + 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_hello_retry_random) == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); /* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement. @@ -214,52 +214,6 @@ ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency() } #endif -/* This list of SSL3 compression methods is sorted in descending order of - * precedence (desirability). It only includes compression methods we - * implement. - */ -static const SSLCompressionMethod ssl_compression_methods[] = { -#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB - ssl_compression_deflate, -#endif - ssl_compression_null -}; - -static const unsigned int ssl_compression_method_count = - PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_compression_methods); - -/* compressionEnabled returns true iff the compression algorithm is enabled - * for the given SSL socket. */ -static PRBool -ssl_CompressionEnabled(sslSocket *ss, SSLCompressionMethod compression) -{ - SSL3ProtocolVersion version; - - if (compression == ssl_compression_null) { - return PR_TRUE; /* Always enabled */ - } - if (ss->sec.isServer) { - /* We can't easily check that the client didn't attempt TLS 1.3, - * so this will have to do. */ - PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); - version = ss->version; - } else { - version = ss->vrange.max; - } - if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - return PR_FALSE; - } -#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB - if (compression == ssl_compression_deflate) { - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - return PR_FALSE; - } - return ss->opt.enableDeflate; - } -#endif - return PR_FALSE; -} - static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types[] = { ct_RSA_sign, ct_ECDSA_sign, @@ -268,173 +222,125 @@ static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types[] = { static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats; -/* Record protection algorithms, indexed by SSL3BulkCipher. - * - * The |max_records| field (|mr| below) is set to a number that is higher than - * recommended in some literature (esp. TLS 1.3) because we currently abort the - * connection when this limit is reached and we want to ensure that we only - * rarely hit this limit. See bug 1268745 for details. - */ -#define MR_MAX RECORD_SEQ_MAX /* 2^48-1 */ -#define MR_128 (0x5aULL << 28) /* For AES and similar. */ -#define MR_LOW (1ULL << 20) /* For weak ciphers. */ -/* clang-format off */ -static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = { - /* |--------- Lengths ---------| */ - /* cipher calg : s : */ - /* : e b n */ - /* oid short_name mr : l o */ - /* k r o t n */ - /* e e i c a c */ - /* y t type v k g e */ - {cipher_null, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER, "NULL", MR_MAX}, - {cipher_rc4, calg_rc4, 16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_RC4, "RC4", MR_LOW}, - {cipher_des, calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_DES_CBC, "DES-CBC", MR_LOW}, - {cipher_3des, calg_3des, 24,24, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "3DES-EDE-CBC", MR_LOW}, - {cipher_aes_128, calg_aes, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC, "AES-128", MR_128}, - {cipher_aes_256, calg_aes, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC, "AES-256", MR_128}, - {cipher_camellia_128, calg_camellia, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, "Camellia-128", MR_128}, - {cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, "Camellia-256", MR_128}, - {cipher_seed, calg_seed, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_SEED_CBC, "SEED-CBC", MR_128}, - {cipher_aes_128_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8, - SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM, "AES-128-GCM", MR_128}, - {cipher_aes_256_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 32,32, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8, - SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM, "AES-256-GCM", MR_128}, - {cipher_chacha20, calg_chacha20, 32,32, type_aead, 12, 0,16, 0, - SEC_OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, "ChaCha20-Poly1305", MR_MAX}, - {cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, - SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, "missing", 0U}, -}; - static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] = -{ /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */ - /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType authKeyType ephemeral oid */ - {kea_null, ssl_kea_null, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_FALSE, 0}, - {kea_rsa, ssl_kea_rsa, nullKey, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_RSA}, - {kea_dh_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS}, - {kea_dh_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA}, - {kea_dhe_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS}, - {kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA}, - {kea_dh_anon, ssl_kea_dh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_ANON}, - {kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA}, - {kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, ecKey, ssl_auth_ecdsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA}, - {kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA}, - {kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA}, - {kea_ecdh_anon, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ANON}, - {kea_ecdhe_psk, ssl_kea_ecdh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_PSK}, - {kea_dhe_psk, ssl_kea_dh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_PSK}, - {kea_tls13_any, ssl_kea_tls13_any, nullKey, ssl_auth_tls13_any, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS13_KEA_ANY}, -}; + { + /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */ + /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType authKeyType ephemeral oid */ + { kea_null, ssl_kea_null, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_FALSE, 0 }, + { kea_rsa, ssl_kea_rsa, nullKey, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_RSA }, + { kea_dh_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS }, + { kea_dh_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA }, + { kea_dhe_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS }, + { kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA }, + { kea_dh_anon, ssl_kea_dh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_ANON }, + { kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA }, + { kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, ecKey, ssl_auth_ecdsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA }, + { kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA }, + { kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA }, + { kea_ecdh_anon, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ANON }, + { kea_ecdhe_psk, ssl_kea_ecdh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_PSK }, + { kea_dhe_psk, ssl_kea_dh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_PSK }, + { kea_tls13_any, ssl_kea_tls13_any, nullKey, ssl_auth_tls13_any, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS13_KEA_ANY }, + }; /* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */ static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = -{ -/* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg prf_hash */ -/* Note that the prf_hash_alg is the hash function used by the PRF, see sslimpl.h. */ - - {TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, mac_null, kea_null, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - - -/* New TLS cipher suites */ - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, - - {TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - - {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, - cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, - cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, - cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, - cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha384}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, - - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, - - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, - - {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256}, - {TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha384}, -}; -/* clang-format on */ + { + /* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg prf_hash */ + /* Note that the prf_hash_alg is the hash function used by the PRF, see sslimpl.h. */ + + { TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, ssl_mac_null, kea_null, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, ssl_mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + /* New TLS cipher suites */ + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + + { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + }; static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE auth_alg_defs[] = { CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_null */ @@ -471,44 +377,20 @@ typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr { /* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */ static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = { /* calg, cmech */ - { calg_null, (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L }, - { calg_rc4, CKM_RC4 }, - { calg_rc2, CKM_RC2_CBC }, - { calg_des, CKM_DES_CBC }, - { calg_3des, CKM_DES3_CBC }, - { calg_idea, CKM_IDEA_CBC }, - { calg_fortezza, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, - { calg_aes, CKM_AES_CBC }, - { calg_camellia, CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC }, - { calg_seed, CKM_SEED_CBC }, - { calg_aes_gcm, CKM_AES_GCM }, - { calg_chacha20, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 }, - /* { calg_init , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL } */ + { ssl_calg_null, CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM }, + { ssl_calg_rc4, CKM_RC4 }, + { ssl_calg_rc2, CKM_RC2_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_des, CKM_DES_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_3des, CKM_DES3_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_idea, CKM_IDEA_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_fortezza, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, + { ssl_calg_aes, CKM_AES_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_camellia, CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_seed, CKM_SEED_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_aes_gcm, CKM_AES_GCM }, + { ssl_calg_chacha20, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 }, }; -#define mmech_invalid (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L -#define mmech_md5 CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC -#define mmech_sha CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC -#define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC -#define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC -#define mmech_sha256_hmac CKM_SHA256_HMAC -#define mmech_sha384_hmac CKM_SHA384_HMAC - -/* clang-format off */ -static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */ - /* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */ - /* mac mmech pad_size mac_size */ - { mac_null, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 , 0}, - { mac_md5, mmech_md5, 48, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5 }, - { mac_sha, mmech_sha, 40, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1}, - {hmac_md5, mmech_md5_hmac, 0, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5}, - {hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 0, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1}, - {hmac_sha256, mmech_sha256_hmac, 0, SHA256_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256}, - { mac_aead, mmech_invalid, 0, 0, 0 }, - {hmac_sha384, mmech_sha384_hmac, 0, SHA384_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384} -}; -/* clang-format on */ - const PRUint8 tls13_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01 }; const PRUint8 tls12_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, @@ -554,48 +436,57 @@ ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType) static char line[40]; switch (msgType) { - case hello_request: + case ssl_hs_hello_request: rv = "hello_request (0)"; break; - case client_hello: + case ssl_hs_client_hello: rv = "client_hello (1)"; break; - case server_hello: + case ssl_hs_server_hello: rv = "server_hello (2)"; break; - case hello_verify_request: + case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: rv = "hello_verify_request (3)"; break; - case new_session_ticket: - rv = "session_ticket (4)"; + case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: + rv = "new_session_ticket (4)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_end_of_early_data: + rv = "end_of_early_data (5)"; break; - case hello_retry_request: + case ssl_hs_hello_retry_request: rv = "hello_retry_request (6)"; break; - case encrypted_extensions: + case ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions: rv = "encrypted_extensions (8)"; break; - case certificate: + case ssl_hs_certificate: rv = "certificate (11)"; break; - case server_key_exchange: + case ssl_hs_server_key_exchange: rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; break; - case certificate_request: + case ssl_hs_certificate_request: rv = "certificate_request (13)"; break; - case server_hello_done: + case ssl_hs_server_hello_done: rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; break; - case certificate_verify: + case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; break; - case client_key_exchange: + case ssl_hs_client_key_exchange: rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; break; - case finished: + case ssl_hs_finished: rv = "finished (20)"; break; + case ssl_hs_certificate_status: + rv = "certificate_status (22)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_key_update: + rv = "key_update (24)"; + break; default: sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType); rv = line; @@ -622,6 +513,9 @@ ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType) case content_application_data: rv = "application_data (23)"; break; + case content_ack: + rv = "ack (25)"; + break; default: sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType); rv = line; @@ -874,20 +768,12 @@ ssl_HasCert(const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType) return PR_FALSE; } -const ssl3BulkCipherDef * -ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def) -{ - PORT_Assert(cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(bulk_cipher_defs)); - PORT_Assert(bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg].cipher == cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg); - return &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg]; -} - /* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens, * regardless of policy or user preference. * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3. */ -int +unsigned int ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) { ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; @@ -896,9 +782,9 @@ ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech; SSLAuthType authType; SSLKEAType keaType; - int i; - int numPresent = 0; - int numEnabled = 0; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int numPresent = 0; + unsigned int numEnabled = 0; PORT_Assert(ss); if (!ss) { @@ -909,6 +795,7 @@ ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) return 0; } + ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(ss); for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; if (suite->enabled) { @@ -944,7 +831,7 @@ ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; } - if (cipher_alg != calg_null && + if (cipher_alg != ssl_calg_null && !PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)) { suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; } @@ -955,7 +842,7 @@ ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) } } PORT_Assert(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0); - if (numPresent <= 0) { + if (numPresent == 0) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); } return numPresent; @@ -1000,10 +887,10 @@ config_match(const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy, /* Return the number of cipher suites that are usable. */ /* called from ssl3_SendClientHello */ -static int +static unsigned int count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy) { - int i, count = 0; + unsigned int i, count = 0; if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { return 0; @@ -1012,7 +899,7 @@ count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy) if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) count++; } - if (count <= 0) { + if (count == 0) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); } return count; @@ -1021,7 +908,7 @@ count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy) /* * Null compression, mac and encryption functions */ -static SECStatus +SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, int inputLen) { @@ -1041,6 +928,19 @@ Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen, * SSL3 Utility functions */ +static void +ssl_SetSpecVersions(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + spec->version = ss->version; + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, spec); + } else if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + spec->recordVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version); + } else { + spec->recordVersion = ss->version; + } +} + /* allowLargerPeerVersion controls whether the function will select the * highest enabled SSL version or fail when peerVersion is greater than the * highest enabled version. @@ -1052,6 +952,8 @@ SECStatus ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion, PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion negotiated; + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); return SECFailure; @@ -1063,9 +965,14 @@ ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion, return SECFailure; } - ss->version = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max); - PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, ss->version)); + negotiated = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max); + PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, negotiated)); + if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version != negotiated) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->version = negotiated; return SECSuccess; } @@ -1104,24 +1011,16 @@ ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, unsigned int *len, v = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(v); } - PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)); - if (ss->vrange.min > v || ss->vrange.max < v) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, - (v > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version - : handshake_failure); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); - return SECFailure; - } *version = v; return SECSuccess; } static SECStatus -ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random *random) +ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random random) { SECStatus rv; - rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random->rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); if (rv != SECSuccess) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); } @@ -1135,7 +1034,7 @@ ssl3_SignHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE; - PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); PRBool useRsaPss = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); SECItem hashItem; @@ -1421,124 +1320,110 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sslSocket *ss, SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes, SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, PRBool padY) { - PRUint8 *hashBuf; - PRUint8 *pBuf; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - unsigned int bufLen, yLen; - PRUint8 buf[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096 / 8 + 2 + 4096 / 8]; + sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int yLen; + unsigned int i; PORT_Assert(dh_p.data); PORT_Assert(dh_g.data); PORT_Assert(dh_Ys.data); - yLen = padY ? dh_p.len : dh_Ys.len; - bufLen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + - 2 + dh_p.len + - 2 + dh_g.len + - 2 + yLen; - if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { - hashBuf = buf; - } else { - hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); - if (!hashBuf) { - return SECFailure; - } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } - - memcpy(hashBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - memcpy(pBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(dh_p.len, 2, pBuf); - memcpy(pBuf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len); - pBuf += dh_p.len; - pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(dh_g.len, 2, pBuf); - memcpy(pBuf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len); - pBuf += dh_g.len; - pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(yLen, 2, pBuf); - if (padY && dh_p.len > dh_Ys.len) { - memset(pBuf, 0, dh_p.len - dh_Ys.len); - pBuf += dh_p.len - dh_Ys.len; + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* p */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&buf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* g */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&buf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* y - complicated by padding */ + yLen = padY ? dh_p.len : dh_Ys.len; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, yLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } /* If we're padding Y, dh_Ys can't be longer than dh_p. */ PORT_Assert(!padY || dh_p.len >= dh_Ys.len); - memcpy(pBuf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len); - pBuf += dh_Ys.len; - PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); - - rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes); - - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", - hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", - hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); - } else { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result", - hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + for (i = dh_Ys.len; i < yLen; ++i) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } } - - if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL) - PORT_Free(hashBuf); - return rv; -} - -/* Called twice, only from ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec (immediately below). */ -static void -ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *mat) -{ - if (mat->write_key != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key); - mat->write_key = NULL; + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } - if (mat->write_mac_key != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key); - mat->write_mac_key = NULL; + + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf), hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } - if (mat->write_mac_context != NULL) { - PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); - mat->write_mac_context = NULL; + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf))); + if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", + hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", + hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + } else { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result", + hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&buf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&buf); + return SECFailure; } -/* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and -** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs() -** ssl3_DestroySSL3Info -** Caller must hold SpecWriteLock. -*/ -void -ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PRBool freeSrvName) +static SECStatus +ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, CipherSpecDirection direction, + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef, + ssl3CipherSpec **specp) { - /* PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */ - if (spec->encodeContext) { - PK11_DestroyContext(spec->encodeContext, PR_TRUE); - spec->encodeContext = NULL; - } - if (spec->decodeContext) { - PK11_DestroyContext(spec->decodeContext, PR_TRUE); - spec->decodeContext = NULL; - } - if (spec->destroyCompressContext && spec->compressContext) { - spec->destroyCompressContext(spec->compressContext, 1); - spec->compressContext = NULL; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec; + const ssl3CipherSpec *prev; + + prev = (direction == CipherSpecWrite) ? ss->ssl3.cwSpec : ss->ssl3.crSpec; + if (prev->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; } - if (spec->destroyDecompressContext && spec->decompressContext) { - spec->destroyDecompressContext(spec->decompressContext, 1); - spec->decompressContext = NULL; + + spec = ssl_CreateCipherSpec(ss, direction); + if (!spec) { + return SECFailure; } - if (spec->master_secret != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret); - spec->master_secret = NULL; + + spec->cipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suiteDef); + spec->macDef = ssl_GetMacDef(ss, suiteDef); + + spec->epoch = prev->epoch + 1; + spec->seqNum = 0; + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && direction == CipherSpecRead) { + dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); } - spec->msItem.data = NULL; - spec->msItem.len = 0; - ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->client); - ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->server); - spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; - spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; + ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, spec); + + ssl_SaveCipherSpec(ss, spec); + *specp = spec; + return SECSuccess; } /* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite. @@ -1548,272 +1433,116 @@ ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PRBool freeSrvName) ** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock. */ SECStatus -ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) +ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) { - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; - ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; - SSL3MACAlgorithm mac; SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; - const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def; - PRBool isTLS; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef; + SECStatus rv; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - PORT_Assert(pwSpec == ss->ssl3.prSpec); - /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */ - cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; - if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ - cwSpec->version = ss->version; + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version = ss->version; } - pwSpec->version = ss->version; - isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); - suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); - if (suite_def == NULL) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */ + suiteDef = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); + if (suiteDef == NULL) { + goto loser; } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { /* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */ - PORT_Assert(suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4); + PORT_Assert(suiteDef->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4); } - kea = suite_def->key_exchange_alg; - mac = suite_def->mac_alg; - if (mac <= ssl_mac_sha && mac != ssl_mac_null && isTLS) - mac += 2; + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suiteDef; - ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suite_def; + kea = suiteDef->key_exchange_alg; ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea]; PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea); - pwSpec->cipher_def = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite_def); - - pwSpec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac]; - PORT_Assert(pwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac); - - pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; - pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; - - pwSpec->mac_size = pwSpec->mac_def->mac_size; - - pwSpec->compression_method = ss->ssl3.hs.compression; - pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; - pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; - - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ - return SECSuccess; -} - -#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB -#define SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE sizeof(z_stream) - -static SECStatus -ssl3_MapZlibError(int zlib_error) -{ - switch (zlib_error) { - case Z_OK: - return SECSuccess; - default: - return SECFailure; - } -} - -static SECStatus -ssl3_DeflateInit(void *void_context) -{ - z_stream *context = void_context; - context->zalloc = NULL; - context->zfree = NULL; - context->opaque = NULL; - - return ssl3_MapZlibError(deflateInit(context, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION)); -} - -static SECStatus -ssl3_InflateInit(void *void_context) -{ - z_stream *context = void_context; - context->zalloc = NULL; - context->zfree = NULL; - context->opaque = NULL; - context->next_in = NULL; - context->avail_in = 0; - - return ssl3_MapZlibError(inflateInit(context)); -} - -static SECStatus -ssl3_DeflateCompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len, - int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) -{ - z_stream *context = void_context; - - if (!inlen) { - *out_len = 0; - return SECSuccess; - } - - context->next_in = (unsigned char *)in; - context->avail_in = inlen; - context->next_out = out; - context->avail_out = maxout; - if (deflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) { - return SECFailure; - } - if (context->avail_out == 0) { - /* We ran out of space! */ - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Ran out of buffer while compressing", - SSL_GETPID())); - return SECFailure; - } - - *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out; - return SECSuccess; -} - -static SECStatus -ssl3_DeflateDecompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len, - int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) -{ - z_stream *context = void_context; - - if (!inlen) { - *out_len = 0; - return SECSuccess; + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, CipherSpecRead, suiteDef, + &ss->ssl3.prSpec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } - - context->next_in = (unsigned char *)in; - context->avail_in = inlen; - context->next_out = out; - context->avail_out = maxout; - if (inflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, CipherSpecWrite, suiteDef, + &ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } - *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out; - return SECSuccess; -} - -static SECStatus -ssl3_DestroyCompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused) -{ - deflateEnd(void_context); - PORT_Free(void_context); - return SECSuccess; -} - -static SECStatus -ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused) -{ - inflateEnd(void_context); - PORT_Free(void_context); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ return SECSuccess; -} -#endif /* NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB */ - -/* Initialize the compression functions and contexts for the given - * CipherSpec. */ -static SECStatus -ssl3_InitCompressionContext(ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec) -{ - /* Setup the compression functions */ - switch (pwSpec->compression_method) { - case ssl_compression_null: - pwSpec->compressor = NULL; - pwSpec->decompressor = NULL; - pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; - pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; - pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; - pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; - break; -#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB - case ssl_compression_deflate: - pwSpec->compressor = ssl3_DeflateCompress; - pwSpec->decompressor = ssl3_DeflateDecompress; - pwSpec->compressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); - pwSpec->decompressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); - pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = ssl3_DestroyCompressContext; - pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext; - ssl3_DeflateInit(pwSpec->compressContext); - ssl3_InflateInit(pwSpec->decompressContext); - break; -#endif /* NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB */ - default: - PORT_Assert(0); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - - return SECSuccess; +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + return SECFailure; } -/* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data - * which is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |out| and returns - * its length. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the - * definition of the AEAD additional data. +/* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data which + * is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |buf|. See + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the definition of the + * AEAD additional data. * * TLS pseudo-header includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. Which - * pseudo-header defintiion to use should be decided based on the version of + * pseudo-header definition to use should be decided based on the version of * the protocol that was negotiated when the cipher spec became current, NOT * based on the version value in the record itself, and the decision is passed * to this function as the |includesVersion| argument. But, the |version| * argument should be the record's version value. */ -static unsigned int -ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(unsigned char *out, - sslSequenceNumber seq_num, +static SECStatus +ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(DTLSEpoch epoch, + sslSequenceNumber seqNum, SSL3ContentType type, PRBool includesVersion, SSL3ProtocolVersion version, PRBool isDTLS, - int length) -{ - out[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 56); - out[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 48); - out[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 40); - out[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 32); - out[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 24); - out[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 16); - out[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 8); - out[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 0); - out[8] = type; + int length, + sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + if (isDTLS) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, epoch, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, seqNum, 6); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, seqNum, 8); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, type, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } /* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */ - if (!includesVersion) { - out[9] = MSB(length); - out[10] = LSB(length); - return 11; + if (includesVersion) { + /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } } - - /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */ - if (isDTLS) { - SSL3ProtocolVersion dtls_version; - - dtls_version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); - out[9] = MSB(dtls_version); - out[10] = LSB(dtls_version); - } else { - out[9] = MSB(version); - out[10] = LSB(version); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, length, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; } - out[11] = MSB(length); - out[12] = LSB(length); - return 13; + + return SECSuccess; } static SECStatus @@ -1833,13 +1562,12 @@ ssl3_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, unsigned int uOutLen; CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams; - const int tagSize = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_aes_128_gcm].tag_size; - const int explicitNonceLen = - bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_aes_128_gcm].explicit_nonce_size; + const int tagSize = 16; + const int explicitNonceLen = 8; /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the * nonce is formed. */ - memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 4); + memcpy(nonce, keys->iv, 4); if (doDecrypt) { memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen); in += explicitNonceLen; @@ -1868,10 +1596,10 @@ ssl3_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8; if (doDecrypt) { - rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, + rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); } else { - rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, + rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); } *outlen += (int)uOutLen; @@ -1893,12 +1621,12 @@ ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, unsigned char nonce[12]; CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS aeadParams; - const int tagSize = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_chacha20].tag_size; + const int tagSize = 16; /* See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04#section-2 * for details of how the nonce is formed. */ - PORT_Memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 12); + PORT_Memcpy(nonce, keys->iv, 12); /* XOR the last 8 bytes of the IV with the sequence number. */ PORT_Assert(additionalDataLen >= 8); @@ -1917,10 +1645,10 @@ ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, aeadParams.ulTagLen = tagSize; if (doDecrypt) { - rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m, + rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); } else { - rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m, + rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); } *outlen = (int)uOutLen; @@ -1933,44 +1661,31 @@ ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, * Caller holds Spec write lock. */ static SECStatus -ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss) +ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) { - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; - const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; - PK11Context *serverContext = NULL; - PK11Context *clientContext = NULL; - SECItem *param; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mac_mech; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE encMechanism; + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE encMode; + SECItem macParam; CK_ULONG macLength; SECItem iv; - SECItem mac_param; SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; - macLength = pwSpec->mac_size; - calg = cipher_def->calg; + macLength = spec->macDef->mac_size; + calg = spec->cipherDef->calg; PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); - pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; - pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; - - if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { - pwSpec->encode = NULL; - pwSpec->decode = NULL; - pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; - pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; + if (spec->cipherDef->type == type_aead) { + spec->cipher = NULL; + spec->cipherContext = NULL; switch (calg) { - case calg_aes_gcm: - pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCM; + case ssl_calg_aes_gcm: + spec->aead = ssl3_AESGCM; break; - case calg_chacha20: - pwSpec->aead = ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305; + case ssl_calg_chacha20: + spec->aead = ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305; break; default: PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); @@ -1983,128 +1698,43 @@ ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss) ** Now setup the MAC contexts, ** crypto contexts are setup below. */ + macParam.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength; + macParam.len = sizeof(macLength); + macParam.type = siBuffer; - mac_mech = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech; - mac_param.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength; - mac_param.len = sizeof(macLength); - mac_param.type = 0; - - pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( - mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param); - if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); - goto fail; - } - pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( - mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param); - if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) { + spec->keyMaterial.macContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + spec->macDef->mmech, CKA_SIGN, spec->keyMaterial.macKey, &macParam); + if (!spec->keyMaterial.macContext) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); - goto fail; + return SECFailure; } /* ** Now setup the crypto contexts. */ - - if (calg == calg_null) { - pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher; - pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher; + if (calg == ssl_calg_null) { + spec->cipher = Null_Cipher; return SECSuccess; } - mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); - /* - * build the server context - */ - iv.data = pwSpec->server.write_iv; - iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; - param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv); - if (param == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); - goto fail; - } - serverContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, - (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT - : CKA_DECRYPT), - pwSpec->server.write_key, param); - iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); - if (iv.data) - PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); - SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE); - if (serverContext == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); - goto fail; - } + spec->cipher = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; + encMechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + encMode = (spec->direction == CipherSpecWrite) ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT; /* - * build the client context + * build the context */ - iv.data = pwSpec->client.write_iv; - iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; - - param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv); - if (param == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); - goto fail; - } - clientContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, - (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT - : CKA_ENCRYPT), - pwSpec->client.write_key, param); - iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); - if (iv.data) - PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); - SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE); - if (clientContext == NULL) { + iv.data = spec->keyMaterial.iv; + iv.len = spec->cipherDef->iv_size; + spec->cipherContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(encMechanism, encMode, + spec->keyMaterial.key, + &iv); + if (!spec->cipherContext) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); - goto fail; + return SECFailure; } - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; - - pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext; - pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext; - - serverContext = NULL; - clientContext = NULL; - - ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec); return SECSuccess; - -fail: - if (serverContext != NULL) - PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE); - if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context != NULL) { - PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); - pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; - } - if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context != NULL) { - PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); - pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; - } - - return SECFailure; -} - -HASH_HashType -ssl3_GetTls12HashType(sslSocket *ss) -{ - if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - return HASH_AlgNULL; - } - - switch (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash) { - case ssl_hash_sha384: - return HASH_AlgSHA384; - case ssl_hash_sha256: - case ssl_hash_none: - /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ - return HASH_AlgSHA256; - default: - PORT_Assert(0); - } - return HASH_AlgSHA256; } /* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts @@ -2114,73 +1744,78 @@ ssl3_GetTls12HashType(sslSocket *ss) * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate. - * NULL pms means re-use old master_secret. * - * If the old master secret is reused, pms is NULL and the master secret is - * already in pwSpec->master_secret. + * If |secret| is a master secret from a previous connection is reused, |derive| + * is PR_FALSE. If the secret is a pre-master secret, then |derive| is PR_TRUE + * and the master secret is derived from |secret|. */ SECStatus -ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) +ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *secret, PRBool derive) { + PK11SymKey *masterSecret; ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; - ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec; SECStatus rv; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(secret); ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); - + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch); + prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; - if (pms || (!pwSpec->msItem.len && !pwSpec->master_secret)) { - rv = ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(ss, pms); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; /* err code set by ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret */ - } + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { + /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many + * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The + * spec says you should be discarding the connection + * and start over, so not much we can do here. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; } - if (pwSpec->master_secret) { - rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(ss); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss); + + if (derive) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, secret, &masterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } } else { - PORT_Assert(pwSpec->master_secret); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; + masterSecret = secret; } + + PORT_Assert(masterSecret); + rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(ss, masterSecret); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; + if (derive) { + /* masterSecret was created here. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(masterSecret); + } + goto loser; } - /* Generic behaviors -- common to all crypto methods */ - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - pwSpec->read_seq_num = pwSpec->write_seq_num = 0; - } else { - if (cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { - /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many - * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The - * spec says you should be discarding the connection - * and start over, so not much we can do here. */ - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto done; - } - /* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */ - pwSpec->epoch = cwSpec->epoch + 1; - pwSpec->read_seq_num = pwSpec->write_seq_num = - (sslSequenceNumber)pwSpec->epoch << 48; + /* Both cipher specs maintain a reference to the master secret, since each + * is managed and freed independently. */ + prSpec->masterSecret = masterSecret; + pwSpec->masterSecret = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(masterSecret); + rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } - dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&pwSpec->recvdRecords); + rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } -done: ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ - if (rv != SECSuccess) - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); - return rv; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; } /* @@ -2213,36 +1848,33 @@ static const unsigned char mac_pad_2[60] = { static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( ssl3CipherSpec *spec, - PRBool useServerMacKey, const unsigned char *header, unsigned int headerLen, const PRUint8 *input, - int inputLength, + int inputLen, unsigned char *outbuf, - unsigned int *outLength) + unsigned int *outLen) { - const ssl3MACDef *mac_def; + PK11Context *context; + int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; SECStatus rv; PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLength)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLen)); - mac_def = spec->mac_def; - if (mac_def->mac == mac_null) { - *outLength = 0; + if (spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { + *outLen = 0; return SECSuccess; } - PK11Context *mac_context = - (useServerMacKey ? spec->server.write_mac_context - : spec->client.write_mac_context); - rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, header, headerLen); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength); - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); - PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLength == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); + context = spec->keyMaterial.macContext; + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(context, header, headerLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(context, input, inputLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(context, outbuf, outLen, macSize); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLen == (unsigned)macSize); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLength)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLen)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { rv = SECFailure; @@ -2260,7 +1892,6 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( ssl3CipherSpec *spec, - PRBool useServerMacKey, const unsigned char *header, unsigned int headerLen, const PRUint8 *input, @@ -2272,13 +1903,13 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType; CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params; SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem; + int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; SECStatus rv; - PK11SymKey *key; - PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->mac_size); + PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->macDef->mac_size); PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen); - if (spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + if (spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { *outLen = 0; return SECSuccess; } @@ -2288,7 +1919,7 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME; } - params.macAlg = spec->mac_def->mmech; + params.macAlg = spec->macDef->mmech; params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen; params.pHeader = (unsigned char *)header; /* const cast */ params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen; @@ -2305,19 +1936,14 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( outputItem.len = *outLen; outputItem.type = 0; - key = spec->server.write_mac_key; - if (!useServerMacKey) { - key = spec->client.write_mac_key; - } - - rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(key, macType, ¶m, &outputItem, &inputItem); + rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(spec->keyMaterial.macKey, macType, ¶m, + &outputItem, &inputItem); if (rv != SECSuccess) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) { /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC() expects the MAC to have been removed * from the input length already. */ - return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, useServerMacKey, - header, headerLen, - input, inputLen - spec->mac_size, + return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, header, headerLen, + input, inputLen - macSize, outbuf, outLen); } @@ -2327,7 +1953,7 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( return rv; } - PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); + PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)macSize); *outLen = outputItem.len; return rv; @@ -2363,34 +1989,30 @@ ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) /* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */ SECStatus -ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, - PRBool isServer, - PRBool isDTLS, - PRBool capRecordVersion, - SSL3ContentType type, - const PRUint8 *pIn, - PRUint32 contentLen, - sslBuffer *wrBuf) -{ - const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; +ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + PRBool isServer, + PRBool isDTLS, + SSL3ContentType type, + const PRUint8 *pIn, + PRUint32 contentLen, + sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ SECStatus rv; PRUint32 macLen = 0; PRUint32 fragLen; PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0; unsigned int ivLen = 0; - unsigned char pseudoHeader[13]; - unsigned int pseudoHeaderLen; - - cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; + unsigned char pseudoHeaderBuf[13]; + sslBuffer pseudoHeader = SSL_BUFFER(pseudoHeaderBuf); - if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block && cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { /* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous * record. */ - ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; + ivLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->iv_size; if (ivLen > wrBuf->space) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; @@ -2400,7 +2022,7 @@ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); return rv; } - rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, wrBuf->buf, /* output */ (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* outlen */ ivLen, /* max outlen */ @@ -2412,24 +2034,14 @@ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, } } - if (cwSpec->compressor) { - int outlen; - rv = cwSpec->compressor(cwSpec->compressContext, wrBuf->buf + ivLen, - &outlen, wrBuf->space - ivLen, pIn, contentLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; - pIn = wrBuf->buf + ivLen; - contentLen = outlen; - } - - pseudoHeaderLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( - pseudoHeader, cwSpec->write_seq_num, type, - cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->version, - isDTLS, contentLen); - PORT_Assert(pseudoHeaderLen <= sizeof(pseudoHeader)); - if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { - const int nonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; - const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; + rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->seqNum, type, + cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->recordVersion, + isDTLS, contentLen, &pseudoHeader); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_aead) { + const int nonceLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->explicit_nonce_size; + const int tagLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->tag_size; if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > wrBuf->space) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); @@ -2437,23 +2049,26 @@ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, } rv = cwSpec->aead( - isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client, + &cwSpec->keyMaterial, PR_FALSE, /* do encrypt */ wrBuf->buf, /* output */ (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* out len */ wrBuf->space, /* max out */ pIn, contentLen, /* input */ - pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen); + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } } else { + int blockSize = cwSpec->cipherDef->block_size; + /* * Add the MAC */ - rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, isServer, pseudoHeader, - pseudoHeaderLen, pIn, contentLen, + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader), + pIn, contentLen, wrBuf->buf + ivLen + contentLen, &macLen); if (rv != SECSuccess) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); @@ -2468,16 +2083,16 @@ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher) * then Encrypt it */ - if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block) { unsigned char *pBuf; int padding_length; int i; - oddLen = contentLen % cipher_def->block_size; + oddLen = contentLen % blockSize; /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */ - padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 - ((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1)); + padding_length = blockSize - 1 - ((fragLen) & (blockSize - 1)); fragLen += padding_length + 1; - PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + PORT_Assert((fragLen % blockSize) == 0); /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */ pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[ivLen + fragLen - 1]; @@ -2495,13 +2110,13 @@ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, } if (oddLen) { p2Len += oddLen; - PORT_Assert((cipher_def->block_size < 2) || - (p2Len % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + PORT_Assert((blockSize < 2) || + (p2Len % blockSize) == 0); memmove(wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen); } if (p1Len > 0) { int cipherBytesPart1 = -1; - rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, wrBuf->buf + ivLen, /* output */ &cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */ p1Len, /* max outlen */ @@ -2516,7 +2131,7 @@ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, } if (p2Len > 0) { int cipherBytesPart2 = -1; - rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */ p2Len, /* max outlen */ @@ -2534,34 +2149,66 @@ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, return SECSuccess; } +/* Note: though this can report failure, it shouldn't. */ +static SECStatus +ssl_InsertRecordHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + SSL3ContentType contentType, unsigned int len, + sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + cwSpec->cipherDef->calg != ssl_calg_null) { + contentType = content_application_data; + } +#endif + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, contentType, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->recordVersion, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->epoch, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->seqNum, 6); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + SECStatus -ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, - PRBool capRecordVersion, SSL3ContentType type, +ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, SSL3ContentType type, const PRUint8 *pIn, PRUint32 contentLen, sslBuffer *wrBuf) { - const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; - PRUint16 headerLen; - sslBuffer protBuf; - SSL3ProtocolVersion version = cwSpec->version; + unsigned int headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; + sslBuffer protBuf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf) + headerLen, + SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf) - headerLen); PRBool isTLS13; - PRUint8 *ptr = wrBuf->buf; SECStatus rv; - if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) { - PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); - headerLen = TLS13_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH_SHORT; - } else { - headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; - } - protBuf.buf = wrBuf->buf + headerLen; - protBuf.len = 0; - protBuf.space = wrBuf->space - headerLen; - - PORT_Assert(cipher_def->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX); - if ((cwSpec->write_seq_num & RECORD_SEQ_MAX) >= cipher_def->max_records) { + PORT_Assert(cwSpec->direction == CipherSpecWrite); + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0); + PORT_Assert(cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX); + if (cwSpec->seqNum >= cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records) { + /* We should have automatically updated before here in TLS 1.3. */ + PORT_Assert(cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[-]: write sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", - SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->write_seq_num)); + SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->seqNum)); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); return SECFailure; } @@ -2569,15 +2216,22 @@ ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, isTLS13 = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE - rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, protBuf.buf, (int *)&protBuf.len, protBuf.space, - pIn, contentLen); + { + int len; + rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&protBuf), &len, + SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(&protBuf), pIn, contentLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error was set */ + } + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&protBuf, len, NULL); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */ + } #else if (isTLS13) { rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, type, pIn, contentLen, &protBuf); } else { - rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, - IS_DTLS(ss), capRecordVersion, type, - pIn, contentLen, &protBuf); + rv = ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss), type, + pIn, contentLen, &protBuf); } #endif if (rv != SECSuccess) { @@ -2585,40 +2239,58 @@ ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, } PORT_Assert(protBuf.len <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + (isTLS13 ? 256 : 1024)); - wrBuf->len = protBuf.len + headerLen; - if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) { - PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); /* Decoder not yet implemented. */ - (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(0x8000 | protBuf.len, 2, ptr); - } else { -#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE - if (isTLS13 && cipher_def->calg != ssl_calg_null) { - *ptr++ = content_application_data; - } else -#endif - { - *ptr++ = type; - } + rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, type, SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&protBuf), + wrBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - version = isTLS13 ? SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 : version; - version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == headerLen); + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&protBuf), NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); /* Can't fail. */ + return SECFailure; + } + ++cwSpec->seqNum; - ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(version, 2, ptr); - ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(cwSpec->write_seq_num, 8, ptr); - } else { - if (capRecordVersion || isTLS13) { - version = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, version); - } - ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(version, 2, ptr); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ProtectNextRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSL3ContentType type, + const PRUint8 *pIn, unsigned int nIn, + unsigned int *written) +{ + sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + unsigned int contentLen; + unsigned int spaceNeeded; + SECStatus rv; + + contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + spaceNeeded = contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE; + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && + spec->cipherDef->type == type_block) { + spaceNeeded += spec->cipherDef->iv_size; + } + if (spaceNeeded > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: failed to expand write buffer to %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded)); + return SECFailure; } - (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(protBuf.len, 2, ptr); } - ++cwSpec->write_seq_num; + rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, spec, type, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf))); + *written = contentLen; return SECSuccess; } - /* Process the plain text before sending it. * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the @@ -2639,16 +2311,6 @@ ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, * all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer. * ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH (for DTLS) * Forces the use of the provided epoch - * ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION - * Caps the record layer version number of TLS ClientHello to { 3, 1 } - * (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore - * ClientHello.client_version and use the record layer version number - * (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when negotiating protocol versions. In - * addition, if the record layer version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 } - * (TLS 1.1) or higher, these servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly, - * some F5 BIG-IP servers hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a - * version greater than { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this - * flag to work around such servers. */ PRInt32 ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, @@ -2659,10 +2321,9 @@ ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) { sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec; SECStatus rv; PRInt32 totalSent = 0; - PRBool capRecordVersion; - ssl3CipherSpec *spec; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type), @@ -2670,6 +2331,7 @@ ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0); if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Suppress write, fatal alert already sent", @@ -2677,114 +2339,41 @@ ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, return SECFailure; } - capRecordVersion = ((flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION) != 0); - - if (capRecordVersion) { - /* ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION can only be used with the - * TLS initial ClientHello. */ - PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); - PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); - PORT_Assert(type == content_handshake); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello); - } - - if (ss->ssl3.initialized == PR_FALSE) { - /* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record - ** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're - ** trying to send an alert. - */ - PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert); - ssl3_InitState(ss); - } - /* check for Token Presence */ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); return SECFailure; } - while (nIn > 0) { - PRUint32 contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); - unsigned int spaceNeeded; - unsigned int numRecords; - - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ + if (cwSpec) { + /* cwSpec can only be set for retransmissions of the DTLS handshake. */ + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && + (type == content_handshake || + type == content_change_cipher_spec)); + spec = cwSpec; + } else { + spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + } - if (nIn > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV && - ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && - type == content_application_data && - ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block /* CBC mode */) { - /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record, - * as explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h - */ - numRecords = 2; - } else { - numRecords = 1; - } + while (nIn > 0) { + unsigned int written = 0; + PRInt32 sent; - spaceNeeded = contentLen + (numRecords * SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE); - if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && - ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block) { - spaceNeeded += ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->iv_size; - } - if (spaceNeeded > wrBuf->space) { - rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded)); - goto spec_locked_loser; /* sslBuffer_Grow set error code. */ - } + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + rv = ssl_ProtectNextRecord(ss, spec, type, pIn, nIn, &written); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; } - if (numRecords == 2) { - sslBuffer secondRecord; - rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, capRecordVersion, type, - pIn, 1, wrBuf); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto spec_locked_loser; - - PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [1/2]:", - wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); - - secondRecord.buf = wrBuf->buf + wrBuf->len; - secondRecord.len = 0; - secondRecord.space = wrBuf->space - wrBuf->len; - - rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, capRecordVersion, type, - pIn + 1, contentLen - 1, &secondRecord); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [2/2]:", - secondRecord.buf, secondRecord.len)); - wrBuf->len += secondRecord.len; - } - } else { - if (cwSpec) { - /* cwSpec can only be set for retransmissions of DTLS handshake - * messages. */ - PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && - (type == content_handshake || - type == content_change_cipher_spec)); - spec = cwSpec; - } else { - spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; - } - - rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, spec, !IS_DTLS(ss) && capRecordVersion, - type, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", - wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); - } + PORT_Assert(written > 0); + /* DTLS should not fragment non-application data here. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && type != content_application_data) { + PORT_Assert(written == nIn); } - spec_locked_loser: - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ - - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return SECFailure; - - pIn += contentLen; - nIn -= contentLen; + pIn += written; + nIn -= written; PORT_Assert(nIn >= 0); /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext, @@ -2794,58 +2383,64 @@ ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) || (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { - rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len); + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ - return SECFailure; + goto loser; } - wrBuf->len = 0; /* All cipher text is saved away. */ if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { - PRInt32 sent; ss->handshakeBegun = 1; sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; + goto loser; } if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; } } - } else if (wrBuf->len > 0) { - PRInt32 sent; + } else { + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) > 0); ss->handshakeBegun = 1; - sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len, + sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf), flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK); if (sent < 0) { - if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + if (PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; + goto loser; } /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */ sent = 0; } - wrBuf->len -= sent; - if (wrBuf->len) { + if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) > (unsigned int)sent) { if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */ - PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0); - return SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + goto loser; } /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext. */ - rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf + sent, wrBuf->len); + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf) + sent, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) - sent); if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ - return SECFailure; + goto loser; } } } - totalSent += contentLen; + wrBuf->len = 0; + totalSent += written; } return totalSent; + +loser: + /* Don't leave bits of buffer lying around. */ + wrBuf->len = 0; + return -1; } #define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024 @@ -2859,6 +2454,7 @@ ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, { PRInt32 totalSent = 0; PRInt32 discarded = 0; + PRBool splitNeeded = PR_FALSE; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); /* These flags for internal use only */ @@ -2885,6 +2481,16 @@ ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, len--; discarded = 1; } + + /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record, as + * explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h. + */ + if (len > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block /* CBC */) { + splitNeeded = PR_TRUE; + } + while (len > totalSent) { PRInt32 sent, toSend; @@ -2899,7 +2505,13 @@ ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); } - toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + + if (splitNeeded) { + toSend = 1; + splitNeeded = PR_FALSE; + } else { + toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + } /* * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require @@ -2959,9 +2571,8 @@ ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) { if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { return dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); - } else { - return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); } + return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); } /* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record. @@ -2973,8 +2584,7 @@ ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) { - static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER | - ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION; + static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; PRInt32 count = -1; SECStatus rv; @@ -3105,6 +2715,15 @@ SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc) ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); } } + + rv = tls13_SetAlertCipherSpec(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (needHsLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + } + return rv; + } + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); if (rv == SECSuccess) { @@ -3340,9 +2959,6 @@ ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) case bad_certificate_hash_value: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT; break; - case end_of_early_data: - error = SSL_ERROR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_ALERT; - break; default: error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; break; @@ -3354,7 +2970,6 @@ ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) switch (desc) { case close_notify: case user_canceled: - case end_of_early_data: break; default: level = alert_fatal; @@ -3374,9 +2989,6 @@ ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) PORT_SetError(error); return SECFailure; } - if (desc == end_of_early_data) { - return tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(ss); - } if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) { /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ SECStatus rv; @@ -3399,59 +3011,64 @@ ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) * and pending write spec pointers. */ -static SECStatus -ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) +SECStatus +ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(sslSocket *ss) { PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice; - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; SECStatus rv; - PRInt32 sent; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ } + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1, - ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + PRInt32 sent; + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_change_cipher_spec, + &change, 1, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); if (sent < 0) { - return (SECStatus)sent; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ } } else { + SECStatus rv; rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; + return SECFailure; } } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* Error code set. */ + } /* swap the pending and current write specs. */ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; - ss->ssl3.cwSpec = pwSpec; + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ss->ssl3.cwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + ss->ssl3.pwSpec = NULL; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - /* We need to free up the contexts, keys and certs ! */ - /* If we are really through with the old cipher spec - * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. - */ - if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) { - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/); - } else { - /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final - * message got lost */ - rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss); - } + /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final + * message got lost */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch) { + rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss); } ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ @@ -3467,7 +3084,6 @@ ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) static SECStatus ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) { - ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec; SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change; @@ -3477,19 +3093,18 @@ ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - if (ws != wait_change_cipher) { - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */ - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order " - "DTLS change_cipher_spec", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - buf->len = 0; - return SECSuccess; - } - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); - return SECFailure; + /* For DTLS: Ignore this if we aren't expecting it. Don't kill a connection + * as a result of receiving trash. + * For TLS: Maybe ignore, but only after checking format. */ + if (ws != wait_change_cipher && IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order " + "DTLS change_cipher_spec", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + buf->len = 0; + return SECSuccess; } + /* Handshake messages should not span ChangeCipherSpec. */ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); @@ -3508,26 +3123,44 @@ ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); return SECFailure; } - buf->len = 0; - /* Swap the pending and current read specs. */ - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ - prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; - - ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; - ss->ssl3.crSpec = prSpec; - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished; + buf->len = 0; + if (ws != wait_change_cipher) { + /* Ignore a CCS for TLS 1.3. This only happens if the server sends a + * HelloRetryRequest. In other cases, the CCS will fail decryption and + * will be discarded by ssl3_HandleRecord(). */ + if (ws == wait_server_hello && + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + return SECSuccess; + } + /* Note: For a server, we can't test ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry or + * ss->version because the server might be stateless (and so it won't + * have set either value yet). Set a flag so that at least we will + * guarantee that the server will treat any ClientHello properly. */ + if (ws == wait_client_hello && + ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + !ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - - /* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec - * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. - */ - if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) { - ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/); - } + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec); + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.crSpec); + ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + ss->ssl3.prSpec = NULL; ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished; return SECSuccess; } @@ -3650,12 +3283,8 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, PK11SymKey **msp) { - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - unsigned char *cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; - unsigned char *sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; - PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - PRBool isTLS12 = - (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); /* * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size @@ -3701,9 +3330,9 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, } master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; - master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; if (isTLS12) { master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); @@ -3763,7 +3392,7 @@ tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, pms_version_ptr = &pms_version; } - if (pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { /* TLS 1.2+ */ extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; @@ -3795,7 +3424,6 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, { PORT_Assert(pms != NULL); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { return tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp); @@ -3804,36 +3432,6 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, } } -/* This method uses PKCS11 to derive the MS from the PMS, where PMS -** is a PKCS11 symkey. We call ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret to do the -** computations and then modify the pwSpec->state as a side effect. -** -** This is used in all cases except the "triple bypass" with RSA key -** exchange. -** -** Called from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec. prSpec is pwSpec. -*/ -static SECStatus -ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) -{ - SECStatus rv; - PK11SymKey *ms = NULL; - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - - PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); - - if (pms) { - rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, pms, &ms); - pwSpec->master_secret = ms; - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; - } - - return SECSuccess; -} - /* * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure. @@ -3850,17 +3448,18 @@ ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) * */ static SECStatus -ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss) +ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *masterSecret) { ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - unsigned char *cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; - unsigned char *sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; - PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *clientSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *serverSpec; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); PRBool isTLS12 = - (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); - const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + (PRBool)(isTLS && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipherDef; PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; - PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey *derivedKeyHandle = NULL; void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; int keySize; CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; /* may be used as a @@ -3871,48 +3470,53 @@ ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss) CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism; SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; SECItem params; - PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == calg_null); + PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + PORT_Assert(masterSecret); - if (!pwSpec->master_secret) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; + /* These functions operate in terms of who is writing specs. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + clientSpec = prSpec; + serverSpec = pwSpec; + } else { + clientSpec = pwSpec; + serverSpec = prSpec; } + /* * generate the key material */ - key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size * BPB; - key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; - key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; if (cipher_def->type == type_block && - pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { /* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */ key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; - memset(pwSpec->client.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); - memset(pwSpec->server.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); + PORT_Memset(clientSpec->keyMaterial.iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); + PORT_Memset(serverSpec->keyMaterial.iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); } key_material_params.bIsExport = PR_FALSE; - key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys; - returnedKeys.pIVClient = pwSpec->client.write_iv; - returnedKeys.pIVServer = pwSpec->server.write_iv; - keySize = cipher_def->key_size; - if (skipKeysAndIVs) { keySize = 0; - key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0; - key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL; returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + } else { + keySize = cipher_def->key_size; + returnedKeys.pIVClient = clientSpec->keyMaterial.iv; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = serverSpec->keyMaterial.iv; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; } + key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->macDef->mac_size * BPB; calg = cipher_def->calg; bulk_mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); @@ -3934,9 +3538,9 @@ ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss) /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and * DERIVE by DEFAULT */ - symKey = PK11_Derive(pwSpec->master_secret, key_derive, ¶ms, - bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize); - if (!symKey) { + derivedKeyHandle = PK11_Derive(masterSecret, key_derive, ¶ms, + bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize); + if (!derivedKeyHandle) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } @@ -3944,41 +3548,44 @@ ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss) * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both * mac's map to the same keytype. */ - slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey); + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(derivedKeyHandle); PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */ - pwSpec->client.write_mac_key = - PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, - CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); - if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL) { + clientSpec->keyMaterial.macKey = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, + PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (clientSpec->keyMaterial.macKey == NULL) { goto loser; /* loser sets err */ } - pwSpec->server.write_mac_key = - PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, - CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); - if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL) { + serverSpec->keyMaterial.macKey = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, + PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (serverSpec->keyMaterial.macKey == NULL) { goto loser; /* loser sets err */ } if (!skipKeysAndIVs) { - pwSpec->client.write_key = - PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, - bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); - if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL) { + clientSpec->keyMaterial.key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, + PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (clientSpec->keyMaterial.key == NULL) { goto loser; /* loser sets err */ } - pwSpec->server.write_key = - PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, - bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); - if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL) { + serverSpec->keyMaterial.key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, + PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (serverSpec->keyMaterial.key == NULL) { goto loser; /* loser sets err */ } } - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedKeyHandle); return SECSuccess; loser: - if (symKey) - PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedKeyHandle); ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } @@ -4022,11 +3629,11 @@ ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) return SECFailure; } ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single; - if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } + } else { /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or * created successfully. */ @@ -4117,7 +3724,7 @@ ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages, b, l); } - PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "handshake hash input:", b, l)); + PRINT_BUF(90, (ss, "handshake hash input:", b, l)); if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); @@ -4141,104 +3748,8 @@ ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l return rv; } -/************************************************************************** - * Append Handshake functions. - * All these functions set appropriate error codes. - * Most rely on ssl3_AppendHandshake to set the error code. - **************************************************************************/ -SECStatus -ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, PRInt32 bytes) -{ - unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)void_src; - int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; - SECStatus rv; - - PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); /* protects sendBuf. */ - - if (!bytes) - return SECSuccess; - if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) { - rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, - PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes))); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ - room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; - } - - PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char *)void_src, bytes)); - rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */ - - while (bytes > room) { - if (room > 0) - PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, - room); - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room; - rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ - } - bytes -= room; - src += room; - room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space; - PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0); - } - PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes); - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes; - return SECSuccess; -} - -SECStatus -ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize) -{ - SECStatus rv; - PRUint8 b[4]; - PRUint8 *p = b; - - PORT_Assert(lenSize <= 4 && lenSize > 0); - if (lenSize < 4 && num >= (1L << (lenSize * 8))) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); - return SECFailure; - } - - switch (lenSize) { - case 4: - *p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff; - case 3: - *p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff; - case 2: - *p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff; - case 1: - *p = num & 0xff; - } - SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID())); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &b[0], lenSize); - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ -} - -SECStatus -ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( - sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *src, PRInt32 bytes, PRInt32 lenSize) -{ - SECStatus rv; - - PORT_Assert((bytes < (1 << 8) && lenSize == 1) || - (bytes < (1L << 16) && lenSize == 2) || - (bytes < (1L << 24) && lenSize == 3)); - - SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID())); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ - } - SSL_TRC(60, ("data:")); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes); - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ -} - SECStatus -ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType t, PRUint32 length) +ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType t, PRUint32 length) { SECStatus rv; @@ -4330,17 +3841,22 @@ ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. */ SECStatus -ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, PRUint32 bytes, - PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(sslSocket *ss, PRUint64 *num, PRUint32 bytes, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) { PRUint8 *buf = *b; - int i; + PRUint32 i; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); *num = 0; - if (bytes > *length || bytes > sizeof(*num)) { + if (bytes > sizeof(*num)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (bytes > *length) { return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); } PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); @@ -4353,6 +3869,26 @@ ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, PRUint32 bytes, return SECSuccess; } +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, PRUint32 bytes, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRUint64 num64; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(bytes <= sizeof(*num)); + if (bytes > sizeof(*num)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(ss, &num64, bytes, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + *num = num64 & 0xffffffff; + return SECSuccess; +} + /* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is * *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes" * bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value @@ -4762,6 +4298,8 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen; unsigned char md5StackBuf[256]; unsigned char shaStackBuf[512]; + const int md5Pad = ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(ssl_mac_md5)->pad_size; + const int shaPad = ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(ssl_mac_sha)->pad_size; md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf, sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen); @@ -4783,7 +4321,7 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ unsigned char s[4]; - if (!spec->master_secret) { + if (!spec->masterSecret) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); rv = SECFailure; goto loser; @@ -4799,11 +4337,10 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); } - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, - mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, md5Pad)); - rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->masterSecret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, md5Pad); rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); if (rv != SECSuccess) { @@ -4819,11 +4356,10 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); } - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, - mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, shaPad)); - rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->masterSecret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, shaPad); rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); if (rv != SECSuccess) { @@ -4834,13 +4370,12 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, - mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, md5Pad)); PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5); - rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->masterSecret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, md5Pad); rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); } rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); @@ -4854,13 +4389,12 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); if (!isTLS) { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, - mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, shaPad)); PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha); - rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->masterSecret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, shaPad); rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); } rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); @@ -4926,6 +4460,48 @@ ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(sslClientHelloType type) #undef CHTYPE #endif +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); +static void +ssl_MakeFakeSid(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf) +{ + PRUint8 x = 0x5a; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; ++i) { + x += ss->ssl3.hs.client_random[i]; + buf[i] = x; + } +} + +/* Set the version fields of the cipher spec for a ClientHello. */ +static void +ssl_SetClientHelloSpecVersion(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + PORT_Assert(spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null); + /* This is - a best guess - but it doesn't matter here. */ + spec->version = ss->vrange.max; + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + spec->recordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE; + } else { + /* For new connections, cap the record layer version number of TLS + * ClientHello to { 3, 1 } (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem + * to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore ClientHello.client_version and use the + * record layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when + * negotiating protocol versions. In addition, if the record layer + * version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 } (TLS 1.1) or higher, these + * servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly, some F5 BIG-IP servers + * hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a version greater than + * { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this flag to work around + * such servers. + * + * The final version is set when a version is negotiated. + */ + spec->recordVersion = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, + ss->vrange.max); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); +} + /* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(), * ssl3_RedoHandshake() * ssl_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session) @@ -4942,18 +4518,18 @@ SECStatus ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) { sslSessionID *sid; - ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; SECStatus rv; - int i; - int length; - int num_suites; - int actual_count = 0; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int length; + unsigned int num_suites; + unsigned int actual_count = 0; PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE, fallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE; - PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0; - unsigned numCompressionMethods; - PRUint16 version; + PRBool unlockNeeded = PR_FALSE; + sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + PRUint16 version = ss->vrange.max; PRInt32 flags; + unsigned int cookieLen = ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send %s ClientHello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(type))); @@ -4972,22 +4548,26 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) * to maintain the handshake hashes. */ if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { PORT_Assert(type == client_hello_retry); + /* This cookieLen applies to the cookie that appears in the DTLS + ClientHello, which isn't used in DTLS 1.3. */ + cookieLen = 0; } else { - ssl3_InitState(ss); ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); } + if (type == client_hello_initial) { + ssl_SetClientHelloSpecVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + } /* These must be reset every handshake. */ + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || type != client_hello_retransmit); SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; - ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); /* How many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */ - num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (!num_suites) { + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */ } @@ -5035,7 +4615,7 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) } /* Check that we can recover the master secret. */ - if (sidOK && sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + if (sidOK) { PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid) { slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, @@ -5100,8 +4680,6 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) if (sid->version < ss->vrange.min || sid->version > ss->vrange.max) { sidOK = PR_FALSE; - } else { - version = ss->vrange.max; } } } @@ -5135,8 +4713,6 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) */ if (ss->firstHsDone) { version = ss->clientHelloVersion; - } else { - version = ss->vrange.max; } sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); @@ -5149,10 +4725,9 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) isTLS = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); - cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; - if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ - cwSpec->version = version; + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version = version; } ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); @@ -5176,9 +4751,10 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) * NewSessionTicket that will cause the ticket in the sid to be replaced. * Once we've copied the session ticket into our ClientHello message, it * is OK for the ticket to change, so we just need to make sure we hold - * the lock across the calls to ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders. + * the lock across the calls to ssl_ConstructExtensions. */ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + unlockNeeded = PR_TRUE; PR_RWLock_Rlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } @@ -5186,24 +4762,14 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) type == client_hello_initial) { rv = tls13_SetupClientHello(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return SECFailure; + goto loser; } } if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) { - PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; /* 2^16 - 1 */ - PRInt32 extLen; - - extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, NULL); - if (extLen < 0) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return SECFailure; + rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_client_hello); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } - total_exten_len += extLen; - - if (total_exten_len > 0) - total_exten_len += 2; } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { @@ -5213,10 +4779,7 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) /* how many suites are permitted by policy and user preference? */ num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3.policy); if (!num_suites) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return SECFailure; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */ + goto loser; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */ } fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && (!requestingResume || @@ -5229,37 +4792,30 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) ++num_suites; } - /* count compression methods */ - numCompressionMethods = 0; - for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { - if (ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) - numCompressionMethods++; - } - length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + - 1 + (sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 - ? 0 - : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) + + 1 + /* session id */ 2 + num_suites * sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + - 1 + numCompressionMethods + total_exten_len; + 1 + 1 /* compression methods */; + if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + length += sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength; + } else if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + length += SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - length += 1 + ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len; + length += 1 + cookieLen; } - if (total_exten_len > 0) { - ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtLen(ss, length); - if (ss->xtnData.paddingLen) { - total_exten_len += 4 + ss->xtnData.paddingLen; - length += 4 + ss->xtnData.paddingLen; + if (extensionBuf.len) { + rv = ssl_InsertPaddingExtension(ss, length, &extensionBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl_InsertPaddingExtension */ } + length += 2 + extensionBuf.len; } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_hello, length); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } if (ss->firstHsDone) { @@ -5277,60 +4833,49 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } /* Generate a new random if this is the first attempt. */ if (type == client_hello_initial) { - rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random); + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ + goto loser; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ } } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) + if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); - else + } else if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* We're faking session resumption, so rather than create new + * randomness, just mix up the client random a little. */ + PRUint8 buf[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; + ssl_MakeFakeSid(ss, buf); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf, SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES, 1); + } else { rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( - ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, 1); + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data, cookieLen, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites * sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { @@ -5338,10 +4883,7 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } actual_count++; } @@ -5349,10 +4891,7 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } actual_count++; } @@ -5361,20 +4900,14 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) { actual_count++; if (actual_count > num_suites) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } /* set error card removal/insertion error */ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); - return SECFailure; + goto loser; } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite, sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } } } @@ -5384,57 +4917,37 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) * the server.. */ if (actual_count != num_suites) { /* Card removal/insertion error */ - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); - return SECFailure; + goto loser; } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, numCompressionMethods, 1); + /* Compression methods: count is always 1, null compression. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { - if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) - continue; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i], 1); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ - } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_compression_null, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - if (total_exten_len) { - PRUint32 maxBytes = total_exten_len - 2; - PRInt32 extLen; - - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, maxBytes, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + if (extensionBuf.len) { + /* If we are sending a PSK binder, replace the dummy value. Note that + * we only set statelessResume on the client in TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->statelessResume && + ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) { + rv = tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder(ss, &extensionBuf); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionBuf, 2); } - - extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, maxBytes, NULL); - if (extLen < 0) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { - PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); - } - return SECFailure; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } - maxBytes -= extLen; - - PORT_Assert(!maxBytes); } - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + if (unlockNeeded) { + /* Note: goto loser can't be used past this point. */ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } @@ -5450,9 +4963,6 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) } flags = 0; - if (!ss->firstHsDone && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { - flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION; - } rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ @@ -5467,6 +4977,13 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello; return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (unlockNeeded) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + return SECFailure; } /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a @@ -6018,7 +5535,7 @@ ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); - isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL); ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); @@ -6041,41 +5558,20 @@ ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) goto loser; } -#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE - if (ssl_keylog_iob) { +#ifdef TRACE + if (ssl_trace >= 100) { SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms); if (extractRV == SECSuccess) { SECItem *keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms); if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) { -#ifdef TRACE - if (ssl_trace >= 100) { - ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", - keyData->data, keyData->len); - } -#endif - if (ssl_keylog_iob && enc_pms.len >= 8 && keyData->len == 48) { - /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ - - /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the - * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to - * fwrite. */ - char buf[4 + 8 * 2 + 1 + 48 * 2 + 1]; - - strcpy(buf, "RSA "); - hexEncode(buf + 4, enc_pms.data, 8); - buf[20] = ' '; - hexEncode(buf + 21, keyData->data, 48); - buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n'; - - fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob); - fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); - } + ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", + keyData->data, keyData->len); } } } #endif - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange, isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 : enc_pms.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { @@ -6090,7 +5586,7 @@ ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL; @@ -6114,27 +5610,27 @@ loser: /* DH shares need to be padded to the size of their prime. Some implementations * require this. TLS 1.3 also requires this. */ SECStatus -ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(const sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, +ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(sslBuffer *buf, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PRBool appendLength) { SECStatus rv; unsigned int pad = pubKey->u.dh.prime.len - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; if (appendLength) { - rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } } while (pad) { - rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } --pad; } - rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshake(ss, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); + rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } @@ -6158,11 +5654,13 @@ ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) }; sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + PRUint8 dhData[1026]; /* Enough for the 8192-bit group. */ + sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER(dhData); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); /* Copy DH parameters from server key */ @@ -6217,22 +5715,27 @@ ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) } /* Note: send the DH share padded to avoid triggering bugs. */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange, params->prime.len + 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(ss, pubKey, PR_TRUE); + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(&dhBuf, pubKey, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* err set by ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare */ } + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &dhBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake */ + } - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); goto loser; } + sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); return SECSuccess; @@ -6242,6 +5745,7 @@ loser: PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); if (keyPair) ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); return SECFailure; } @@ -6422,8 +5926,8 @@ ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss) /* Sets error code, if needed. */ return ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, keyPair->pubKey, keyPair->privKey, - ss->xtnData.clientSigSchemes, - ss->xtnData.numClientSigScheme, + ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, + ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */); } @@ -6540,7 +6044,7 @@ ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, len); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ } @@ -6564,11 +6068,9 @@ done: /* Once a cipher suite has been selected, make sure that the necessary secondary * information is properly set. */ SECStatus -ssl3_SetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite chosenSuite, - PRBool initHashes) +ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, PRBool initHashes) { - ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = chosenSuite; - ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(chosenSuite); + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { PORT_Assert(0); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); @@ -6581,10 +6083,53 @@ ssl3_SetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite chosenSuite, if (!initHashes) { return SECSuccess; } - /* Now we've have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */ + /* Now we have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */ return ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); } +SECStatus +ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + ssl3CipherSuite suite, PRBool initHashes) +{ + unsigned int i; + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite == suiteCfg->cipher_suite) { + SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version }; + if (!config_match(suiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is + * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here + * in order to give a more precise error code. */ + if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite, &vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION); + } else { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + } + return SECFailure; + } + break; + } + } + if (i >= ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Don't let the server change its mind. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && suite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)suite; + return ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, initHashes); +} + /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete * ssl3 ServerHello message. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. @@ -6592,14 +6137,16 @@ ssl3_SetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite chosenSuite, static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) { - PRUint32 temp; - PRBool suite_found = PR_FALSE; - int i; + PRUint32 cipher; int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + PRUint32 compression; SECStatus rv; SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + PRBool isHelloRetry; SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + TLSExtension *versionExtension; + const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; + const PRUint32 savedLength = length; #ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION SSL3ProtocolVersion downgradeCheckVersion; #endif @@ -6608,7 +6155,6 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.initialized); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) { errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO; @@ -6630,11 +6176,95 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; } + /* Note that if the server selects TLS 1.3, this will set the version to TLS + * 1.2. We will amend that once all other fields have been read. */ rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &ss->version); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + isHelloRetry = !PORT_Memcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + ssl_hello_retry_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* Read the cipher suite. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &cipher, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + + /* Compression method. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &compression, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (compression != ssl_compression_null) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Parse extensions. */ + if (length != 0) { + PRUint32 extensionLength; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extensionLength, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (extensionLength != length) { + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + } + } + + /* Update the version based on the extension, as necessary. */ + versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn); + if (versionExtension) { + rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &versionExtension->data.data, + &versionExtension->data.len, + &ss->version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* An alert is sent by ssl_ClientReadVersion */ + } + } + + PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)); + /* Check that the version is within the configured range. */ + if (ss->vrange.min > ss->version || ss->vrange.max < ss->version) { + desc = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) + ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (isHelloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: received a second hello_retry_request", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; + goto alert_loser; + } + /* The server didn't pick 1.3 although we either received a * HelloRetryRequest, or we prepared to send early app data. */ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { @@ -6657,18 +6287,10 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) * us to be getting this version number, but it's what we have. * (1294697). */ if (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->version != ss->ssl3.crSpec->version)) { - desc = illegal_parameter; + desc = protocol_version; errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; goto alert_loser; } - ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; - isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( - ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ - } #ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION /* Check the ServerHello.random per @@ -6688,8 +6310,8 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) if (downgradeCheckVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && downgradeCheckVersion > ss->version) { /* Both sections use the same sentinel region. */ - unsigned char *downgrade_sentinel = - ss->ssl3.hs.server_random.rand + + PRUint8 *downgrade_sentinel = + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random); if (!PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, tls13_downgrade_random, @@ -6704,110 +6326,64 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) } #endif - if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + /* Finally, now all the version-related checks have passed. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + /* Update the write cipher spec to match the version. But not after + * HelloRetryRequest, because cwSpec might be a 0-RTT cipher spec. */ + if (!ss->firstHsDone && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } + + /* Check that the session ID is as expected. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PRUint8 buf[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; + unsigned int expectedSidLen; + if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + expectedSidLen = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + ssl_MakeFakeSid(ss, buf); + } else { + expectedSidLen = 0; } - if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { - if (isTLS) - desc = decode_error; - goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + if (sidBytes.len != expectedSidLen || + (expectedSidLen > 0 && + PORT_Memcmp(buf, sidBytes.data, expectedSidLen) != 0)) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; } } - /* find selected cipher suite in our list. */ - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &b, &length); + /* Only initialize hashes if this isn't a Hello Retry. */ + rv = ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(ss, ss->version, cipher, + !isHelloRetry); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ - } - i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - PORT_Assert(i > 0); - if (i <= 0) { + desc = illegal_parameter; errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; + goto alert_loser; } - for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; - if (temp == suite->cipher_suite) { - SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; - if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { - /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is - * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here - * in order to give a more precise error code. */ - if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(temp, &vrange)) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION; - goto alert_loser; - } - break; /* failure */ - } + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); - suite_found = PR_TRUE; - break; /* success */ + if (isHelloRetry) { + rv = tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(ss, savedMsg, savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } - } - if (!suite_found) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; - goto alert_loser; + return SECSuccess; } - rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, (ssl3CipherSuite)temp, PR_TRUE); + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello); + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - desc = internal_error; - errCode = PORT_GetError(); goto alert_loser; } - if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - /* find selected compression method in our list. */ - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ - } - suite_found = PR_FALSE; - for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { - if (temp == ssl_compression_methods[i]) { - if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) { - break; /* failure */ - } - suite_found = PR_TRUE; - break; /* success */ - } - } - if (!suite_found) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; - goto alert_loser; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.compression = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp; - } else { - ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null; - } - - /* Note that if !isTLS and the extra stuff is not extensions, we - * do NOT goto alert_loser. - * There are some old SSL 3.0 implementations that do send stuff - * after the end of the server hello, and we deliberately ignore - * such stuff in the interest of maximal interoperability (being - * "generous in what you accept"). - * Update: Starting in NSS 3.12.6, we handle the renegotiation_info - * extension in SSL 3.0. - */ - if (length != 0) { - SECItem extensions; - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) { - if (isTLS) - goto alert_loser; - } else { - rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensions.data, - &extensions.len, server_hello); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto alert_loser; - } + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, + savedMsg, savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; } if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { @@ -6835,6 +6411,51 @@ loser: } static SECStatus +ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretClient(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey **ms) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + SECItem wrappedMS = { + siBuffer, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len + }; + + /* unwrap master secret */ + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (slot == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return SECFailure; + } + wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (wrapKey == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + *ms = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH, keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (!*ms) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, int *retErrCode) { @@ -6860,7 +6481,7 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the * key exchange algorithm. */ - rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); + rv = ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */ } @@ -6883,9 +6504,7 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, goto alert_loser; } do { - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - - SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped master secret. */ + PK11SymKey *masterSecret; /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] * @@ -6917,60 +6536,12 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup); + ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; - if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ - CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; - - /* unwrap master secret */ - slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, - sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); - if (slot == NULL) { - break; /* not considered an error. */ - } - if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - break; /* not considered an error. */ - } - wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, - ss->pkcs11PinArg); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - if (wrapKey == NULL) { - break; /* not considered an error. */ - } - - if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ - keyFlags = - CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; - } - - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - pwSpec->master_secret = - PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, - CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); - if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { - break; /* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */ - } - } else { - /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - pwSpec->master_secret = - PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, - PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, - &wrappedMS, NULL); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { - break; - } + rv = ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretClient(ss, sid, &masterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + break; /* not considered an error */ } /* Got a Match */ @@ -6992,8 +6563,8 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); } - /* NULL value for PMS because we are reusing the old MS */ - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + /* We are re-using the old MS, so no need to derive again. */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, masterSecret, PR_FALSE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */ } @@ -7098,11 +6669,11 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) } rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (rv != SECSuccess || minDH <= 0) { minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; } dh_p_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_p); - if (dh_p_bits < minDH) { + if (dh_p_bits < (unsigned)minDH) { errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; goto alert_loser; } @@ -7283,7 +6854,7 @@ typedef struct dnameNode { */ SECStatus ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, - PLArenaPool *arena, CERTDistNames *ca_list) + CERTDistNames *ca_list) { PRUint32 remaining; int nnames = 0; @@ -7298,7 +6869,7 @@ ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, if (remaining > *length) goto alert_loser; - ca_list->head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + ca_list->head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(ca_list->arena, dnameNode); if (node == NULL) goto no_mem; @@ -7324,14 +6895,14 @@ ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, if (remaining <= 0) break; /* success */ - node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(ca_list->arena, dnameNode); node = node->next; if (node == NULL) goto no_mem; } ca_list->nnames = nnames; - ca_list->names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, nnames); + ca_list->names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(ca_list->arena, SECItem, nnames); if (nnames > 0 && ca_list->names == NULL) goto no_mem; @@ -7475,7 +7046,7 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) } } - rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, arena, &ca_list); + rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, &ca_list); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto done; /* alert sent in ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs */ @@ -7575,7 +7146,7 @@ ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, case SECFailure: default: send_no_certificate: - if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE; } else { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); @@ -7606,7 +7177,7 @@ ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage. * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); - maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10; + maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipherDef->secret_key_size >= 10; ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); if (!maybeFalseStart) { @@ -7858,7 +7429,7 @@ ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_request, 0); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_hello_request, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */ } @@ -7927,6 +7498,7 @@ ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) sid->references = 1; sid->cached = never_cached; sid->version = ss->version; + sid->sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; @@ -8037,8 +7609,8 @@ SECStatus ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, PRBool initHashes) { - int j; - int i; + unsigned int j; + unsigned int i; for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; @@ -8049,7 +7621,8 @@ ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) { PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1]; if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { - return ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, initHashes); + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i; + return ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, initHashes); } } } @@ -8148,7 +7721,6 @@ ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss) * and save the name. */ SECStatus rv; SECItem *name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret]; - int configedCiphers; SECItem *pwsName; /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */ @@ -8177,8 +7749,7 @@ ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss) ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; break; } - configedCiphers = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (configedCiphers <= 0) { + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported */ errCode = PORT_GetError(); desc = handshake_failure; @@ -8189,7 +7760,7 @@ ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss) * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket. */ ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_server_name_xtn, - ssl3_SendServerNameXtn); + ssl_SendEmptyExtension); } else { /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */ PORT_Assert((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize); @@ -8288,13 +7859,14 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) SECItem suites = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem comps = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; PRBool isTLS13; + const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; + const PRUint32 savedLen = length; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.initialized); ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; if (!ss->sec.isServer || @@ -8319,6 +7891,9 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) } } + /* We should always be in a fresh state. */ + SSL_ASSERT_HASHES_EMPTY(ss); + /* Get peer name of client */ rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { @@ -8328,7 +7903,7 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should * clear previous state. */ - ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { @@ -8349,7 +7924,7 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) /* Grab the client random data. */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( - ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* malformed */ } @@ -8366,6 +7941,9 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* malformed */ } + if (cookieBytes.len != 0) { + goto loser; /* We never send cookies in DTLS 1.2. */ + } } /* Grab the list of cipher suites. */ @@ -8389,14 +7967,15 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) if (length) { /* Get length of hello extensions */ - PRUint32 extension_length; - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extension_length, 2, &b, &length); + PRUint32 extensionLength; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extensionLength, 2, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* alert already sent */ } - if (extension_length != length) { - ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* send alert */ - goto loser; + if (extensionLength != length) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; } rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); @@ -8427,17 +8006,35 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) goto alert_loser; } } + + if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + /* Update the write spec to match the selected version. */ + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } - /* You can't resume TLS 1.3 like this. */ - if (isTLS13 && sidBytes.len) { - goto alert_loser; + if (isTLS13 && sidBytes.len > 0 && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE); + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, &sidBytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } } /* Generate the Server Random now so it is available * when we process the ClientKeyShare in TLS 1.3 */ - rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random); + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.server_random); if (rv != SECSuccess) { errCode = SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE; goto loser; @@ -8463,8 +8060,8 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) * we ship the final version of TLS 1.3. Bug 1306672. */ if (ss->vrange.max > ss->version) { - unsigned char *downgrade_sentinel = - ss->ssl3.hs.server_random.rand + + PRUint8 *downgrade_sentinel = + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random); switch (ss->vrange.max) { @@ -8485,8 +8082,25 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) } #endif + /* If there is a cookie, then this is a second ClientHello (TLS 1.3). */ + if (ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs) { + /* This is only valid if we sent HelloRetryRequest, so we should have + * negotiated TLS 1.3 and there should be a cookie extension. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + /* Now parse the rest of the extensions. */ - rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, client_hello); + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello); + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* malformed */ } @@ -8509,6 +8123,12 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) if (comps.len != 1 || comps.data[0] != ssl_compression_null) { goto alert_loser; } + } else { + /* Other versions need to include null somewhere. */ + if (comps.len < 1 || + !memchr(comps.data, ssl_compression_null, comps.len)) { + goto alert_loser; + } } if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { @@ -8521,34 +8141,30 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { PRUint8 *b2 = (PRUint8 *)emptyRIext; PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; - (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, client_hello); + (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, ssl_hs_client_hello); break; } } } - /* This is a second check for TLS 1.3 and re-handshake to stop us - * from re-handshake up to TLS 1.3, so it happens after version - * negotiation. */ - if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - desc = unexpected_message; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; - goto alert_loser; - } - if (ss->firstHsDone && - (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN || - ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) && - !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { - desc = no_renegotiation; - level = alert_warning; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; - goto alert_loser; - } - if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || - (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) && - !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; - goto alert_loser; + + /* The check for renegotiation in TLS 1.3 is earlier. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (ss->firstHsDone && + (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN || + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = no_renegotiation; + level = alert_warning; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || + (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; + } } /* We do stateful resumes only if we are in TLS < 1.3 and @@ -8621,21 +8237,14 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); } -#ifdef PARANOID - /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ - j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ - errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ - goto alert_loser; - } -#endif - if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - rv = tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid); + rv = tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid, savedMsg, savedLen); } else { - rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, &comps, sid); + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid, + savedMsg, savedLen); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { errCode = PORT_GetError(); @@ -8652,22 +8261,60 @@ loser: } static SECStatus +ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretServer(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey **ms) +{ + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + SECItem wrappedMS = { + siBuffer, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len + }; + + wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!wrapKey) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + /* unwrap the master secret. */ + *ms = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH, keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (!*ms) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *suites, - SECItem *comps, - sslSessionID *sid) + sslSessionID *sid, + const PRUint8 *msg, + unsigned int len) { - PRBool haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; SECStatus rv; unsigned int i; - int j; + unsigned int j; - /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the - ** same cipher suite and compression method we picked before. - ** This is not a loop, despite appearances. + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, msg, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the same + ** cipher suite we picked before. This is not a loop, despite appearances. */ if (sid) do { @@ -8676,18 +8323,6 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; #endif - /* Check that the cached compression method is still enabled. */ - if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, sid->u.ssl3.compression)) - break; - - /* Check that the cached compression method is in the client's list */ - for (i = 0; i < comps->len; i++) { - if (comps->data[i] == sid->u.ssl3.compression) - break; - } - if (i == comps->len) - break; - suite = ss->cipherSuites; /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */ for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) { @@ -8695,7 +8330,7 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, break; } PORT_Assert(j > 0); - if (j <= 0) + if (j == 0) break; #ifdef PARANOID /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled, @@ -8714,17 +8349,15 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) { PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1]; if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { - rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i; + rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { desc = internal_error; errCode = PORT_GetError(); goto alert_loser; } - /* Use the cached compression method. */ - ss->ssl3.hs.compression = - sid->u.ssl3.compression; - goto compression_found; + goto cipher_found; } } } while (0); @@ -8732,8 +8365,7 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, #ifndef PARANOID /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ - j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { desc = internal_error; errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ goto alert_loser; @@ -8747,25 +8379,8 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, goto alert_loser; } - /* Select a compression algorithm. */ - for (i = 0; i < comps->len; i++) { - SSLCompressionMethod method = (SSLCompressionMethod)comps->data[i]; - if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, method)) - continue; - for (j = 0; j < ssl_compression_method_count; j++) { - if (method == ssl_compression_methods[j]) { - ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_methods[j]; - goto compression_found; - } - } - } - errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; - /* null compression must be supported */ - goto alert_loser; - -compression_found: +cipher_found: suites->data = NULL; - comps->data = NULL; /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid, * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave @@ -8775,12 +8390,10 @@ compression_found: */ if (sid != NULL) do { - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; - SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped key */ + PK11SymKey *masterSecret; if (sid->version != ss->version || - sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite || - sid->u.ssl3.compression != ss->ssl3.hs.compression) { + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { break; /* not an error */ } @@ -8829,54 +8442,13 @@ compression_found: } ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; } - /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ - - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); - haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE; - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { - PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ - CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; - - wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - ss->pkcs11PinArg); - if (!wrapKey) { - /* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */ - break; - } - - if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ - keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; - } - - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - /* unwrap the master secret. */ - pwSpec->master_secret = - PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, - CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); - PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); - if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { - break; /* not an error */ - } - } else { - /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); - pwSpec->master_secret = - PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, - PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &wrappedMS, - NULL); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { - break; /* not an error */ - } + /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ + rv = ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretServer(ss, sid, &masterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + break; /* not an error */ } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); @@ -8884,8 +8456,6 @@ compression_found: /* * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session. - * - * XXX make sure compression still matches */ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits); if (ss->statelessResume) @@ -8896,6 +8466,8 @@ compression_found: ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup); + ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); @@ -8930,13 +8502,8 @@ compression_found: goto loser; } - if (haveSpecWriteLock) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; - } - - /* NULL value for PMS because we are re-using the old MS */ - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + /* We are re-using the old MS, so no need to derive again. */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, masterSecret, PR_FALSE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { errCode = PORT_GetError(); goto loser; @@ -8961,12 +8528,8 @@ compression_found: return SECSuccess; } while (0); - if (haveSpecWriteLock) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; - } - if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); ss->sec.uncache(sid); ssl_FreeSID(sid); @@ -8985,9 +8548,8 @@ compression_found: */ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { - ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, - ssl_session_ticket_xtn, - ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn); + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_session_ticket_xtn, + ssl_SendEmptyExtension); } rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss); @@ -9031,10 +8593,6 @@ compression_found: return SECSuccess; alert_loser: - if (haveSpecWriteLock) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; - } (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); /* FALLTHRU */ loser: @@ -9043,10 +8601,6 @@ loser: ssl_FreeSID(sid); } - if (haveSpecWriteLock) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - } - if (haveXmitBufLock) { ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); } @@ -9060,7 +8614,7 @@ loser: * in asking to use the V3 handshake. */ SECStatus -ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, +ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length, PRUint8 padding) { sslSessionID *sid = NULL; @@ -9068,11 +8622,11 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, unsigned char *random; SSL3ProtocolVersion version; SECStatus rv; - int i; - int j; - int sid_length; - int suite_length; - int rand_length; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int j; + unsigned int sid_length; + unsigned int suite_length; + unsigned int rand_length; int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; unsigned int total = SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; @@ -9083,14 +8637,11 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); - version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { goto loser; } - ssl3_InitState(ss); ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) { @@ -9122,6 +8673,11 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, goto alert_loser; } ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */ if (length != total) { @@ -9144,15 +8700,14 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy( - &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], - random, rand_length); + PORT_Memset(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], + random, rand_length); - PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[0], + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); - i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (i <= 0) { + + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ goto alert_loser; } @@ -9161,8 +8716,6 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, ** ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in ** ssl3_HandleClientHello(). - ** - ** See the comments about export cipher suites in ssl3_HandleClientHello(). */ for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; @@ -9173,7 +8726,8 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { - rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i; + rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { desc = internal_error; errCode = PORT_GetError(); @@ -9209,7 +8763,7 @@ suite_found: if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { PRUint8 *b2 = (PRUint8 *)emptyRIext; PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; - (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, client_hello); + (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, ssl_hs_client_hello); break; } } @@ -9221,8 +8775,6 @@ suite_found: goto alert_loser; } - ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null; - rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { errCode = PORT_GetError(); @@ -9266,6 +8818,64 @@ loser: return SECFailure; } +SECStatus +ssl_ConstructServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool helloRetry, + const sslBuffer *extensionBuf, sslBuffer *messageBuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version); + } else { + version = PR_MIN(ss->version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Random already generated in ssl3_HandleClientHello */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(messageBuf, helloRetry ? ssl_hello_retry_random : ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (sid) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(messageBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, 0, 1); + } + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(messageBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.data, + ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.len, 1); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, ssl_compression_null, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(extensionBuf)) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(messageBuf, extensionBuf, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + /* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version. ** ** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session), @@ -9275,12 +8885,9 @@ loser: SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss) { - sslSessionID *sid; SECStatus rv; - PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; - PRUint32 length; - PRInt32 extensions_len = 0; - SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer messageBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); @@ -9294,94 +8901,43 @@ ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss) return SECFailure; } - sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; - - extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders( - ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, &ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders[0]); - if (extensions_len > 0) - extensions_len += 2; /* Add sizeof total extension length */ - - /* TLS 1.3 doesn't use the session_id or compression_method - * fields in the ServerHello. */ - length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - length += 1 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength); - } - length += sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite); - if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - length += 1; /* Compression */ - } - length += extensions_len; - - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello, length); + rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_server_hello); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - - if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version); - } else { - version = tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(ss->version); + goto loser; } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2); + rv = ssl_ConstructServerHello(ss, PR_FALSE, &extensionBuf, &messageBuf); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - /* Random already generated in ssl3_HandleClientHello */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake( - ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - - if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - if (sid) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( - ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); - } else { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); - } - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } + goto loser; } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } - if (extensions_len) { - PRInt32 sent_len; - extensions_len -= 2; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber */ - sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len, - &ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders[0]); - PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len); - if (sent_len != extensions_len) { - if (sent_len >= 0) - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&messageBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); + rv = ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */ + goto loser; /* err set */ } } + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); + return SECFailure; } SECStatus @@ -9438,6 +8994,8 @@ ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; SECKEYPrivateKey *certPrivateKey; const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + /* Do this on the heap, this could be over 2k long. */ + sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; if (kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_dss && kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_rsa) { /* TODO: Support DH_anon. It might be sufficient to drop the signature. @@ -9461,7 +9019,7 @@ ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) } PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); - if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); } else { /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ @@ -9493,11 +9051,11 @@ ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + 2 + signed_hash.len; - if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { length += 2; } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_key_exchange, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } @@ -9514,12 +9072,16 @@ ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } - rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(ss, pubKey, PR_TRUE); + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(&dhBuf, pubKey, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendPaddedDHKeyShare. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &dhBuf); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } - if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ @@ -9531,12 +9093,15 @@ ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); return SECSuccess; loser: if (signed_hash.data) PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); return SECFailure; } @@ -9571,14 +9136,15 @@ ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) } SECStatus -ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, unsigned maxLen, PRUint32 *len) +ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) { + unsigned int lengthOffset; unsigned int i; - PRUint8 *p = buf; + PRBool found = PR_FALSE; + SECStatus rv; - PORT_Assert(maxLen >= ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * 2); - if (maxLen < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * 2) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { return SECFailure; } @@ -9596,16 +9162,21 @@ ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, unsigned maxLen, PRUint32 if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) != SECSuccess) || (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { - p = ssl_EncodeUintX((PRUint32)ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], 2, p); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + found = PR_TRUE; } } - if (p == buf) { + if (!found) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); return SECFailure; } - *len = p - buf; - return SECSuccess; + + return sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2); } static SECStatus @@ -9614,15 +9185,15 @@ ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) PRBool isTLS12; const PRUint8 *certTypes; SECStatus rv; - int length; - SECItem *names; + PRUint32 length; + const SECItem *names; unsigned int calen; unsigned int nnames; - SECItem *name; - int i; + const SECItem *name; + unsigned int i; int certTypesLength; - PRUint8 sigAlgs[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2]; - unsigned int sigAlgsLength = 0; + PRUint8 sigAlgs[2 + MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2]; + sslBuffer sigAlgsBuf = SSL_BUFFER(sigAlgs); SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); @@ -9630,7 +9201,7 @@ ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); rv = ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames); if (rv != SECSuccess) { @@ -9641,14 +9212,14 @@ ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen; if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, sigAlgs, sizeof(sigAlgs), &sigAlgsLength); + rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, &sigAlgsBuf); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } - length += 2 + sigAlgsLength; + length += SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sigAlgsBuf); } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_request, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } @@ -9657,7 +9228,8 @@ ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigAlgs, sigAlgsLength, 2); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&sigAlgsBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sigAlgsBuf)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } @@ -9687,7 +9259,7 @@ ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello_done, 0); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello_done, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } @@ -9703,8 +9275,7 @@ ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus -ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, - SSL3Hashes *hashes) +ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) { SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECStatus rv; @@ -9712,9 +9283,9 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; PRBool isTLS; SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; - SSLHashType hashAlg; - SSL3Hashes localHashes; - SSL3Hashes *hashesForVerify = NULL; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; + const PRUint32 savedLen = length; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); @@ -9730,14 +9301,8 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, /* TLS 1.3 is handled by tls13_HandleCertificateVerify */ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); - if (!hashes) { - PORT_Assert(0); - desc = internal_error; - errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; - goto alert_loser; - } - - if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record); rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ @@ -9750,25 +9315,20 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, goto alert_loser; } - hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); - - /* Read from the message buffer, but we need to use only up to the end - * of the previous handshake message. The length of the transcript up to - * that point is saved in |hashes->u.transcriptLen|. */ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, - hashes->u.transcriptLen, - hashAlg, &localHashes); - - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - hashesForVerify = &localHashes; - } else { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE; - desc = decrypt_error; - goto alert_loser; - } + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme), + &hashes); } else { - hashesForVerify = hashes; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record); sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, &hashes, 0); + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE; + desc = decrypt_error; + goto alert_loser; } rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); @@ -9779,7 +9339,7 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */ - rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, hashesForVerify, &signed_hash); + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signed_hash); if (rv != SECSuccess) { errCode = PORT_GetError(); desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; @@ -9792,6 +9352,14 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter; goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ } + + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, + savedMsg, savedLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; return SECSuccess; @@ -9832,9 +9400,9 @@ ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock. */ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch); - calg = spec->cipher_def->calg; + calg = spec->cipherDef->calg; /* First get an appropriate slot. */ mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN; @@ -9902,7 +9470,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch); enc_pms.data = b; enc_pms.len = length; @@ -9999,7 +9567,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, } /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */ - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, currentPms); + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, currentPms, PR_TRUE); PK11_FreeSymKey(currentPms); if (rv != SECSuccess) { @@ -10064,7 +9632,7 @@ ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, return SECFailure; } - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); return rv; @@ -10163,13 +9731,13 @@ ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss) const SECItem *context; if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest); - context = &ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested); + context = &ss->xtnData.certReqContext; len = context->len + 1; isTLS13 = PR_TRUE; } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, len + 3); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } @@ -10195,13 +9763,14 @@ ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss) SECStatus rv; NewSessionTicket nticket = { 0 }; - rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &nticket, &ticket); + rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &nticket, NULL, 0, + ss->ssl3.pwSpec->masterSecret, &ticket); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* Serialize the handshake message. Length = * lifetime (4) + ticket length (2) + ticket. */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket, + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_new_session_ticket, 4 + 2 + ticket.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; @@ -10251,7 +9820,7 @@ ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) * until it has verified the server's Finished message." See the comment in * ssl3_FinishHandshake for more details. */ - ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = PR_Now(); + ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_TimeUsec(); if (length < 4) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); @@ -10393,8 +9962,8 @@ ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) if (isTLS13) { contextLen = 1; /* Size of the context length */ if (!ss->sec.isServer) { - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest); - context = ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested); + context = ss->xtnData.certReqContext; contextLen += context.len; } } @@ -10412,7 +9981,7 @@ ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) } } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, contextLen + certChainLen + 3); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ @@ -10487,7 +10056,7 @@ ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss) /* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */ len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_status, len); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_status, len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } @@ -10618,6 +10187,10 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) return SECFailure; } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + } + return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(ss, b, length); } @@ -10837,7 +10410,8 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss) } if (pubKey) { KeyType pubKeyType; - PRInt32 minKey; + PRUint32 minKey; + PRInt32 optval; /* This partly fixes Bug 124230 and may cause problems for * callers which depend on the old (wrong) behavior. */ ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey); @@ -10848,29 +10422,29 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss) case rsaPssKey: case rsaOaepKey: rv = - NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); - if (rv != - SECSuccess) { - minKey = - SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS; + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval); + if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { + minKey = (PRUint32)optval; + } else { + minKey = SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS; } break; case dsaKey: rv = - NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); - if (rv != - SECSuccess) { - minKey = - SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS; + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval); + if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { + minKey = (PRUint32)optval; + } else { + minKey = SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS; } break; case dhKey: rv = - NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); - if (rv != - SECSuccess) { - minKey = - SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval); + if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { + minKey = (PRUint32)optval; + } else { + minKey = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; } break; default: @@ -11029,8 +10603,8 @@ ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PK11Context *prf_context; unsigned int retLen; - PORT_Assert(spec->master_secret); - if (!spec->master_secret) { + PORT_Assert(spec->masterSecret); + if (!spec->masterSecret) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } @@ -11045,7 +10619,7 @@ ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, param.data = (unsigned char *)&tls_mac_params; param.len = sizeof(tls_mac_params); prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_MAC, CKA_SIGN, - spec->master_secret, ¶m); + spec->masterSecret, ¶m); if (!prf_context) return SECFailure; @@ -11070,40 +10644,39 @@ ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen, unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen) { - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL; + PK11Context *prf_context; + unsigned int retLen; + SECStatus rv; - if (spec->master_secret) { - SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL; - PK11Context *prf_context; - unsigned int retLen; + if (!spec->masterSecret) { + PORT_Assert(spec->masterSecret); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } - if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - /* Bug 1312976 non-SHA256 exporters are broken. */ - if (ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss) != CKM_SHA256) { - PORT_Assert(0); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256; - } - prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN, - spec->master_secret, ¶m); - if (!prf_context) + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + /* Bug 1312976 non-SHA256 exporters are broken. */ + if (ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss) != CKM_SHA256) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; + } + mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256; + } + prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN, + spec->masterSecret, ¶m); + if (!prf_context) + return SECFailure; - rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *)label, labelLen); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen); - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen); - PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen); + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *)label, labelLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen); - PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); - } else { - PORT_Assert(spec->master_secret); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - } + PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); return rv; } @@ -11127,7 +10700,7 @@ ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss) padding_len = 32 - ((ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2) % 32); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, next_proto, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2 + padding_len); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_next_proto, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2 + padding_len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */ } @@ -11143,40 +10716,44 @@ ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss) return rv; } -/* called from ssl3_SendFinished +/* called from ssl3_SendFinished and tls13_DeriveSecret. * * This function is simply a debugging aid and therefore does not return a * SECStatus. */ -static void -ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss) +void +ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss, const char *label, PK11SymKey *secret) { #ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE SECStatus rv; SECItem *keyData; - char buf[14 /* "CLIENT_RANDOM " */ + - SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2 /* client_random */ + - 1 /* " " */ + - 48 * 2 /* master secret */ + - 1 /* new line */]; - unsigned int j; + /* Longest label is "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET", master secret is 48 + * bytes which happens to be the largest in TLS 1.3 as well (SHA384). + * Maximum line length: "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" (31) + " " (1) + + * client_random (32*2) + " " (1) + + * traffic_secret (48*2) + "\n" (1) = 194. */ + char buf[200]; + unsigned int offset, len; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (!ssl_keylog_iob) return; - rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret); + rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(secret); if (rv != SECSuccess) return; - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); - /* keyData does not need to be freed. */ - keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret); - if (!keyData || !keyData->data || keyData->len != 48) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(secret); + if (!keyData || !keyData->data) + return; + + len = strlen(label) + 1 + /* label + space */ + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2 + 1 + /* client random (hex) + space */ + keyData->len * 2 + 1; /* secret (hex) + newline */ + PORT_Assert(len <= sizeof(buf)); + if (len > sizeof(buf)) return; - } /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ @@ -11184,23 +10761,22 @@ ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss) * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to * fwrite. */ - memcpy(buf, "CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14); - j = 14; - hexEncode(buf + j, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - j += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2; - buf[j++] = ' '; - hexEncode(buf + j, keyData->data, 48); - j += 48 * 2; - buf[j++] = '\n'; - - PORT_Assert(j == sizeof(buf)); - - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - - if (fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob) != 1) - return; - fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); - return; + strcpy(buf, label); + offset = strlen(label); + buf[offset++] += ' '; + hexEncode(buf + offset, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + offset += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2; + buf[offset++] = ' '; + hexEncode(buf + offset, keyData->data, keyData->len); + offset += keyData->len * 2; + buf[offset++] = '\n'; + + PORT_Assert(offset == len); + + PZ_Lock(ssl_keylog_lock); + if (fwrite(buf, len, 1, ssl_keylog_iob) == 1) + fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); + PZ_Unlock(ssl_keylog_lock); #endif } @@ -11242,7 +10818,7 @@ ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) else ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, sizeof tlsFinished); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished); @@ -11255,7 +10831,7 @@ ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes.u.s); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, sizeof hashes.u.s); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s); @@ -11267,7 +10843,7 @@ ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ } - ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss); + ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss, "CLIENT_RANDOM", ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret); return SECSuccess; @@ -11279,8 +10855,8 @@ fail: * Caller holds the Spec read lock. */ SECStatus -ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, - ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, + PK11SymKey *secret) { PK11SymKey *wrappingKey = NULL; PK11SlotInfo *symKeySlot; @@ -11289,7 +10865,7 @@ ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; - symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(spec->master_secret); + symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(secret); if (!isServer) { int wrapKeyIndex; int incarnation; @@ -11350,7 +10926,7 @@ ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey, - spec->master_secret, &wmsItem); + secret, &wmsItem); /* rv is examined below. */ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len; PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); @@ -11363,13 +10939,13 @@ ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus -ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, - const SSL3Hashes *hashes) +ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) { sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; PRBool isTLS; + SSL3Hashes hashes; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); @@ -11383,13 +10959,23 @@ ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, return SECFailure; } - if (!hashes) { - PORT_Assert(0); - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + if (!ss->sec.isServer || !ss->opt.requestCertificate) { + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + } + + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, &hashes, + isServer ? sender_client : sender_server); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_finished, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); if (isTLS) { TLSFinished tlsFinished; @@ -11402,7 +10988,7 @@ ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, #endif } rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer, - hashes, &tlsFinished); + &hashes, &tlsFinished); if (!isServer) ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; else @@ -11425,12 +11011,12 @@ ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, } if (!isServer) - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes->u.s; + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s; else - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes->u.s; - PORT_Assert(hashes->len == sizeof hashes->u.s); - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes->u.s; - if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes->u.s, b, length)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; + PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; + if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes.u.s, b, length)) { (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); return SECFailure; @@ -11500,7 +11086,7 @@ xmit_loser: } if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache) { - rv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, sid); + rv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, sid, ss->ssl3.crSpec->masterSecret); /* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid. * The connection continues normally however. @@ -11524,21 +11110,26 @@ xmit_loser: } SECStatus -ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey *secret) { - SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(secret); /* fill in the sid */ sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; - sid->u.ssl3.compression = ss->ssl3.hs.compression; sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy; sid->version = ss->version; sid->authType = ss->sec.authType; sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType; sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; - sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(); - sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout; + if (ss->sec.keaGroup) { + sid->keaGroup = ss->sec.keaGroup->name; + } else { + sid->keaGroup = ssl_grp_none; + } + sid->sigScheme = ss->sec.signatureScheme; + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_TimeUsec(); + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout * PR_USEC_PER_SEC; sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); if (ss->sec.isServer) { sid->namedCurve = ss->sec.serverCert->namedCurve; @@ -11552,25 +11143,8 @@ ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) } } - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ - /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */ - if (ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data) { - sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = - ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len; - memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, - ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data, ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len); - sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; - sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_FALSE; - rv = SECSuccess; - } else { - rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, - ss->ssl3.crSpec); - sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_TRUE; - } - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ - - return rv; + return ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, secret); } /* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs @@ -11619,8 +11193,66 @@ ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) return SECSuccess; } +SECStatus +ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType type, + PRUint32 dtlsSeq, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRUint8 hdr[4]; + PRUint8 dtlsData[8]; + SECStatus rv; + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Hash handshake message:", b, length)); + + hdr[0] = (PRUint8)type; + hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length); + + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)hdr, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + + /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Sequence number */ + dtlsData[0] = MSB(dtlsSeq); + dtlsData[1] = LSB(dtlsSeq); + + /* Fragment offset */ + dtlsData[2] = 0; + dtlsData[3] = 0; + dtlsData[4] = 0; + + /* Fragment length */ + dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length); + + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)dtlsData, + sizeof(dtlsData)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + } + + /* The message body */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType type, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, type, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, + b, length); +} + /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3 - * hanshake message. + * handshake message. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ SECStatus @@ -11628,130 +11260,43 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, PRBool endOfRecord) { SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - SSL3HandshakeType type = ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; - SSL3Hashes hashes; /* computed hashes are put here. */ - SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr = NULL; /* Set when hashes are computed */ - PRUint8 hdr[4]; - PRUint8 dtlsData[8]; - PRBool computeHashes = PR_FALSE; PRUint16 epoch; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - /* - * We have to compute the hashes before we update them with the - * current message. - */ - if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - if ((type == finished) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished)) { - computeHashes = PR_TRUE; - } else if ((type == certificate_verify) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_cert_verify)) { - if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { - /* We cannot compute the hash yet. We must wait until we have - * decoded the certificate_verify message in - * ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify, which will tell us which - * hash function we must use. - * - * (ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify cannot simply look at the - * buffer length itself, because at the time we reach it, - * additional handshake messages will have been added to the - * buffer, e.g. the certificate_verify message itself.) - * - * Therefore, we use SSL3Hashes.u.transcriptLen to save how much - * data there is and read directly from ss->ssl3.hs.messages - * when calculating the hashes. - * - * ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify will detect - * hashType == handshake_hash_record - * and use that information to calculate the hash. - */ - hashes.u.transcriptLen = ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len; - hashesPtr = &hashes; - } else { - computeHashes = PR_TRUE; - } - } - } else { - if (type == certificate_verify) { - computeHashes = TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); - } else if (type == finished) { - computeHashes = - TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_request, wait_finished); - } - } - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ - if (computeHashes) { - SSL3Sender sender = (SSL3Sender)0; - ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ? ss->ssl3.crSpec - : ss->ssl3.prSpec; - - if (type == finished) { - sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server; - rSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; - } - rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - hashesPtr = &hashes; - } - } - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/ - } SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type))); - hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; - hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); - hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); - hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length); - - /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake. Unless this is - * TLS 1.3 and we sent a HelloRetryRequest. */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == client_hello && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == ssl_hs_client_hello) { ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); } - /* We should not include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages - * in the handshake hashes */ - if ((ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_request) && - (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_verify_request)) { - rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)hdr, 4); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* err code already set. */ - - /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */ - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - /* Sequence number */ - dtlsData[0] = MSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq); - dtlsData[1] = LSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq); - - /* Fragment offset */ - dtlsData[2] = 0; - dtlsData[3] = 0; - dtlsData[4] = 0; - - /* Fragment length */ - dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); - dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); - dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length); + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case ssl_hs_hello_request: + case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: + /* We don't include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages + * in the handshake hashes */ + break; - rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)dtlsData, - sizeof(dtlsData)); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* err code already set. */ - } + /* Defer hashing of these messages until the message handlers. */ + case ssl_hs_client_hello: + case ssl_hs_server_hello: + case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: + case ssl_hs_finished: + break; - /* The message body */ - rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* err code already set. */ + default: + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } } PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status && - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != certificate_status) { + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != ssl_hs_certificate_status) { /* If we negotiated the certificate_status extension then we deferred * certificate validation until we get the CertificateStatus messsage. * But the CertificateStatus message is optional. If the server did @@ -11768,7 +11313,7 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch; switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { - case client_hello: + case ssl_hs_client_hello: if (!ss->sec.isServer) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO); @@ -11776,7 +11321,7 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, } rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length); break; - case server_hello: + case ssl_hs_server_hello: if (ss->sec.isServer) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO); @@ -11786,10 +11331,9 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, break; default: if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - rv = ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + rv = ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length); } else { - rv = tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length, - hashesPtr); + rv = tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length); } break; } @@ -11811,13 +11355,13 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, static SECStatus ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, - PRUint32 length, SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr) + PRUint32 length) { SECStatus rv; PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { - case hello_request: + case ssl_hs_hello_request: if (length != 0) { (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST); @@ -11831,13 +11375,7 @@ ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss); break; - case hello_retry_request: - /* This arrives here because - as a client - we haven't received a - * final decision on the version from the server. */ - rv = tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(ss, b, length); - break; - - case hello_verify_request: + case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST); @@ -11845,13 +11383,13 @@ ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, } rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length); break; - case certificate: + case ssl_hs_certificate: rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); break; - case certificate_status: + case ssl_hs_certificate_status: rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); break; - case server_key_exchange: + case ssl_hs_server_key_exchange: if (ss->sec.isServer) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); @@ -11859,7 +11397,7 @@ ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, } rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); break; - case certificate_request: + case ssl_hs_certificate_request: if (ss->sec.isServer) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST); @@ -11867,7 +11405,7 @@ ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, } rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); break; - case server_hello_done: + case ssl_hs_server_hello_done: if (length != 0) { (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE); @@ -11880,15 +11418,15 @@ ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, } rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss); break; - case certificate_verify: + case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: if (!ss->sec.isServer) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY); return SECFailure; } - rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length); break; - case client_key_exchange: + case ssl_hs_client_key_exchange: if (!ss->sec.isServer) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); @@ -11896,7 +11434,7 @@ ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, } rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length); break; - case new_session_ticket: + case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: if (ss->sec.isServer) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); @@ -11904,8 +11442,8 @@ ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, } rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); break; - case finished: - rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + case ssl_hs_finished: + rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length); break; default: (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); @@ -11946,7 +11484,7 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) t = *(buf->buf++); buf->len--; if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0) - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSLHandshakeType)t; else ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t; if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) @@ -12276,31 +11814,34 @@ ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext, * */ static SECStatus -ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, +ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, SSL3AlertDescription *alert) { - ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; - const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = spec->cipherDef; PRBool isTLS; unsigned int good; unsigned int ivLen = 0; SSL3ContentType rType; unsigned int minLength; unsigned int originalLen = 0; - unsigned char header[13]; - unsigned int headerLen; + PRUint8 headerBuf[13]; + sslBuffer header = SSL_BUFFER(headerBuf); PRUint8 hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; PRUint8 givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; PRUint8 *givenHash; unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1; SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(spec->direction == CipherSpecRead); + good = ~0U; - minLength = crSpec->mac_size; + minLength = spec->macDef->mac_size; if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */ minLength++; - if (crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */ minLength += cipher_def->iv_size; } @@ -12315,7 +11856,7 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, } if (cipher_def->type == type_block && - crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { /* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV @@ -12338,8 +11879,8 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, * the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block. */ - rv = crSpec->decode(crSpec->decodeContext, iv, &decoded, - sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen); + rv = spec->cipher(spec->cipherContext, iv, &decoded, + sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen); good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); } @@ -12347,7 +11888,7 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen)); - isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); if (isTLS && cText->buf->len - ivLen > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) { *alert = record_overflow; @@ -12364,19 +11905,18 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int decryptedLen = cText->buf->len - cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size - cipher_def->tag_size; - headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( - header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num, - rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen); - PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header)); - rv = crSpec->aead( - ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server, - PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */ - plaintext->buf, /* out */ - (int *)&plaintext->len, /* outlen */ - plaintext->space, /* maxout */ - cText->buf->buf, /* in */ - cText->buf->len, /* inlen */ - header, headerLen); + rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + spec->epoch, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : spec->seqNum, + rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen, &header); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + rv = spec->aead(&spec->keyMaterial, + PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */ + plaintext->buf, /* out */ + (int *)&plaintext->len, /* outlen */ + plaintext->space, /* maxout */ + cText->buf->buf, /* in */ + cText->buf->len, /* inlen */ + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { good = 0; } @@ -12387,8 +11927,8 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, } /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */ - rv = crSpec->decode( - crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len, + rv = spec->cipher( + spec->cipherContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len, plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto decrypt_loser; @@ -12401,7 +11941,7 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */ if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size; - const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size; + const unsigned int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; if (!isTLS) { good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding( @@ -12413,32 +11953,32 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, } /* compute the MAC */ - headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( - header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num, + rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + spec->epoch, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : spec->seqNum, rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), - plaintext->len - crSpec->mac_size); - PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header)); + plaintext->len - spec->macDef->mac_size, &header); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( - crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen, + spec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen, hash, &hashBytes); ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf, - crSpec->mac_size); + spec->macDef->mac_size); givenHash = givenHashBuf; /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */ - plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; + plaintext->len -= spec->macDef->mac_size; } else { /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */ - plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; + plaintext->len -= spec->macDef->mac_size; rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( - crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen, + spec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes); /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location @@ -12448,8 +11988,8 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); - if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size || - NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) { + if (hashBytes != (unsigned)spec->macDef->mac_size || + NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, spec->macDef->mac_size) != 0) { /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */ good = 0; } @@ -12465,7 +12005,84 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, return SECSuccess; } -/* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ContentType rType, + DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum, + sslBuffer *databuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if + ** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock. + */ + switch (rType) { + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_alert: + rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_handshake: + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); + } else { + rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, epoch, seqNum, databuf); + } + break; + case content_ack: + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) { + rv = dtls13_HandleAck(ss, databuf); + break; + } + /* Fall through. */ + default: + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rType)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* Find the cipher spec to use for a given record. For TLS, this + * is the current cipherspec. For DTLS, we look up by epoch. + * In DTLS < 1.3 this just means the current epoch or nothing, + * but in DTLS >= 1.3, we keep multiple reading cipherspecs. + * Returns NULL if no appropriate cipher spec is found. + */ +static ssl3CipherSpec * +ssl3_GetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, sslSequenceNumber seq) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *newSpec = NULL; + DTLSEpoch epoch = seq >> 48; + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return crSpec; + } + if (crSpec->epoch == epoch) { + return crSpec; + } + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* Try to find the cipher spec. */ + newSpec = ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(ss, CipherSpecRead, + epoch); + if (newSpec != NULL) { + return newSpec; + } + } + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: Couldn't find cipherspec from epoch %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, epoch)); + return NULL; +} + +/* if cText is non-null, then decipher and check the MAC of the * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf) * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf * is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type, @@ -12475,8 +12092,8 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, * checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL * Handshake message. * - * DOES NOT process the decrypted/decompressed application data. - * On return, databuf contains the decrypted/decompressed record. + * DOES NOT process the decrypted application data. + * On return, databuf contains the decrypted record. * * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq @@ -12492,20 +12109,15 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) { SECStatus rv; PRBool isTLS; - sslSequenceNumber seq_num = 0; - ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec; + DTLSEpoch epoch; + sslSequenceNumber seqNum = 0; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec = NULL; + PRBool outOfOrderSpec = PR_FALSE; SSL3ContentType rType; sslBuffer *plaintext; - sslBuffer temp_buf = { NULL, 0, 0 }; SSL3AlertDescription alert = internal_error; PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); - if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) { - ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - ssl3_InitState(ss); - ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - } - /* check for Token Presence */ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); @@ -12519,41 +12131,48 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) if (cText == NULL) { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - rType = content_handshake; - goto process_it; + /* Note that this doesn't pass the epoch and sequence number of the + * record through, which DTLS 1.3 depends on. DTLS doesn't support + * asynchronous certificate validation, so that should be OK. */ + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); + return ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, content_handshake, + 0, 0, databuf); } ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/ - crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; - isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - + spec = ssl3_GetCipherSpec(ss, cText->seq_num); + if (!spec) { + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ + return SECSuccess; + } + if (spec != ss->ssl3.crSpec) { + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: Handling out-of-epoch record from epoch=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec->epoch)); + outOfOrderSpec = PR_TRUE; + } + isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - PRBool sameEpoch; - if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, cText, &sameEpoch, &seq_num)) { + if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, spec, cText, &seqNum)) { ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ - /* Maybe retransmit if needed. */ - return dtls_MaybeRetransmitHandshake(ss, cText, sameEpoch); + return SECSuccess; } } else { - seq_num = crSpec->read_seq_num + 1; + seqNum = spec->seqNum + 1; } - if (seq_num >= crSpec->cipher_def->max_records) { + if (seqNum >= spec->cipherDef->max_records) { ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: read sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, seq_num)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, seqNum)); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); return SECFailure; } - /* If we will be decompressing the buffer we need to decrypt somewhere - * other than into databuf */ - if (crSpec->decompressor) { - plaintext = &temp_buf; - } else { - plaintext = databuf; - } + plaintext = databuf; plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by Unprotect call below. */ /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted. @@ -12588,12 +12207,12 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) /* IMPORTANT: Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent. */ - if (crSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || - crSpec->cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) { + if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + spec->cipherDef->calg == ssl_calg_null) { /* Unencrypted TLS 1.3 records use the pre-TLS 1.3 format. */ - rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, cText, plaintext, &alert); + rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &alert); } else { - rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, cText, plaintext, &alert); + rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &alert); } #endif @@ -12602,14 +12221,25 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - /* Clear the temp buffer used for decompression upon failure. */ - sslBuffer_Clear(&temp_buf); + /* Ensure that we don't process this data again. */ + databuf->len = 0; + /* Ignore a CCS if the alternative handshake is negotiated. Note that + * this will fail if the server fails to negotiate the alternative + * handshake type in a 0-RTT session that is resumed from a session that + * did negotiate it. We don't care about that corner case right now. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + cText->type == content_change_cipher_spec && + ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake && + cText->buf->len == 1 && + cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) { + /* Ignore the CCS. */ + return SECSuccess; + } if (IS_DTLS(ss) || (ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial)) { /* Silently drop the packet */ - databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ return SECSuccess; } else { int errCode = PORT_GetError(); @@ -12622,10 +12252,11 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) } /* SECSuccess */ - crSpec->read_seq_num = seq_num; + spec->seqNum = PR_MAX(spec->seqNum, seqNum); if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, seq_num); + dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&spec->recvdRecords, seqNum); } + epoch = spec->epoch; ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/ @@ -12635,70 +12266,16 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) rType = cText->type; /* This must go after decryption because TLS 1.3 * has encrypted content types. */ - /* possibly decompress the record. If we aren't using compression then - * plaintext == databuf and so the uncompressed data is already in - * databuf. */ - if (crSpec->decompressor) { - if (databuf->space < plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION) { - rv = sslBuffer_Grow( - databuf, plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, - plaintext->len + - SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION)); - /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ - /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ - sslBuffer_Clear(&temp_buf); - return SECFailure; - } - } - - rv = crSpec->decompressor(crSpec->decompressContext, - databuf->buf, - (int *)&databuf->len, - databuf->space, - plaintext->buf, - plaintext->len); - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, - isTLS ? decompression_failure - : bad_record_mac); - - /* There appears to be a bug with (at least) Apache + OpenSSL where - * resumed SSLv3 connections don't actually use compression. See - * comments 93-95 of - * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=275744 - * - * So, if we get a decompression error, and the record appears to - * be already uncompressed, then we return a more specific error - * code to hopefully save somebody some debugging time in the - * future. - */ - if (plaintext->len >= 4) { - unsigned int len = ((unsigned int)plaintext->buf[1] << 16) | - ((unsigned int)plaintext->buf[2] << 8) | - (unsigned int)plaintext->buf[3]; - if (len == plaintext->len - 4) { - /* This appears to be uncompressed already */ - err = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD; - } - } - - sslBuffer_Clear(&temp_buf); - PORT_SetError(err); - return SECFailure; - } - - sslBuffer_Clear(&temp_buf); + /* IMPORTANT: We are in DTLS 1.3 mode and we have processed something + * from the wrong epoch. Divert to a divert processing function to make + * sure we don't accidentally use the data unsafely. */ + if (outOfOrderSpec) { + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + return dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(ss, spec, rType, databuf); } - /* - ** Having completed the decompression, check the length again. - */ - if (isTLS && databuf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024)) { + /* Check the length of the plaintext. */ + if (isTLS && databuf->len > MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) { SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); return SECFailure; @@ -12720,45 +12297,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) return SECFailure; } -/* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application. - */ -process_it: - /* XXX Get the xmit lock here. Odds are very high that we'll be xmiting - * data ang getting the xmit lock here prevents deadlocks. - */ - ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - - /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if - ** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock. - */ - switch (rType) { - case content_change_cipher_spec: - rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); - break; - case content_alert: - rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); - break; - case content_handshake: - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); - } else { - rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); - } - break; - /* - case content_application_data is handled before this switch - */ - default: - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type)); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); - ssl3_DecodeError(ss); - rv = SECFailure; - break; - } - - ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - return rv; + return ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, rType, epoch, seqNum, databuf); } /* @@ -12776,83 +12315,36 @@ ssl_InitSecState(sslSecurityInfo *sec) sec->keaGroup = NULL; } -/* Called from ssl3_InitState, immediately below. */ -/* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */ -void -ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) -{ - spec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null]; - PORT_Assert(spec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null); - spec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac_null]; - PORT_Assert(spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null); - spec->encode = Null_Cipher; - spec->decode = Null_Cipher; - spec->compressor = NULL; - spec->decompressor = NULL; - spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; - spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; - spec->mac_size = 0; - spec->master_secret = NULL; - - spec->msItem.data = NULL; - spec->msItem.len = 0; - - spec->client.write_key = NULL; - spec->client.write_mac_key = NULL; - spec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; - - spec->server.write_key = NULL; - spec->server.write_mac_key = NULL; - spec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; - - spec->write_seq_num = 0; - spec->read_seq_num = 0; - spec->epoch = 0; - - spec->refCt = 128; /* Arbitrarily high number to prevent - * non-TLS 1.3 cipherSpecs from being - * GCed. This will be overwritten with - * a valid refCt for TLS 1.3. */ - dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); -} - -/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord -** ssl3_SendClientHello() -** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() -** ssl3_HandleRecord() -** -** This function should perhaps acquire and release the SpecWriteLock. -*/ -void +SECStatus ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) { - PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - - if (ss->ssl3.initialized) - return; /* Function should be idempotent */ + SECStatus rv; ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; ssl_InitSecState(&ss->sec); ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); - ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[0]; - ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[1]; - ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.crSpec); - ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec); - ss->ssl3.crSpec->version = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version = ss->vrange.max; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + rv = ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(ss, CipherSpecRead); + rv |= ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(ss, CipherSpecWrite); + ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec = NULL; ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Rely on ssl_CreateNullCipherSpec() to set error code. */ + return SECFailure; + } ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : wait_server_hello; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : idle_handshake; - ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0; ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS; + ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer->timeout = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS; ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0; ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1; PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); @@ -12868,8 +12360,6 @@ ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL; ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret = NULL; ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret = NULL; - ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL; - PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space); ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; @@ -12881,9 +12371,7 @@ ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; - ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(ss); - - ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; } /* record the export policy for this cipher suite */ @@ -13137,8 +12625,7 @@ ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache) PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - if (!ss->firstHsDone || - (ss->ssl3.initialized && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake))) { + if (!ss->firstHsDone || (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); return SECFailure; } @@ -13152,6 +12639,11 @@ ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache) PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); return SECFailure; } + if (ss->version > ss->vrange.max || ss->version < ss->vrange.min) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + if (sid && flushCache) { ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */ ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */ @@ -13209,15 +12701,7 @@ ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss) SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName, PR_FALSE); - - if (ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest) { - PORT_FreeArena(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->arena, PR_FALSE); - ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL; - } - - /* free up the CipherSpecs */ - ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[0], PR_TRUE /*freeSrvName*/); - ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[1], PR_TRUE /*freeSrvName*/); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE); /* Destroy the DTLS data */ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { @@ -13229,10 +12713,10 @@ ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss) /* Destroy remote extensions */ ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); - ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + ssl3_DestroyExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); - /* Destroy TLS 1.3 cipher specs */ - tls13_DestroyCipherSpecs(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + /* Destroy cipher specs */ + ssl_DestroyCipherSpecs(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); /* Destroy TLS 1.3 keys */ if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) @@ -13261,8 +12745,6 @@ ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss) ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; /* Destroy TLS 1.3 buffered early data. */ tls13_DestroyEarlyData(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); - - ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_FALSE; } #define MAP_NULL(x) (((x) != 0) ? (x) : SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER) @@ -13301,7 +12783,7 @@ ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(void) } if (ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->type != type_aead) { - policyOid = MAP_NULL(mac_defs[suite->mac_alg].oid); + policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(suite->mac_alg)->oid); rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL)) { ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); |