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author | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
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committer | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
commit | 5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch) | |
tree | 10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c | |
parent | 49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff) | |
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Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c | 1019 |
1 files changed, 1019 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e9726d03c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c @@ -0,0 +1,1019 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +/* + * This file PK11Contexts which are used in multipart hashing, + * encryption/decryption, and signing/verication operations. + */ + +#include "seccomon.h" +#include "secmod.h" +#include "nssilock.h" +#include "secmodi.h" +#include "secmodti.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "secoid.h" +#include "sechash.h" +#include "secerr.h" + +static const SECItem pk11_null_params = { 0 }; + +/********************************************************************** + * + * Now Deal with Crypto Contexts + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * the monitors... + */ +void +PK11_EnterContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx) +{ + /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor + * the Context */ + if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) { + /* Should this use monitors instead? */ + PZ_Lock(cx->sessionLock); + } else { + PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(cx->slot); + } +} + +void +PK11_ExitContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx) +{ + /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor + * the Context */ + if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) { + /* Should this use monitors instead? */ + PZ_Unlock(cx->sessionLock); + } else { + PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot); + } +} + +/* + * Free up a Cipher Context + */ +void +PK11_DestroyContext(PK11Context *context, PRBool freeit) +{ + pk11_CloseSession(context->slot, context->session, context->ownSession); + /* initialize the critical fields of the context */ + if (context->savedData != NULL) + PORT_Free(context->savedData); + if (context->key) + PK11_FreeSymKey(context->key); + if (context->param && context->param != &pk11_null_params) + SECITEM_FreeItem(context->param, PR_TRUE); + if (context->sessionLock) + PZ_DestroyLock(context->sessionLock); + PK11_FreeSlot(context->slot); + if (freeit) + PORT_Free(context); +} + +/* + * save the current context. Allocate Space if necessary. + */ +static unsigned char * +pk11_saveContextHelper(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *buffer, + unsigned long *savedLength) +{ + CK_RV crv; + + /* If buffer is NULL, this will get the length */ + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength); + if (!buffer || (crv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) { + /* the given buffer wasn't big enough (or was NULL), but we + * have the length, so try again with a new buffer and the + * correct length + */ + unsigned long bufLen = *savedLength; + buffer = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (buffer == NULL) { + return (unsigned char *)NULL; + } + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufLen); + } + } + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv)); + return (unsigned char *)NULL; + } + return buffer; +} + +void * +pk11_saveContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long *savedLength) +{ + return pk11_saveContextHelper(context, + (unsigned char *)space, savedLength); +} + +/* + * restore the current context + */ +SECStatus +pk11_restoreContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long savedLength) +{ + CK_RV crv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = (context->key) ? context->key->objectID : CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + PORT_Assert(space != NULL); + if (space == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)space, savedLength, objectID, 0); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv)); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context); + +/* + * Context initialization. Used by all flavors of CreateContext + */ +static SECStatus +pk11_context_init(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM *mech_info) +{ + CK_RV crv; + PK11SymKey *symKey = context->key; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + switch (context->operation) { + case CKA_ENCRYPT: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID); + break; + case CKA_DECRYPT: + if (context->fortezzaHack) { + CK_ULONG count = 0; + /* generate the IV for fortezza */ + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID); + if (crv != CKR_OK) + break; + PK11_GETTAB(context->slot) + ->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, + NULL, &count); + } + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID); + break; + case CKA_SIGN: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID); + break; + case CKA_VERIFY: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID); + break; + case CKA_DIGEST: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestInit(context->session, mech_info); + break; + default: + crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + break; + } + + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv)); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* + * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex + */ + if (!context->ownSession) { + context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, + &context->savedLength); + if (context->savedData == NULL) + rv = SECFailure; + /* clear out out session for others to use */ + pk11_Finalize(context); + } + return rv; +} + +/* + * Common Helper Function do come up with a new context. + */ +static PK11Context * +pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, + PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey, + SECItem *param) +{ + CK_MECHANISM mech_info; + PK11Context *context; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(slot != NULL); + if (!slot || (!symKey && ((operation != CKA_DIGEST) || + (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64)))) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return NULL; + } + context = (PK11Context *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11Context)); + if (context == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + /* now deal with the fortezza hack... the fortezza hack is an attempt + * to get around the issue of the card not allowing you to do a FORTEZZA + * LoadIV/Encrypt, which was added because such a combination could be + * use to circumvent the key escrow system. Unfortunately SSL needs to + * do this kind of operation, so in SSL we do a loadIV (to verify it), + * Then GenerateIV, and through away the first 8 bytes on either side + * of the connection.*/ + context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE; + if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64) { + if (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack) { + context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE; + } + } + + /* initialize the critical fields of the context */ + context->operation = operation; + context->key = symKey ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey) : NULL; + context->slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); + context->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &context->ownSession); + context->cx = symKey ? symKey->cx : NULL; + /* get our session */ + context->savedData = NULL; + + /* save the parameters so that some digesting stuff can do multiple + * begins on a single context */ + context->type = type; + if (param) { + if (param->len > 0) { + context->param = SECITEM_DupItem(param); + } else { + context->param = (SECItem *)&pk11_null_params; + } + } else { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + context->param = NULL; + } + context->init = PR_FALSE; + context->sessionLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockPK11cxt); + if ((context->param == NULL) || (context->sessionLock == NULL)) { + PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE); + return NULL; + } + + mech_info.mechanism = type; + mech_info.pParameter = param->data; + mech_info.ulParameterLen = param->len; + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); + rv = pk11_context_init(context, &mech_info); + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE); + return NULL; + } + context->init = PR_TRUE; + return context; +} + +/* + * put together the various PK11_Create_Context calls used by different + * parts of libsec. + */ +PK11Context * +__PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, + PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, + SECItem *param, void *wincx) +{ + PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL; + PK11Context *context = NULL; + + /* first get a slot */ + if (slot == NULL) { + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, wincx); + if (slot == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); + goto loser; + } + } else { + PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); + } + + /* now import the key */ + symKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, type, origin, operation, key, wincx); + if (symKey == NULL) + goto loser; + + context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(type, operation, symKey, param); + +loser: + if (symKey) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + } + if (slot) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + + return context; +} + +PK11Context * +PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, + PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, + SECItem *param, void *wincx) +{ + return __PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(slot, type, origin, operation, + key, param, wincx); +} + +/* + * Create a context from a key. We really should make sure we aren't using + * the same key in multiple session! + */ +PK11Context * +PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, + PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *param) +{ + PK11SymKey *newKey; + PK11Context *context; + + /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */ + newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey, type, operation); + if (newKey == NULL) { + PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey); + } else { + symKey = newKey; + } + + /* Context Adopts the symKey.... */ + context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, symKey->slot, operation, symKey, + param); + PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + return context; +} + +/* + * Digest contexts don't need keys, but the do need to find a slot. + * Macing should use PK11_CreateContextBySymKey. + */ +PK11Context * +PK11_CreateDigestContext(SECOidTag hashAlg) +{ + /* digesting has to work without authentication to the slot */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type; + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PK11Context *context; + SECItem param; + + type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hashAlg); + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL); + if (slot == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); + return NULL; + } + + /* maybe should really be PK11_GenerateNewParam?? */ + param.data = NULL; + param.len = 0; + param.type = 0; + + context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, slot, CKA_DIGEST, NULL, ¶m); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return context; +} + +/* + * create a new context which is the clone of the state of old context. + */ +PK11Context * +PK11_CloneContext(PK11Context *old) +{ + PK11Context *newcx; + PRBool needFree = PR_FALSE; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + void *data; + unsigned long len; + + newcx = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(old->type, old->slot, old->operation, + old->key, old->param); + if (newcx == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* now clone the save state. First we need to find the save state + * of the old session. If the old context owns it's session, + * the state needs to be saved, otherwise the state is in saveData. */ + if (old->ownSession) { + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(old); + data = pk11_saveContext(old, NULL, &len); + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(old); + needFree = PR_TRUE; + } else { + data = old->savedData; + len = old->savedLength; + } + + if (data == NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE); + return NULL; + } + + /* now copy that state into our new context. Again we have different + * work if the new context owns it's own session. If it does, we + * restore the state gathered above. If it doesn't, we copy the + * saveData pointer... */ + if (newcx->ownSession) { + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(newcx); + rv = pk11_restoreContext(newcx, data, len); + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(newcx); + } else { + PORT_Assert(newcx->savedData != NULL); + if ((newcx->savedData == NULL) || (newcx->savedLength < len)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + PORT_Memcpy(newcx->savedData, data, len); + newcx->savedLength = len; + } + } + + if (needFree) + PORT_Free(data); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE); + return NULL; + } + return newcx; +} + +/* + * save the current context state into a variable. Required to make FORTEZZA + * work. + */ +SECStatus +PK11_SaveContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int *len, int saveLength) +{ + unsigned char *data = NULL; + CK_ULONG length = saveLength; + + if (cx->ownSession) { + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); + data = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, save, &length); + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); + if (data) + *len = length; + } else if ((unsigned)saveLength >= cx->savedLength) { + data = (unsigned char *)cx->savedData; + if (cx->savedData) { + PORT_Memcpy(save, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength); + } + *len = cx->savedLength; + } + if (data != NULL) { + if (cx->ownSession) { + PORT_ZFree(data, length); + } + return SECSuccess; + } else { + return SECFailure; + } +} + +/* same as above, but may allocate the return buffer. */ +unsigned char * +PK11_SaveContextAlloc(PK11Context *cx, + unsigned char *preAllocBuf, unsigned int pabLen, + unsigned int *stateLen) +{ + unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL; + unsigned long length = (unsigned long)pabLen; + + if (cx->ownSession) { + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); + stateBuf = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, preAllocBuf, &length); + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); + *stateLen = (stateBuf != NULL) ? length : 0; + } else { + if (pabLen < cx->savedLength) { + stateBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(cx->savedLength); + if (!stateBuf) { + return (unsigned char *)NULL; + } + } else { + stateBuf = preAllocBuf; + } + if (cx->savedData) { + PORT_Memcpy(stateBuf, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength); + } + *stateLen = cx->savedLength; + } + return stateBuf; +} + +/* + * restore the context state into a new running context. Also required for + * FORTEZZA . + */ +SECStatus +PK11_RestoreContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int len) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + if (cx->ownSession) { + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); + pk11_Finalize(cx); + rv = pk11_restoreContext(cx, save, len); + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); + } else { + PORT_Assert(cx->savedData != NULL); + if ((cx->savedData == NULL) || (cx->savedLength < (unsigned)len)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + PORT_Memcpy(cx->savedData, save, len); + cx->savedLength = len; + } + } + return rv; +} + +/* + * This is to get FIPS compliance until we can convert + * libjar to use PK11_ hashing functions. It returns PR_FALSE + * if we can't get a PK11 Context. + */ +PRBool +PK11_HashOK(SECOidTag algID) +{ + PK11Context *cx; + + cx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(algID); + if (cx == NULL) + return PR_FALSE; + PK11_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* + * start a new digesting or Mac'ing operation on this context + */ +SECStatus +PK11_DigestBegin(PK11Context *cx) +{ + CK_MECHANISM mech_info; + SECStatus rv; + + if (cx->init == PR_TRUE) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* + * make sure the old context is clear first + */ + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); + pk11_Finalize(cx); + + mech_info.mechanism = cx->type; + mech_info.pParameter = cx->param->data; + mech_info.ulParameterLen = cx->param->len; + rv = pk11_context_init(cx, &mech_info); + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + cx->init = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +PK11_HashBuf(SECOidTag hashAlg, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, + PRInt32 len) +{ + PK11Context *context; + unsigned int max_length; + unsigned int out_length; + SECStatus rv; + + /* len will be passed to PK11_DigestOp as unsigned. */ + if (len < 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hashAlg); + if (context == NULL) + return SECFailure; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE); + return rv; + } + + rv = PK11_DigestOp(context, in, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE); + return rv; + } + + /* XXX This really should have been an argument to this function! */ + max_length = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg); + PORT_Assert(max_length); + if (!max_length) + max_length = HASH_LENGTH_MAX; + + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context, out, &out_length, max_length); + PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE); + return rv; +} + +/* + * execute a bulk encryption operation + */ +SECStatus +PK11_CipherOp(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *out, int *outlen, + int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) +{ + CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; + CK_ULONG length = maxout; + CK_ULONG offset = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned char *saveOut = out; + unsigned char *allocOut = NULL; + + /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored + * state. + */ + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); + if (!context->ownSession) { + rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, + context->savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + return rv; + } + } + + /* + * The fortezza hack is to send 8 extra bytes on the first encrypted and + * lose them on the first decrypt. + */ + if (context->fortezzaHack) { + unsigned char random[8]; + if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) { + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, sizeof(random)); + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); + + /* since we are offseting the output, we can't encrypt back into + * the same buffer... allocate a temporary buffer just for this + * call. */ + allocOut = out = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(maxout); + if (out == NULL) { + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + return SECFailure; + } + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, random, sizeof(random), out, &length); + + out += length; + maxout -= length; + offset = length; + } else if (context->operation == CKA_DECRYPT) { + length = sizeof(random); + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, sizeof(random), random, &length); + inlen -= length; + in += length; + context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + switch (context->operation) { + case CKA_ENCRYPT: + length = maxout; + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length); + length += offset; + break; + case CKA_DECRYPT: + length = maxout; + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length); + break; + default: + crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + break; + } + + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv)); + *outlen = 0; + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + *outlen = length; + } + + if (context->fortezzaHack) { + if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) { + PORT_Assert(allocOut); + PORT_Memcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length); + PORT_Free(allocOut); + } + context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* + * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex + */ + if (!context->ownSession) { + context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, + &context->savedLength); + if (context->savedData == NULL) + rv = SECFailure; + + /* clear out out session for others to use */ + pk11_Finalize(context); + } + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + return rv; +} + +/* + * execute a digest/signature operation + */ +SECStatus +PK11_DigestOp(PK11Context *context, const unsigned char *in, unsigned inLen) +{ + CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (inLen == 0) { + return SECSuccess; + } + if (!in) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored + * state. + */ + context->init = PR_FALSE; + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); + if (!context->ownSession) { + rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, + context->savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + return rv; + } + } + + switch (context->operation) { + /* also for MAC'ing */ + case CKA_SIGN: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen); + break; + case CKA_VERIFY: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen); + break; + case CKA_DIGEST: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen); + break; + default: + crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + break; + } + + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv)); + rv = SECFailure; + } + + /* + * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex + */ + if (!context->ownSession) { + context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, + &context->savedLength); + if (context->savedData == NULL) + rv = SECFailure; + + /* clear out out session for others to use */ + pk11_Finalize(context); + } + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + return rv; +} + +/* + * Digest a key if possible./ + */ +SECStatus +PK11_DigestKey(PK11Context *context, PK11SymKey *key) +{ + CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL; + + if (!context || !key) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored + * state. + */ + if (context->slot != key->slot) { + newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(context->slot, CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, CKA_SIGN, key); + } else { + newKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(key); + } + + context->init = PR_FALSE; + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); + if (!context->ownSession) { + rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, + context->savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); + return rv; + } + } + + if (newKey == NULL) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + if (key->data.data) { + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, key->data.data, key->data.len); + } + } else { + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestKey(context->session, newKey->objectID); + } + + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv)); + rv = SECFailure; + } + + /* + * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex + */ + if (!context->ownSession) { + context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, + &context->savedLength); + if (context->savedData == NULL) + rv = SECFailure; + + /* clear out out session for others to use */ + pk11_Finalize(context); + } + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + if (newKey) + PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); + return rv; +} + +/* + * externally callable version of the lowercase pk11_finalize(). + */ +SECStatus +PK11_Finalize(PK11Context *context) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); + rv = pk11_Finalize(context); + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + return rv; +} + +/* + * clean up a cipher operation, so the session can be used by + * someone new. + */ +SECStatus +pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context) +{ + CK_ULONG count = 0; + CK_RV crv; + unsigned char stackBuf[256]; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + + if (!context->ownSession) { + return SECSuccess; + } + +finalize: + switch (context->operation) { + case CKA_ENCRYPT: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count); + break; + case CKA_DECRYPT: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count); + break; + case CKA_SIGN: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, buffer, &count); + break; + case CKA_VERIFY: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, buffer, count); + break; + case CKA_DIGEST: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, buffer, &count); + break; + default: + crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + break; + } + + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + if (buffer != stackBuf) { + PORT_Free(buffer); + } + if (crv == CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED) { + /* if there's no operation, it is finalized */ + return SECSuccess; + } + PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv)); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* try to finalize the session with a buffer */ + if (buffer == NULL) { + if (count <= sizeof stackBuf) { + buffer = stackBuf; + } else { + buffer = PORT_Alloc(count); + if (buffer == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + } + goto finalize; + } + if (buffer != stackBuf) { + PORT_Free(buffer); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Return the final digested or signed data... + * this routine can either take pre initialized data, or allocate data + * either out of an arena or out of the standard heap. + */ +SECStatus +PK11_DigestFinal(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *data, + unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int length) +{ + CK_ULONG len; + CK_RV crv; + SECStatus rv; + + /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored + * state. + */ + PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); + if (!context->ownSession) { + rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, + context->savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + return rv; + } + } + + len = length; + switch (context->operation) { + case CKA_SIGN: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, data, &len); + break; + case CKA_VERIFY: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, data, len); + break; + case CKA_DIGEST: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, data, &len); + break; + case CKA_ENCRYPT: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, data, &len); + break; + case CKA_DECRYPT: + crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, data, &len); + break; + default: + crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + break; + } + PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); + + *outLen = (unsigned int)len; + context->init = PR_FALSE; /* allow Begin to start up again */ + + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv)); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} |