Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 1159 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/ec.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/ec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..12bfeed41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/ec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1159 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
+#include "stubs.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "prerr.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "secmpi.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "mplogic.h"
+#include "ec.h"
+#include "ecl.h"
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+
+static const ECMethod kMethods[] = {
+    { ECCurve25519,
+      ec_Curve25519_pt_mul,
+      ec_Curve25519_pt_validate }
+};
+
+static const ECMethod *
+ec_get_method_from_name(ECCurveName name)
+{
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(kMethods) / sizeof(kMethods[0]); ++i) {
+        if (kMethods[i].name == name) {
+            return &kMethods[i];
+        }
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if pointP is the point at infinity, false otherwise
+ */
+PRBool
+ec_point_at_infinity(SECItem *pointP)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < pointP->len; i++) {
+        if (pointP->data[i] != 0x00)
+            return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes scalar point multiplication pointQ = k1 * G + k2 * pointP for
+ * the curve whose parameters are encoded in params with base point G.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ec_points_mul(const ECParams *params, const mp_int *k1, const mp_int *k2,
+              const SECItem *pointP, SECItem *pointQ)
+{
+    mp_int Px, Py, Qx, Qy;
+    mp_int Gx, Gy, order, irreducible, a, b;
+    ECGroup *group = NULL;
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
+    int len;
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    int i;
+    char mpstr[256];
+
+    printf("ec_points_mul: params [len=%d]:", params->DEREncoding.len);
+    for (i = 0; i < params->DEREncoding.len; i++)
+        printf("%02x:", params->DEREncoding.data[i]);
+    printf("\n");
+
+    if (k1 != NULL) {
+        mp_tohex((mp_int *)k1, mpstr);
+        printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k1: %s\n", mpstr);
+        mp_todecimal((mp_int *)k1, mpstr);
+        printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k1: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    }
+
+    if (k2 != NULL) {
+        mp_tohex((mp_int *)k2, mpstr);
+        printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k2: %s\n", mpstr);
+        mp_todecimal((mp_int *)k2, mpstr);
+        printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k2: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    }
+
+    if (pointP != NULL) {
+        printf("ec_points_mul: pointP [len=%d]:", pointP->len);
+        for (i = 0; i < pointP->len; i++)
+            printf("%02x:", pointP->data[i]);
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* NOTE: We only support uncompressed points for now */
+    len = (params->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
+    if (pointP != NULL) {
+        if ((pointP->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) ||
+            (pointP->len != (2 * len + 1))) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM);
+            return SECFailure;
+        };
+    }
+
+    MP_DIGITS(&Px) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&Py) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&Qx) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&Qy) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&Gx) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&Gy) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&order) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&irreducible) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&a) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&b) = 0;
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Px));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Py));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Qx));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Qy));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Gx));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Gy));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&order));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&irreducible));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&a));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&b));
+
+    if ((k2 != NULL) && (pointP != NULL)) {
+        /* Initialize Px and Py */
+        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Px, pointP->data + 1, (mp_size)len));
+        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Py, pointP->data + 1 + len, (mp_size)len));
+    }
+
+    /* construct from named params, if possible */
+    if (params->name != ECCurve_noName) {
+        group = ECGroup_fromName(params->name);
+    }
+
+    if (group == NULL)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if ((k2 != NULL) && (pointP != NULL)) {
+        CHECK_MPI_OK(ECPoints_mul(group, k1, k2, &Px, &Py, &Qx, &Qy));
+    } else {
+        CHECK_MPI_OK(ECPoints_mul(group, k1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Qx, &Qy));
+    }
+
+    /* Construct the SECItem representation of point Q */
+    pointQ->data[0] = EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED;
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&Qx, pointQ->data + 1,
+                                     (mp_size)len));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&Qy, pointQ->data + 1 + len,
+                                     (mp_size)len));
+
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    printf("ec_points_mul: pointQ [len=%d]:", pointQ->len);
+    for (i = 0; i < pointQ->len; i++)
+        printf("%02x:", pointQ->data[i]);
+    printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+    ECGroup_free(group);
+    mp_clear(&Px);
+    mp_clear(&Py);
+    mp_clear(&Qx);
+    mp_clear(&Qy);
+    mp_clear(&Gx);
+    mp_clear(&Gy);
+    mp_clear(&order);
+    mp_clear(&irreducible);
+    mp_clear(&a);
+    mp_clear(&b);
+    if (err) {
+        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a supplied
+ * value and the public key is the result of performing a scalar
+ * point multiplication of that value with the curve's base point.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ec_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey,
+          const unsigned char *privKeyBytes, int privKeyLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+    ECPrivateKey *key;
+    mp_int k;
+    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
+    int len;
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    printf("ec_NewKey called\n");
+#endif
+    MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
+
+    if (!ecParams || !privKey || !privKeyBytes || (privKeyLen < 0) ||
+        !ecParams->name) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Initialize an arena for the EC key. */
+    if (!(arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE)))
+        return SECFailure;
+
+    key = (ECPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(ECPrivateKey));
+    if (!key) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Set the version number (SEC 1 section C.4 says it should be 1) */
+    SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->version, 1);
+    key->version.data[0] = 1;
+
+    /* Copy all of the fields from the ECParams argument to the
+     * ECParams structure within the private key.
+     */
+    key->ecParams.arena = arena;
+    key->ecParams.type = ecParams->type;
+    key->ecParams.fieldID.size = ecParams->fieldID.size;
+    key->ecParams.fieldID.type = ecParams->fieldID.type;
+    if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_GFp ||
+        ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+        CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.fieldID.u.prime,
+                                      &ecParams->fieldID.u.prime));
+    } else {
+        CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.fieldID.u.poly,
+                                      &ecParams->fieldID.u.poly));
+    }
+    key->ecParams.fieldID.k1 = ecParams->fieldID.k1;
+    key->ecParams.fieldID.k2 = ecParams->fieldID.k2;
+    key->ecParams.fieldID.k3 = ecParams->fieldID.k3;
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.a,
+                                  &ecParams->curve.a));
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.b,
+                                  &ecParams->curve.b));
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.seed,
+                                  &ecParams->curve.seed));
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.base,
+                                  &ecParams->base));
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.order,
+                                  &ecParams->order));
+    key->ecParams.cofactor = ecParams->cofactor;
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.DEREncoding,
+                                  &ecParams->DEREncoding));
+    key->ecParams.name = ecParams->name;
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curveOID,
+                                  &ecParams->curveOID));
+
+    SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->publicValue, EC_GetPointSize(ecParams));
+    len = ecParams->order.len;
+    SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->privateValue, len);
+
+    /* Copy private key */
+    if (privKeyLen >= len) {
+        memcpy(key->privateValue.data, privKeyBytes, len);
+    } else {
+        memset(key->privateValue.data, 0, (len - privKeyLen));
+        memcpy(key->privateValue.data + (len - privKeyLen), privKeyBytes, privKeyLen);
+    }
+
+    /* Compute corresponding public key */
+
+    /* Use curve specific code for point multiplication */
+    if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+        const ECMethod *method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
+        if (method == NULL || method->mul == NULL) {
+            /* unknown curve */
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+        rv = method->mul(&key->publicValue, &key->privateValue, NULL);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, key->privateValue.data,
+                                         (mp_size)len));
+
+    rv = ec_points_mul(ecParams, &k, NULL, NULL, &(key->publicValue));
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+done:
+    *privKey = key;
+
+cleanup:
+    mp_clear(&k);
+    if (rv) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    printf("ec_NewKey returning %s\n",
+           (rv == SECSuccess) ? "success" : "failure");
+#endif
+#else
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a supplied
+ * random value (in seed) and the public key is the result of
+ * performing a scalar point multiplication of that value with
+ * the curve's base point.
+ */
+SECStatus
+EC_NewKeyFromSeed(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey,
+                  const unsigned char *seed, int seedlen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+    rv = ec_NewKey(ecParams, privKey, seed, seedlen);
+#else
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+/* Generate a random private key using the algorithm A.4.1 of ANSI X9.62,
+ * modified a la FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1 to eliminate the bias in the
+ * random number generator.
+ *
+ * Parameters
+ * - order: a buffer that holds the curve's group order
+ * - len: the length in octets of the order buffer
+ *
+ * Return Value
+ * Returns a buffer of len octets that holds the private key. The caller
+ * is responsible for freeing the buffer with PORT_ZFree.
+ */
+static unsigned char *
+ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(const unsigned char *order, int len)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    mp_err err;
+    unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
+    mp_int privKeyVal, order_1, one;
+
+    MP_DIGITS(&privKeyVal) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&order_1) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&one) = 0;
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&privKeyVal));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&order_1));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&one));
+
+    /* Generates 2*len random bytes using the global random bit generator
+     * (which implements Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1) then
+     * reduces modulo the group order.
+     */
+    if ((privKeyBytes = PORT_Alloc(2 * len)) == NULL)
+        goto cleanup;
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKeyBytes, 2 * len));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, 2 * len));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&order_1, order, len));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_set_int(&one, 1));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&order_1, &one, &order_1));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&privKeyVal, &order_1, &privKeyVal));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&privKeyVal, &one, &privKeyVal));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, len));
+    memset(privKeyBytes + len, 0, len);
+cleanup:
+    mp_clear(&privKeyVal);
+    mp_clear(&order_1);
+    mp_clear(&one);
+    if (err < MP_OKAY) {
+        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && privKeyBytes) {
+        PORT_ZFree(privKeyBytes, 2 * len);
+        privKeyBytes = NULL;
+    }
+    return privKeyBytes;
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a random value and
+ * the public key is the result of performing a scalar point multiplication
+ * of that value with the curve's base point.
+ */
+SECStatus
+EC_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+    int len;
+    unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
+
+    if (!ecParams) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    len = ecParams->order.len;
+    privKeyBytes = ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ecParams->order.data, len);
+    if (privKeyBytes == NULL)
+        goto cleanup;
+    /* generate public key */
+    CHECK_SEC_OK(ec_NewKey(ecParams, privKey, privKeyBytes, len));
+
+cleanup:
+    if (privKeyBytes) {
+        PORT_ZFree(privKeyBytes, len);
+    }
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    printf("EC_NewKey returning %s\n",
+           (rv == SECSuccess) ? "success" : "failure");
+#endif
+#else
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Validates an EC public key as described in Section 5.2.2 of
+ * X9.62. The ECDH primitive when used without the cofactor does
+ * not address small subgroup attacks, which may occur when the
+ * public key is not valid. These attacks can be prevented by
+ * validating the public key before using ECDH.
+ */
+SECStatus
+EC_ValidatePublicKey(ECParams *ecParams, SECItem *publicValue)
+{
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+    mp_int Px, Py;
+    ECGroup *group = NULL;
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
+    int len;
+
+    if (!ecParams || !publicValue || !ecParams->name) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Uses curve specific code for point validation. */
+    if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+        const ECMethod *method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
+        if (method == NULL || method->validate == NULL) {
+            /* unknown curve */
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        return method->validate(publicValue);
+    }
+
+    /* NOTE: We only support uncompressed points for now */
+    len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
+    if (publicValue->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM);
+        return SECFailure;
+    } else if (publicValue->len != (2 * len + 1)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    MP_DIGITS(&Px) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&Py) = 0;
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Px));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Py));
+
+    /* Initialize Px and Py */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Px, publicValue->data + 1, (mp_size)len));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Py, publicValue->data + 1 + len, (mp_size)len));
+
+    /* construct from named params */
+    group = ECGroup_fromName(ecParams->name);
+    if (group == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * ECGroup_fromName fails if ecParams->name is not a valid
+         * ECCurveName value, or if we run out of memory, or perhaps
+         * for other reasons.  Unfortunately if ecParams->name is a
+         * valid ECCurveName value, we don't know what the right error
+         * code should be because ECGroup_fromName doesn't return an
+         * error code to the caller.  Set err to MP_UNDEF because
+         * that's what ECGroup_fromName uses internally.
+         */
+        if ((ecParams->name <= ECCurve_noName) ||
+            (ecParams->name >= ECCurve_pastLastCurve)) {
+            err = MP_BADARG;
+        } else {
+            err = MP_UNDEF;
+        }
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* validate public point */
+    if ((err = ECPoint_validate(group, &Px, &Py)) < MP_YES) {
+        if (err == MP_NO) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            err = MP_OKAY; /* don't change the error code */
+        }
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+    ECGroup_free(group);
+    mp_clear(&Px);
+    mp_clear(&Py);
+    if (err) {
+        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    }
+    return rv;
+#else
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+    return SECFailure;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+}
+
+/*
+** Performs an ECDH key derivation by computing the scalar point
+** multiplication of privateValue and publicValue (with or without the
+** cofactor) and returns the x-coordinate of the resulting elliptic
+** curve point in derived secret.  If successful, derivedSecret->data
+** is set to the address of the newly allocated buffer containing the
+** derived secret, and derivedSecret->len is the size of the secret
+** produced. It is the caller's responsibility to free the allocated
+** buffer containing the derived secret.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ECDH_Derive(SECItem *publicValue,
+            ECParams *ecParams,
+            SECItem *privateValue,
+            PRBool withCofactor,
+            SECItem *derivedSecret)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+    unsigned int len = 0;
+    SECItem pointQ = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+    mp_int k; /* to hold the private value */
+    mp_int cofactor;
+    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    int i;
+#endif
+
+    if (!publicValue || !ecParams || !privateValue || !derivedSecret ||
+        !ecParams->name) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Perform curve specific multiplication using ECMethod */
+    if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+        const ECMethod *method;
+        memset(derivedSecret, 0, sizeof(*derivedSecret));
+        derivedSecret = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, derivedSecret, EC_GetPointSize(ecParams));
+        if (derivedSecret == NULL) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
+        if (method == NULL || method->validate == NULL ||
+            method->mul == NULL) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        if (method->validate(publicValue) != SECSuccess) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        return method->mul(derivedSecret, privateValue, publicValue);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We fail if the public value is the point at infinity, since
+     * this produces predictable results.
+     */
+    if (ec_point_at_infinity(publicValue)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
+    memset(derivedSecret, 0, sizeof *derivedSecret);
+    len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
+    pointQ.len = EC_GetPointSize(ecParams);
+    if ((pointQ.data = PORT_Alloc(pointQ.len)) == NULL)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, privateValue->data,
+                                         (mp_size)privateValue->len));
+
+    if (withCofactor && (ecParams->cofactor != 1)) {
+        /* multiply k with the cofactor */
+        MP_DIGITS(&cofactor) = 0;
+        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&cofactor));
+        mp_set(&cofactor, ecParams->cofactor);
+        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&k, &cofactor, &k));
+    }
+
+    /* Multiply our private key and peer's public point */
+    if (ec_points_mul(ecParams, NULL, &k, publicValue, &pointQ) != SECSuccess) {
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    if (ec_point_at_infinity(&pointQ)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); /* XXX better error code? */
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* Allocate memory for the derived secret and copy
+     * the x co-ordinate of pointQ into it.
+     */
+    SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, derivedSecret, len);
+    memcpy(derivedSecret->data, pointQ.data + 1, len);
+
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    printf("derived_secret:\n");
+    for (i = 0; i < derivedSecret->len; i++)
+        printf("%02x:", derivedSecret->data[i]);
+    printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+    mp_clear(&k);
+
+    if (err) {
+        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+    }
+
+    if (pointQ.data) {
+        PORT_ZFree(pointQ.data, pointQ.len);
+    }
+#else
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Computes the ECDSA signature (a concatenation of two values r and s)
+ * on the digest using the given key and the random value kb (used in
+ * computing s).
+ */
+SECStatus
+ECDSA_SignDigestWithSeed(ECPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature,
+                         const SECItem *digest, const unsigned char *kb, const int kblen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+    mp_int x1;
+    mp_int d, k; /* private key, random integer */
+    mp_int r, s; /* tuple (r, s) is the signature */
+    mp_int t;    /* holding tmp values */
+    mp_int n;
+    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
+    ECParams *ecParams = NULL;
+    SECItem kGpoint = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+    int flen = 0;   /* length in bytes of the field size */
+    unsigned olen;  /* length in bytes of the base point order */
+    unsigned obits; /* length in bits  of the base point order */
+    unsigned char *t2 = NULL;
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    char mpstr[256];
+#endif
+
+    /* Initialize MPI integers. */
+    /* must happen before the first potential call to cleanup */
+    MP_DIGITS(&x1) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&d) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&s) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&t) = 0;
+
+    /* Check args */
+    if (!key || !signature || !digest || !kb || (kblen < 0)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ecParams = &(key->ecParams);
+    flen = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
+    olen = ecParams->order.len;
+    if (signature->data == NULL) {
+        /* a call to get the signature length only */
+        goto finish;
+    }
+    if (signature->len < 2 * olen) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&x1));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&d));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&n));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&t));
+
+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(ecParams->order, &n);
+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateValue, &d);
+
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, kblen));
+    /* Make sure k is in the interval [1, n-1] */
+    if ((mp_cmp_z(&k) <= 0) || (mp_cmp(&k, &n) >= 0)) {
+#if EC_DEBUG
+        printf("k is outside [1, n-1]\n");
+        mp_tohex(&k, mpstr);
+        printf("k : %s \n", mpstr);
+        mp_tohex(&n, mpstr);
+        printf("n : %s \n", mpstr);
+#endif
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+    ** so we compute k*G using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+    ** bit-length.
+    ** Fix based on patch for ECDSA timing attack in the paper
+    ** by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri at
+    **   http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232
+    **
+    ** How do we convert k to a value of a fixed bit-length?
+    ** k starts off as an integer satisfying 0 <= k < n.  Hence,
+    ** n <= k+n < 2n, which means k+n has either the same number
+    ** of bits as n or one more bit than n.  If k+n has the same
+    ** number of bits as n, the second addition ensures that the
+    ** final value has exactly one more bit than n.  Thus, we
+    ** always end up with a value that exactly one more bit than n.
+    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &n, &k));
+    if (mpl_significant_bits(&k) <= mpl_significant_bits(&n)) {
+        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &n, &k));
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.2, Step 2
+    **
+    ** Compute kG
+    */
+    kGpoint.len = EC_GetPointSize(ecParams);
+    kGpoint.data = PORT_Alloc(kGpoint.len);
+    if ((kGpoint.data == NULL) ||
+        (ec_points_mul(ecParams, &k, NULL, NULL, &kGpoint) != SECSuccess))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 1
+    **
+    ** Extract the x co-ordinate of kG into x1
+    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&x1, kGpoint.data + 1,
+                                         (mp_size)flen));
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 2
+    **
+    ** r = x1 mod n  NOTE: n is the order of the curve
+    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&x1, &n, &r));
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 3
+    **
+    ** verify r != 0
+    */
+    if (mp_cmp_z(&r) == 0) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 4
+    **
+    ** s = (k**-1 * (HASH(M) + d*r)) mod n
+    */
+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*digest, &s); /* s = HASH(M)     */
+
+    /* In the definition of EC signing, digests are truncated
+     * to the length of n in bits.
+     * (see SEC 1 "Elliptic Curve Digit Signature Algorithm" section 4.1.*/
+    CHECK_MPI_OK((obits = mpl_significant_bits(&n)));
+    if (digest->len * 8 > obits) {
+        mpl_rsh(&s, &s, digest->len * 8 - obits);
+    }
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    mp_todecimal(&n, mpstr);
+    printf("n : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&d, mpstr);
+    printf("d : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_tohex(&x1, mpstr);
+    printf("x1: %s\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&s, mpstr);
+    printf("digest: %s (decimal)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&r, mpstr);
+    printf("r : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_tohex(&r, mpstr);
+    printf("r : %s\n", mpstr);
+#endif
+
+    if ((t2 = PORT_Alloc(2 * ecParams->order.len)) == NULL) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    if (RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(t2, 2 * ecParams->order.len) != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&t, t2, 2 * ecParams->order.len)); /* t <-$ Zn */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &n, &k));                                /* k = k * t mod n */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &n, &k));                                    /* k = k**-1 mod n */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &n, &k));                                /* k = k * t mod n */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&d, &r, &n, &d));                                /* d = d * r mod n */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_addmod(&s, &d, &n, &s));                                /* s = s + d mod n */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &n, &s));                                /* s = s * k mod n */
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    mp_todecimal(&s, mpstr);
+    printf("s : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_tohex(&s, mpstr);
+    printf("s : %s\n", mpstr);
+#endif
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 5
+    **
+    ** verify s != 0
+    */
+    if (mp_cmp_z(&s) == 0) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /*
+    **
+    ** Signature is tuple (r, s)
+    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&r, signature->data, olen));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&s, signature->data + olen, olen));
+finish:
+    signature->len = 2 * olen;
+
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+    err = MP_OKAY;
+cleanup:
+    mp_clear(&x1);
+    mp_clear(&d);
+    mp_clear(&k);
+    mp_clear(&r);
+    mp_clear(&s);
+    mp_clear(&n);
+    mp_clear(&t);
+
+    if (t2) {
+        PORT_Free(t2);
+    }
+
+    if (kGpoint.data) {
+        PORT_ZFree(kGpoint.data, kGpoint.len);
+    }
+
+    if (err) {
+        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    }
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    printf("ECDSA signing with seed %s\n",
+           (rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
+#endif
+#else
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+** Computes the ECDSA signature on the digest using the given key
+** and a random seed.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ECDSA_SignDigest(ECPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+    int len;
+    unsigned char *kBytes = NULL;
+
+    if (!key) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Generate random value k */
+    len = key->ecParams.order.len;
+    kBytes = ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(key->ecParams.order.data, len);
+    if (kBytes == NULL)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    /* Generate ECDSA signature with the specified k value */
+    rv = ECDSA_SignDigestWithSeed(key, signature, digest, kBytes, len);
+
+cleanup:
+    if (kBytes) {
+        PORT_ZFree(kBytes, len);
+    }
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    printf("ECDSA signing %s\n",
+           (rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
+#endif
+#else
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+** Checks the signature on the given digest using the key provided.
+**
+** The key argument must represent a valid EC public key (a point on
+** the relevant curve).  If it is not a valid point, then the behavior
+** of this function is undefined.  In cases where a public key might
+** not be valid, use EC_ValidatePublicKey to check.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ECDSA_VerifyDigest(ECPublicKey *key, const SECItem *signature,
+                   const SECItem *digest)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+    mp_int r_, s_;       /* tuple (r', s') is received signature) */
+    mp_int c, u1, u2, v; /* intermediate values used in verification */
+    mp_int x1;
+    mp_int n;
+    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
+    ECParams *ecParams = NULL;
+    SECItem pointC = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+    int slen;       /* length in bytes of a half signature (r or s) */
+    int flen;       /* length in bytes of the field size */
+    unsigned olen;  /* length in bytes of the base point order */
+    unsigned obits; /* length in bits  of the base point order */
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    char mpstr[256];
+    printf("ECDSA verification called\n");
+#endif
+
+    /* Initialize MPI integers. */
+    /* must happen before the first potential call to cleanup */
+    MP_DIGITS(&r_) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&s_) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&c) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&u1) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&u2) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&x1) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&v) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
+
+    /* Check args */
+    if (!key || !signature || !digest) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ecParams = &(key->ecParams);
+    flen = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
+    olen = ecParams->order.len;
+    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
+        signature->len > 2 * olen) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    slen = signature->len / 2;
+
+    SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &pointC, EC_GetPointSize(ecParams));
+    if (pointC.data == NULL)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r_));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s_));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&c));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&u1));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&u2));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&x1));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&v));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&n));
+
+    /*
+    ** Convert received signature (r', s') into MPI integers.
+    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&r_, signature->data, slen));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&s_, signature->data + slen, slen));
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Steps 1 and 2
+    **
+    ** Verify that 0 < r' < n and 0 < s' < n
+    */
+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(ecParams->order, &n);
+    if (mp_cmp_z(&r_) <= 0 || mp_cmp_z(&s_) <= 0 ||
+        mp_cmp(&r_, &n) >= 0 || mp_cmp(&s_, &n) >= 0) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+        goto cleanup; /* will return rv == SECFailure */
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 3
+    **
+    ** c = (s')**-1 mod n
+    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&s_, &n, &c)); /* c = (s')**-1 mod n */
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 4
+    **
+    ** u1 = ((HASH(M')) * c) mod n
+    */
+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*digest, &u1); /* u1 = HASH(M)     */
+
+    /* In the definition of EC signing, digests are truncated
+     * to the length of n in bits.
+     * (see SEC 1 "Elliptic Curve Digit Signature Algorithm" section 4.1.*/
+    CHECK_MPI_OK((obits = mpl_significant_bits(&n)));
+    if (digest->len * 8 > obits) { /* u1 = HASH(M')     */
+        mpl_rsh(&u1, &u1, digest->len * 8 - obits);
+    }
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    mp_todecimal(&r_, mpstr);
+    printf("r_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&s_, mpstr);
+    printf("s_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&c, mpstr);
+    printf("c : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&u1, mpstr);
+    printf("digest: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+#endif
+
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&u1, &c, &n, &u1)); /* u1 = u1 * c mod n */
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 4
+    **
+    ** u2 = ((r') * c) mod n
+    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&r_, &c, &n, &u2));
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.3, Step 1
+    **
+    ** Compute u1*G + u2*Q
+    ** Here, A = u1.G     B = u2.Q    and   C = A + B
+    ** If the result, C, is the point at infinity, reject the signature
+    */
+    if (ec_points_mul(ecParams, &u1, &u2, &key->publicValue, &pointC) != SECSuccess) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    if (ec_point_at_infinity(&pointC)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&x1, pointC.data + 1, flen));
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.4, Step 2
+    **
+    ** v = x1 mod n
+    */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&x1, &n, &v));
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    mp_todecimal(&r_, mpstr);
+    printf("r_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&v, mpstr);
+    printf("v : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+#endif
+
+    /*
+    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.4, Step 3
+    **
+    ** Verification:  v == r'
+    */
+    if (mp_cmp(&v, &r_)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+        rv = SECFailure; /* Signature failed to verify. */
+    } else {
+        rv = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
+    }
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    mp_todecimal(&u1, mpstr);
+    printf("u1: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&u2, mpstr);
+    printf("u2: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+    mp_tohex(&x1, mpstr);
+    printf("x1: %s\n", mpstr);
+    mp_todecimal(&v, mpstr);
+    printf("v : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+    mp_clear(&r_);
+    mp_clear(&s_);
+    mp_clear(&c);
+    mp_clear(&u1);
+    mp_clear(&u2);
+    mp_clear(&x1);
+    mp_clear(&v);
+    mp_clear(&n);
+
+    if (pointC.data)
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pointC, PR_FALSE);
+    if (err) {
+        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    }
+
+#if EC_DEBUG
+    printf("ECDSA verification %s\n",
+           (rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
+#endif
+#else
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+    return rv;
+}