Update NSS to 3.38

- Added HACL*Poly1305 32-bit (INRIA/Microsoft)
- Updated to final TLS 1.3 draft version (28)
- Removed TLS 1.3 prerelease draft limit check
- Removed NPN code
- Enabled dev/urandom-only RNG on Linux with NSS_SEED_ONLY_DEV_URANDOM for non-standard environments
- Fixed several bugs with TLS 1.3 negotiation
- Updated internal certificate store
- Added support for the TLS Record Size Limit Extension.
- Fixed CVE-2018-0495
- Various security fixes in the ASN.1 code.

1 files changed, 26 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
index 9324d306b..aef353967 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
@@ -16,14 +16,11 @@
 #include "blapi.h"
 #include "nssilock.h"
 #include "secitem.h"
-#include "blapi.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
 #include "mpi.h"
 #include "secmpi.h"
 #include "pqg.h"
 
-/* XXX to be replaced by define in blapit.h */
-#define NSS_FREEBL_DSA_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE 2048
-
 /*
  * FIPS 186-2 requires result from random output to be reduced mod q when
  * generating random numbers for DSA.
@@ -168,7 +165,7 @@ dsa_NewKeyExtended(const PQGParams *params, const SECItem *seed,
         return SECFailure;
     }
     /* Initialize an arena for the DSA key. */
-    arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DSA_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (!arena) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
         return SECFailure;
@@ -213,8 +210,9 @@ cleanup:
     mp_clear(&g);
     mp_clear(&x);
     mp_clear(&y);
-    if (key)
+    if (key) {
         PORT_FreeArena(key->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
+    }
     if (err) {
         translate_mpi_error(err);
         return SECFailure;
@@ -321,6 +319,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
     mp_int x, k;    /* private key & pseudo-random integer */
     mp_int r, s;    /* tuple (r, s) is signature) */
     mp_int t;       /* holding tmp values */
+    mp_int ar;      /* holding blinding values */
     mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     unsigned int dsa_subprime_len, dsa_signature_len, offset;
@@ -364,6 +363,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
     MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
     MP_DIGITS(&s) = 0;
     MP_DIGITS(&t) = 0;
+    MP_DIGITS(&ar) = 0;
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g));
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&t));
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&ar));
     /*
     ** Convert stored PQG and private key into MPI integers.
     */
@@ -397,14 +398,28 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
         rv = SECFailure;
         goto cleanup;
     }
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(t2, &t);                /* t <-$ Zq */
+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(t2, &t); /* t <-$ Zq */
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(&t2, PR_FALSE);
+    if (DSA_NewRandom(NULL, &key->params.subPrime, &t2) != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(t2, &ar); /* ar <-$ Zq */
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(&t2, PR_FALSE);
+
+    /* Using mp_invmod on k directly would leak bits from k. */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&k, &ar, &k));       /* k = k * ar */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k));     /* k = k**-1 mod q */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s);       /* s = HASH(M)     */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x)); /* x = x * r mod q */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_addmod(&s, &x, &q, &s)); /* s = s + x mod q */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s)); /* s = s * k mod q */
+    /* To avoid leaking secret bits here the addition is blinded. */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x));        /* x = x * ar */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x));  /* x = x * r mod q */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &ar, &q, &t)); /* t = s * ar mod q */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s));         /* s = t + x */
+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s));  /* s = s * k mod q */
     /*
     ** verify r != 0 and s != 0
     ** mentioned as optional in FIPS 186-1.
@@ -438,7 +453,7 @@ cleanup:
     mp_clear(&r);
     mp_clear(&s);
     mp_clear(&t);
-    SECITEM_FreeItem(&t2, PR_FALSE);
+    mp_clear(&ar);
     if (err) {
         translate_mpi_error(err);
         rv = SECFailure;