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authoradeshkp <adeshkp@users.noreply.github.com>2019-01-12 06:20:31 -0500
committeradeshkp <adeshkp@users.noreply.github.com>2019-01-12 06:20:31 -0500
commit5335681cd2ab05ad47e81be7722c9eee19d54065 (patch)
treeeced0f22032c4f01229ac0a18b9ffb6219cea309 /security/manager/ssl
parentf38edc94a31de3bae839cf63ed57c3851908ac46 (diff)
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Telemetry: Remove stubs and related code
Diffstat (limited to 'security/manager/ssl')
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp47
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h3
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp90
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h30
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp450
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/moz.build1
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp10
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp47
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp17
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp93
10 files changed, 6 insertions, 782 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp
index 1f34c880b..ffee8ba48 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp
@@ -4,11 +4,9 @@
#include "PublicKeyPinningService.h"
-#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
-#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "nsISiteSecurityService.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsSiteSecurityService.h"
@@ -233,8 +231,7 @@ FindPinningInformation(const char* hostname, mozilla::pkix::Time time,
static nsresult
CheckPinsForHostname(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, const char* hostname,
bool enforceTestMode, mozilla::pkix::Time time,
- /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins,
- /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo)
+ /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins)
{
chainHasValidPins = false;
if (!certList) {
@@ -265,47 +262,11 @@ CheckPinsForHostname(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, const char* hostname,
return rv;
}
chainHasValidPins = enforceTestModeResult;
- Telemetry::ID histogram = staticFingerprints->mIsMoz
- ? Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_MOZ_RESULTS
- : Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_RESULTS;
if (staticFingerprints->mTestMode) {
- histogram = staticFingerprints->mIsMoz
- ? Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_MOZ_TEST_RESULTS
- : Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_TEST_RESULTS;
if (!enforceTestMode) {
chainHasValidPins = true;
}
}
- // We can collect per-host pinning violations for this host because it is
- // operationally critical to Firefox.
- if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
- if (staticFingerprints->mId != kUnknownId) {
- int32_t bucket = staticFingerprints->mId * 2
- + (enforceTestModeResult ? 1 : 0);
- histogram = staticFingerprints->mTestMode
- ? Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_MOZ_TEST_RESULTS_BY_HOST
- : Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_MOZ_RESULTS_BY_HOST;
- pinningTelemetryInfo->certPinningResultBucket = bucket;
- } else {
- pinningTelemetryInfo->certPinningResultBucket =
- enforceTestModeResult ? 1 : 0;
- }
- pinningTelemetryInfo->accumulateResult = true;
- pinningTelemetryInfo->certPinningResultHistogram = histogram;
- }
-
- // We only collect per-CA pinning statistics upon failures.
- CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
- // Only log telemetry if the certificate list is non-empty.
- if (!CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
- if (!enforceTestModeResult && pinningTelemetryInfo) {
- int32_t binNumber = RootCABinNumber(&rootNode->cert->derCert);
- if (binNumber != ROOT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN ) {
- pinningTelemetryInfo->accumulateForRoot = true;
- pinningTelemetryInfo->rootBucket = binNumber;
- }
- }
- }
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: Pin check %s for %s host '%s' (mode=%s)\n",
@@ -322,8 +283,7 @@ PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
const char* hostname,
mozilla::pkix::Time time,
bool enforceTestMode,
- /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins,
- /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo)
+ /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins)
{
chainHasValidPins = false;
if (!certList) {
@@ -334,8 +294,7 @@ PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
}
nsAutoCString canonicalizedHostname(CanonicalizeHostname(hostname));
return CheckPinsForHostname(certList, canonicalizedHostname.get(),
- enforceTestMode, time, chainHasValidPins,
- pinningTelemetryInfo);
+ enforceTestMode, time, chainHasValidPins);
}
nsresult
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h b/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h
index f42376b52..09fdd8474 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h
@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ public:
const char* hostname,
mozilla::pkix::Time time,
bool enforceTestMode,
- /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins,
- /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo);
+ /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins);
/**
* Sets chainMatchesPinset to true if there is any intersection between the
* certificate list and the pins specified in the aSHA256keys array.
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 3f9ea3eb6..000000000
--- a/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h"
-
-#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
-#include "RootHashes.inc" // Note: Generated by genRootCAHashes.js
-#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
-#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
-
-namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
-
-mozilla::LazyLogModule gPublicKeyPinningTelemetryLog("PublicKeyPinningTelemetryService");
-
-// Used in the BinarySearch method, this does a memcmp between the pointer
-// provided to its construtor and whatever the binary search is looking for.
-//
-// This implementation assumes everything to be of HASH_LEN, so it should not
-// be used generically.
-class BinaryHashSearchArrayComparator
-{
-public:
- explicit BinaryHashSearchArrayComparator(const uint8_t* aTarget, size_t len)
- : mTarget(aTarget)
- {
- NS_ASSERTION(len == HASH_LEN, "Hashes should be of the same length.");
- }
-
- int operator()(const CertAuthorityHash val) const {
- return memcmp(mTarget, val.hash, HASH_LEN);
- }
-
-private:
- const uint8_t* mTarget;
-};
-
-// Perform a hash of the provided cert, then search in the RootHashes.inc data
-// structure for a matching bin number.
-int32_t
-RootCABinNumber(const SECItem* cert)
-{
- Digest digest;
-
- // Compute SHA256 hash of the certificate
- nsresult rv = digest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, cert->data, cert->len);
- if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
- return ROOT_CERTIFICATE_HASH_FAILURE;
- }
-
- // Compare against list of stored hashes
- size_t idx;
-
- MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningTelemetryLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("pkpinTelem: First bytes %02hx %02hx %02hx %02hx\n",
- digest.get().data[0], digest.get().data[1], digest.get().data[2], digest.get().data[3]));
-
- if (mozilla::BinarySearchIf(ROOT_TABLE, 0, ArrayLength(ROOT_TABLE),
- BinaryHashSearchArrayComparator(static_cast<uint8_t*>(digest.get().data),
- digest.get().len),
- &idx)) {
-
- MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningTelemetryLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("pkpinTelem: Telemetry index was %lu, bin is %d\n",
- idx, ROOT_TABLE[idx].binNumber));
- return (int32_t) ROOT_TABLE[idx].binNumber;
- }
-
- // Didn't match.
- return ROOT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
-}
-
-
-// Attempt to increment the appropriate bin in the provided Telemetry probe ID. If
-// there was a hash failure, we do nothing.
-void
-AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(mozilla::Telemetry::ID probe,
- const CERTCertificate* cert)
-{
- int32_t binId = RootCABinNumber(&cert->derCert);
-
- if (binId != ROOT_CERTIFICATE_HASH_FAILURE) {
- Accumulate(probe, binId);
- }
-}
-
-} // namespace psm
-} // namespace mozilla
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h b/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 05dbb4e44..000000000
--- a/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#ifndef RootCertificateTelemetryUtils_h
-#define RootCertificateTelemetryUtils_h
-
-#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
-#include "certt.h"
-
-namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
-
-// Note: New CAs will show up as UNKNOWN_ROOT until
-// RootHashes.inc is updated to include them. 0 is reserved by
-// genRootCAHashes.js for the unknowns.
-#define ROOT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 0
-#define ROOT_CERTIFICATE_HASH_FAILURE -1
-
-int32_t
-RootCABinNumber(const SECItem* cert);
-
-void
-AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(mozilla::Telemetry::ID probe, const CERTCertificate* cert);
-
-} // namespace psm
-} // namespace mozilla
-
-#endif // RootCertificateTelemetryUtils_h
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp
index 757534955..af985eb92 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include "PSMRunnable.h"
-#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
#include "SharedSSLState.h"
@@ -112,7 +111,6 @@
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"
#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
-#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "mozilla/net/DNS.h"
@@ -150,11 +148,6 @@ namespace {
// do not use a nsCOMPtr to avoid static initializer/destructor
nsIThreadPool* gCertVerificationThreadPool = nullptr;
-// We avoid using a mutex for the success case to avoid lock-related
-// performance issues. However, we do use a lock in the error case to simplify
-// the code, since performance in the error case is not important.
-Mutex* gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = nullptr;
-
// We add a mutex to serialize PKCS11 database operations
Mutex* gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr;
@@ -173,7 +166,6 @@ Mutex* gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr;
void
InitializeSSLServerCertVerificationThreads()
{
- gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = new Mutex("SSLVerificationTelemetryMutex");
gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = new Mutex("SSLVerificationPK11Mutex");
// TODO: tuning, make parameters preferences
// XXX: instantiate nsThreadPool directly, to make this more bulletproof.
@@ -207,10 +199,6 @@ void StopSSLServerCertVerificationThreads()
gCertVerificationThreadPool->Shutdown();
NS_RELEASE(gCertVerificationThreadPool);
}
- if (gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex) {
- delete gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex;
- gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = nullptr;
- }
if (gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex) {
delete gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex;
gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr;
@@ -244,8 +232,6 @@ public:
SSLServerCertVerificationResult(nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject,
PRErrorCode errorCode,
- Telemetry::ID telemetryID = Telemetry::HistogramCount,
- uint32_t telemetryValue = -1,
SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType =
PlainErrorMessage);
@@ -255,8 +241,6 @@ private:
public:
const PRErrorCode mErrorCode;
const SSLErrorMessageType mErrorMessageType;
- const Telemetry::ID mTelemetryID;
- const uint32_t mTelemetryValue;
};
class CertErrorRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase
@@ -297,63 +281,6 @@ private:
const uint32_t mProviderFlags;
};
-// A probe value of 1 means "no error".
-uint32_t
-MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode)
-{
- switch (errorCode)
- {
- case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: return 2;
- case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: return 3;
- case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: return 4;
- case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: return 5;
- case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: return 6;
- case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: return 7;
- case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED: return 8;
- case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN: return 9;
- case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: return 10;
- case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_CA_CERT_USED_AS_END_ENTITY: return 11;
- case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_V1_CERT_USED_AS_CA: return 12;
- case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE: return 13;
- case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE: return 14;
- case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
- return 15;
- case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: return 16;
- case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_EMPTY_ISSUER_NAME: return 17;
- }
- NS_WARNING("Unknown certificate error code. Does MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue "
- "handle everything in DetermineCertOverrideErrors?");
- return 0;
-}
-
-static uint32_t
-MapCertErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode)
-{
- uint32_t probeValue;
- switch (errorCode)
- {
- // see security/pkix/include/pkix/Result.h
-#define MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP(name, value, nss_name) case nss_name: probeValue = value; break;
- MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP_LIST
-#undef MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP
- default: return 0;
- }
-
- // Since FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is 0x800, fatal error values are much larger than
- // non-fatal error values. To conserve space, we remap these so they start at
- // (decimal) 90 instead of 0x800. Currently there are ~50 non-fatal errors
- // mozilla::pkix might return, so saving space for 90 should be sufficient
- // (similarly, there are 4 fatal errors, so saving space for 10 should also
- // be sufficient).
- static_assert(FATAL_ERROR_FLAG == 0x800,
- "mozilla::pkix::FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is not what we were expecting");
- if (probeValue & FATAL_ERROR_FLAG) {
- probeValue ^= FATAL_ERROR_FLAG;
- probeValue += 90;
- }
- return probeValue;
-}
-
SECStatus
DetermineCertOverrideErrors(const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert,
const char* hostName,
@@ -562,19 +489,6 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides()
}
if (!remaining_display_errors) {
- // This can double- or triple-count one certificate with multiple
- // different types of errors. Since this is telemetry and we just
- // want a ballpark answer, we don't care.
- if (mErrorCodeTrust != 0) {
- uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeTrust);
- }
- if (mErrorCodeMismatch != 0) {
- uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeMismatch);
- }
- if (mErrorCodeTime != 0) {
- uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeTime);
- }
-
// all errors are covered by override rules, so let's accept the cert
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] All errors covered by override rules\n",
@@ -621,8 +535,6 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides()
SSLServerCertVerificationResult* result =
new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject,
errorCodeToReport,
- Telemetry::HistogramCount,
- -1,
OverridableCertErrorMessage);
LogInvalidCertError(mInfoObject,
@@ -656,8 +568,6 @@ CreateCertErrorRunnable(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject);
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
- uint32_t probeValue = MapCertErrorToProbeValue(defaultErrorCodeToReport);
-
uint32_t collected_errors = 0;
PRErrorCode errorCodeTrust = 0;
PRErrorCode errorCodeMismatch = 0;
@@ -861,334 +771,6 @@ BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy(nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject,
return SECFailure;
}
-void
-AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(const char* commonName,
- bool commonNameInSubjectAltNames)
-{
- if (!commonNameInSubjectAltNames) {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: common name '%s' not in subject alt. names "
- "(or the subject alt. names extension is not present)\n",
- commonName));
- }
-}
-
-// Returns true if and only if commonName ends with altName (minus its leading
-// "*"). altName has already been checked to be of the form "*.<something>".
-// commonName may be NULL.
-static bool
-TryMatchingWildcardSubjectAltName(const char* commonName,
- const nsACString& altName)
-{
- return commonName &&
- StringEndsWith(nsDependentCString(commonName), Substring(altName, 1));
-}
-
-// Gathers telemetry on Baseline Requirements 9.2.1 (Subject Alternative
-// Names Extension) and 9.2.2 (Subject Common Name Field).
-// Specifically:
-// - whether or not the subject common name field is present
-// - whether or not the subject alternative names extension is present
-// - if there is a malformed entry in the subject alt. names extension
-// - if there is an entry in the subject alt. names extension corresponding
-// to the subject common name
-// Telemetry is only gathered for certificates that chain to a trusted root
-// in Mozilla's Root CA program.
-// certList consists of a validated certificate chain. The end-entity
-// certificate is first and the root (trust anchor) is last.
-void
-GatherBaselineRequirementsTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
-{
- CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
- CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
- PR_ASSERT(!(CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
- CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)));
- if (CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
- CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
- return;
- }
- CERTCertificate* cert = endEntityNode->cert;
- PR_ASSERT(cert);
- if (!cert) {
- return;
- }
- UniquePORTString commonName(CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject));
- // This only applies to certificates issued by authorities in our root
- // program.
- CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
- PR_ASSERT(rootCert);
- if (!rootCert) {
- return;
- }
- bool isBuiltIn = false;
- Result result = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootCert, isBuiltIn);
- if (result != Success || !isBuiltIn) {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: root certificate for '%s' is not a built-in root "
- "(or IsCertBuiltInRoot failed)\n", commonName.get()));
- return;
- }
- ScopedAutoSECItem altNameExtension;
- SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
- &altNameExtension);
- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: no subject alt names extension for '%s'\n",
- commonName.get()));
- AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), false);
- return;
- }
-
- UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
- CERTGeneralName* subjectAltNames =
- CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena.get(), &altNameExtension);
- if (!subjectAltNames) {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: could not decode subject alt names for '%s'\n",
- commonName.get()));
- AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), false);
- return;
- }
-
- CERTGeneralName* currentName = subjectAltNames;
- bool commonNameInSubjectAltNames = false;
- bool nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = false;
- bool malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = false;
- bool nonFQDNPresent = false;
- do {
- nsAutoCString altName;
- if (currentName->type == certDNSName) {
- altName.Assign(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(
- currentName->name.other.data),
- currentName->name.other.len);
- nsDependentCString altNameWithoutWildcard(altName, 0);
- if (StringBeginsWith(altNameWithoutWildcard, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("*."))) {
- altNameWithoutWildcard.Rebind(altName, 2);
- commonNameInSubjectAltNames |=
- TryMatchingWildcardSubjectAltName(commonName.get(), altName);
- }
- // net_IsValidHostName appears to return true for valid IP addresses,
- // which would be invalid for a DNS name.
- // Note that the net_IsValidHostName check will catch things like
- // "a.*.example.com".
- if (!net_IsValidHostName(altNameWithoutWildcard) ||
- net_IsValidIPv4Addr(altName.get(), altName.Length()) ||
- net_IsValidIPv6Addr(altName.get(), altName.Length())) {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: DNSName '%s' not valid (for '%s')\n",
- altName.get(), commonName.get()));
- malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
- }
- if (!altName.Contains('.')) {
- nonFQDNPresent = true;
- }
- } else if (currentName->type == certIPAddress) {
- // According to DNS.h, this includes space for the null-terminator
- char buf[net::kNetAddrMaxCStrBufSize] = { 0 };
- PRNetAddr addr;
- if (currentName->name.other.len == 4) {
- addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
- memcpy(&addr.inet.ip, currentName->name.other.data,
- currentName->name.other.len);
- if (PR_NetAddrToString(&addr, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) != PR_SUCCESS) {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: IPAddress (v4) not valid (for '%s')\n",
- commonName.get()));
- malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
- } else {
- altName.Assign(buf);
- }
- } else if (currentName->name.other.len == 16) {
- addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET6;
- memcpy(&addr.ipv6.ip, currentName->name.other.data,
- currentName->name.other.len);
- if (PR_NetAddrToString(&addr, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) != PR_SUCCESS) {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: IPAddress (v6) not valid (for '%s')\n",
- commonName.get()));
- malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
- } else {
- altName.Assign(buf);
- }
- } else {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: IPAddress not valid (for '%s')\n",
- commonName.get()));
- malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
- }
- } else {
- MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
- ("BR telemetry: non-DNSName, non-IPAddress present for '%s'\n",
- commonName.get()));
- nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
- }
- if (commonName && altName.Equals(commonName.get())) {
- commonNameInSubjectAltNames = true;
- }
- currentName = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(currentName);
- } while (currentName && currentName != subjectAltNames);
-
- AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(),
- commonNameInSubjectAltNames);
-}
-
-// Gather telemetry on whether the end-entity cert for a server has the
-// required TLS Server Authentication EKU, or any others
-void
-GatherEKUTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
-{
- CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
- CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
- PR_ASSERT(!(CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
- CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)));
- if (CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
- CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
- return;
- }
- CERTCertificate* endEntityCert = endEntityNode->cert;
- PR_ASSERT(endEntityCert);
- if (!endEntityCert) {
- return;
- }
-
- // Only log telemetry if the root CA is built-in
- CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
- PR_ASSERT(rootCert);
- if (!rootCert) {
- return;
- }
- bool isBuiltIn = false;
- Result rv = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootCert, isBuiltIn);
- if (rv != Success || !isBuiltIn) {
- return;
- }
-
- // Find the EKU extension, if present
- bool foundEKU = false;
- SECOidTag oidTag;
- CERTCertExtension* ekuExtension = nullptr;
- for (size_t i = 0; endEntityCert->extensions && endEntityCert->extensions[i];
- i++) {
- oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&endEntityCert->extensions[i]->id);
- if (oidTag == SEC_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
- foundEKU = true;
- ekuExtension = endEntityCert->extensions[i];
- }
- }
-
- if (!foundEKU) {
- return;
- }
-
- // Parse the EKU extension
- UniqueCERTOidSequence ekuSequence(
- CERT_DecodeOidSequence(&ekuExtension->value));
- if (!ekuSequence) {
- return;
- }
-
- // Search through the available EKUs
- bool foundServerAuth = false;
- bool foundOther = false;
- for (SECItem** oids = ekuSequence->oids; oids && *oids; oids++) {
- oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(*oids);
- if (oidTag == SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_SERVER_AUTH) {
- foundServerAuth = true;
- } else {
- foundOther = true;
- }
- }
-}
-
-// Gathers telemetry on which CA is the root of a given cert chain.
-// If the root is a built-in root, then the telemetry makes a count
-// by root. Roots that are not built-in are counted in one bin.
-void
-GatherRootCATelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
-{
- CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
- PR_ASSERT(rootNode);
- if (!rootNode) {
- return;
- }
- PR_ASSERT(!CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList));
- if (CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
- return;
- }
- CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
- PR_ASSERT(rootCert);
- if (!rootCert) {
- return;
- }
- AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_SUCCESS_BY_CA,
- rootCert);
-}
-
-// These time are appoximate, i.e., doesn't account for leap seconds, etc
-const uint64_t ONE_WEEK_IN_SECONDS = (7 * (24 * 60 *60));
-const uint64_t ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS = 52;
-
-// Gathers telemetry on the certificate lifetimes we observe in the wild
-void
-GatherEndEntityTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
-{
- CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
- MOZ_ASSERT(endEntityNode && !CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList));
- if (!endEntityNode || CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList)) {
- return;
- }
-
- CERTCertificate* endEntityCert = endEntityNode->cert;
- PR_ASSERT(endEntityCert);
- if (!endEntityCert) {
- return;
- }
-
- PRTime notBefore;
- PRTime notAfter;
-
- if (CERT_GetCertTimes(endEntityCert, &notBefore, &notAfter) != SECSuccess) {
- return;
- }
-
- PR_ASSERT(notAfter > notBefore);
- if (notAfter <= notBefore) {
- return;
- }
-
- uint64_t durationInWeeks = (notAfter - notBefore)
- / PR_USEC_PER_SEC
- / ONE_WEEK_IN_SECONDS;
-
- if (durationInWeeks > (2 * ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS)) {
- durationInWeeks = (2 * ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS) + 1;
- }
-}
-
-// There are various things that we want to measure about certificate
-// chains that we accept. This is a single entry point for all of them.
-void
-GatherSuccessfulValidationTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
-{
- GatherBaselineRequirementsTelemetry(certList);
- GatherEKUTelemetry(certList);
- GatherRootCATelemetry(certList);
- GatherEndEntityTelemetry(certList);
-}
-
-void
-GatherTelemetryForSingleSCT(const ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp& sct)
-{
-/* STUB */
-}
-
-void
-GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
- const CertificateTransparencyInfo& info)
-{
-/* STUB */
-}
-
// Note: Takes ownership of |peerCertChain| if SECSuccess is not returned.
SECStatus
AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
@@ -1214,7 +796,6 @@ AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
KeySizeStatus keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked;
SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked;
- PinningTelemetryInfo pinningTelemetryInfo;
CertificateTransparencyInfo certificateTransparencyInfo;
int flags = 0;
@@ -1233,22 +814,14 @@ AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
&evOidPolicy,
&ocspStaplingStatus,
&keySizeStatus, &sha1ModeResult,
- &pinningTelemetryInfo,
&certificateTransparencyInfo);
- uint32_t evStatus = (rv != Success) ? 0 // 0 = Failure
- : (evOidPolicy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) ? 1 // 1 = DV
- : 2; // 2 = EV
-
if (rv == Success) {
// Certificate verification succeeded. Delete any potential record of
// certificate error bits.
RememberCertErrorsTable::GetInstance().RememberCertHasError(infoObject,
nullptr,
SECSuccess);
- GatherSuccessfulValidationTelemetry(certList);
- GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(certList,
- certificateTransparencyInfo);
// The connection may get terminated, for example, if the server requires
// a client cert. Let's provide a minimal SSLStatus
@@ -1363,11 +936,6 @@ SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run()
if (mInfoObject->isAlreadyShutDown()) {
error = SEC_ERROR_USER_CANCELLED;
} else {
- Telemetry::ID successTelemetry
- = Telemetry::SSL_SUCCESFUL_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX;
- Telemetry::ID failureTelemetry
- = Telemetry::SSL_INITIAL_FAILED_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX;
-
// Reset the error code here so we can detect if AuthCertificate fails to
// set the error code if/when it fails.
PR_SetError(0, 0);
@@ -1378,21 +946,15 @@ SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run()
MOZ_ASSERT(mPeerCertChain || rv != SECSuccess,
"AuthCertificate() should take ownership of chain on failure");
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
- uint32_t interval = (uint32_t) ((TimeStamp::Now() - mJobStartTime).ToMilliseconds());
RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationResult> restart(
- new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, 0,
- successTelemetry, interval));
+ new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, 0));
restart->Dispatch();
return NS_OK;
}
// Note: the interval is not calculated once as PR_GetError MUST be called
- // before any other function call
+ // before any other function call
error = PR_GetError();
- {
- TimeStamp now = TimeStamp::Now();
- MutexAutoLock telemetryMutex(*gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex);
- }
if (error != 0) {
RefPtr<CertErrorRunnable> runnable(
CreateCertErrorRunnable(*mCertVerifier, error, mInfoObject, mCert,
@@ -1614,19 +1176,11 @@ AuthCertificateHook(void* arg, PRFileDesc* fd, PRBool checkSig, PRBool isServer)
SSLServerCertVerificationResult::SSLServerCertVerificationResult(
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, PRErrorCode errorCode,
- Telemetry::ID telemetryID, uint32_t telemetryValue,
SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType)
: mInfoObject(infoObject)
, mErrorCode(errorCode)
, mErrorMessageType(errorMessageType)
- , mTelemetryID(telemetryID)
- , mTelemetryValue(telemetryValue)
{
-// We accumulate telemetry for (only) successful validations on the main thread
-// to avoid adversely affecting performance by acquiring the mutex that we use
-// when accumulating the telemetry for unsuccessful validations. Unsuccessful
-// validations times are accumulated elsewhere.
-MOZ_ASSERT(telemetryID == Telemetry::HistogramCount || errorCode == 0);
}
void
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/moz.build b/security/manager/ssl/moz.build
index 19e1b4f4b..8c8d25dcc 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/moz.build
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/moz.build
@@ -135,7 +135,6 @@ UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
'PSMContentListener.cpp',
'PSMRunnable.cpp',
'PublicKeyPinningService.cpp',
- 'RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp',
'SecretDecoderRing.cpp',
'SharedSSLState.cpp',
'SSLServerCertVerification.cpp',
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp
index 9196e200c..0af761d7e 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include "cryptohi.h"
#include "keyhi.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
-#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "nsIContent.h"
#include "nsIDOMHTMLSelectElement.h"
#include "nsIGenKeypairInfoDlg.h"
@@ -395,13 +394,6 @@ loser:
return rv;
}
-
-void
-GatherKeygenTelemetry(uint32_t keyGenMechanism, int keysize, char* curve)
-{
-/* STUB */
-}
-
nsresult
nsKeygenFormProcessor::GetPublicKey(const nsAString& aValue,
const nsAString& aChallenge,
@@ -639,8 +631,6 @@ nsKeygenFormProcessor::GetPublicKey(const nsAString& aValue,
CopyASCIItoUTF16(keystring.get(), aOutPublicKey);
rv = NS_OK;
-
- GatherKeygenTelemetry(keyGenMechanism, keysize, keyparamsString);
loser:
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
if ( privateKey ) {
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp
index b8f1b0eb7..dda936d8c 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
-#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
@@ -1072,37 +1071,6 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
return SECSuccess;
}
-static void
-AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::ID probe, uint32_t bits)
-{
- unsigned int value = bits < 512 ? 1 : bits == 512 ? 2
- : bits < 768 ? 3 : bits == 768 ? 4
- : bits < 1024 ? 5 : bits == 1024 ? 6
- : bits < 1280 ? 7 : bits == 1280 ? 8
- : bits < 1536 ? 9 : bits == 1536 ? 10
- : bits < 2048 ? 11 : bits == 2048 ? 12
- : bits < 3072 ? 13 : bits == 3072 ? 14
- : bits < 4096 ? 15 : bits == 4096 ? 16
- : bits < 8192 ? 17 : bits == 8192 ? 18
- : bits < 16384 ? 19 : bits == 16384 ? 20
- : 0;
-}
-
-// XXX: This attempts to map a bit count to an ECC named curve identifier. In
-// the vast majority of situations, we only have the Suite B curves available.
-// In that case, this mapping works fine. If we were to have more curves
-// available, the mapping would be ambiguous since there could be multiple
-// named curves for a given size (e.g. secp256k1 vs. secp256r1). We punt on
-// that for now. See also NSS bug 323674.
-static void
-AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::ID probe, uint32_t bits)
-{
- unsigned int value = bits == 256 ? 23 // P-256
- : bits == 384 ? 24 // P-384
- : bits == 521 ? 25 // P-521
- : 0; // Unknown
-}
-
// In the case of session resumption, the AuthCertificate hook has been bypassed
// (because we've previously successfully connected to our peer). That being the
// case, we unfortunately don't know if the peer's server certificate verified
@@ -1216,11 +1184,6 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) {
rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo));
MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
- // Get the protocol version for telemetry
- // 1=tls1, 2=tls1.1, 3=tls1.2
- unsigned int versionEnum = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF;
- MOZ_ASSERT(versionEnum > 0);
-
SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
sizeof cipherInfo);
@@ -1231,16 +1194,10 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) {
if (infoObject->IsFullHandshake()) {
switch (channelInfo.keaType) {
case ssl_kea_rsa:
- AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
- channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
break;
case ssl_kea_dh:
- AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_DHE_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
- channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
break;
case ssl_kea_ecdh:
- AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_ECDHE_CURVE_FULL,
- channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
break;
default:
MOZ_CRASH("impossible KEA");
@@ -1252,12 +1209,8 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) {
switch (channelInfo.authType) {
case ssl_auth_rsa:
case ssl_auth_rsa_sign:
- AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
- channelInfo.authKeyBits);
break;
case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
- AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ECDSA_CURVE_FULL,
- channelInfo.authKeyBits);
break;
default:
MOZ_CRASH("impossible auth algorithm");
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp
index f580f2bcb..4d6c3963f 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#include "mozilla/Services.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h"
#include "mozilla/SyncRunnable.h"
-#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "nsAppDirectoryServiceDefs.h"
#include "nsCRT.h"
@@ -785,13 +784,6 @@ nsNSSComponent::UnloadFamilySafetyRoot()
// 2: detect Family Safety mode and import the root
const char* kFamilySafetyModePref = "security.family_safety.mode";
-// The telemetry gathered by this function is as follows:
-// 0-2: the value of the Family Safety mode pref
-// 3: detecting Family Safety mode failed
-// 4: Family Safety was not enabled
-// 5: Family Safety was enabled
-// 6: failed to import the Family Safety root
-// 7: successfully imported the root
void
nsNSSComponent::MaybeEnableFamilySafetyCompatibility()
{
@@ -1564,15 +1556,6 @@ CipherSuiteChangeObserver::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject,
void nsNSSComponent::setValidationOptions(bool isInitialSetting,
const MutexAutoLock& lock)
{
- // This preference controls whether we do OCSP fetching and does not affect
- // OCSP stapling.
- // 0 = disabled, 1 = enabled
- int32_t ocspEnabled = Preferences::GetInt("security.OCSP.enabled",
- OCSP_ENABLED_DEFAULT);
-
- bool ocspRequired = ocspEnabled &&
- Preferences::GetBool("security.OCSP.require", false);
-
bool ocspStaplingEnabled = Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling",
true);
PublicSSLState()->SetOCSPStaplingEnabled(ocspStaplingEnabled);
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
index d2549c52d..aec3dec12 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Move.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
-#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "nsArray.h"
#include "nsArrayUtils.h"
#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
@@ -244,21 +243,6 @@ nsNSSSocketInfo::NoteTimeUntilReady()
void
nsNSSSocketInfo::SetHandshakeCompleted()
{
- if (!mHandshakeCompleted) {
- enum HandshakeType {
- Resumption = 1,
- FalseStarted = 2,
- ChoseNotToFalseStart = 3,
- NotAllowedToFalseStart = 4,
- };
-
- HandshakeType handshakeType = !IsFullHandshake() ? Resumption
- : mFalseStarted ? FalseStarted
- : mFalseStartCallbackCalled ? ChoseNotToFalseStart
- : NotAllowedToFalseStart;
- }
-
-
// Remove the plain text layer as it is not needed anymore.
// The plain text layer is not always present - so its not a fatal error
// if it cannot be removed
@@ -1050,29 +1034,6 @@ class SSLErrorRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase
namespace {
-uint32_t tlsIntoleranceTelemetryBucket(PRErrorCode err)
-{
- // returns a numeric code for where we track various errors in telemetry
- // only errors that cause version fallback are tracked,
- // so this is also used to determine which errors can cause version fallback
- switch (err) {
- case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT: return 1;
- case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ: return 2;
- case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT: return 3;
- case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT: return 4;
- case SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT: return 6;
- case SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP: return 7;
- case SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION: return 10;
- case SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT: return 11;
- case SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE: return 13;
- case SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT: return 14;
- case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR: return 16;
- case PR_END_OF_FILE_ERROR: return 17;
- case SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT: return 18;
- default: return 0;
- }
-}
-
bool
retryDueToTLSIntolerance(PRErrorCode err, nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo)
{
@@ -1097,13 +1058,6 @@ retryDueToTLSIntolerance(PRErrorCode err, nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo)
// this as a hard failure, but forget any intolerance so that later attempts
// don't use this version (i.e., range.max) and trigger the error again.
- // First, track the original cause of the version fallback. This uses the
- // same buckets as the telemetry below, except that bucket 0 will include
- // all cases where there wasn't an original reason.
- PRErrorCode originalReason =
- helpers.getIntoleranceReason(socketInfo->GetHostName(),
- socketInfo->GetPort());
-
helpers.forgetIntolerance(socketInfo->GetHostName(),
socketInfo->GetPort());
@@ -1139,29 +1093,14 @@ retryDueToTLSIntolerance(PRErrorCode err, nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo)
return false;
}
- uint32_t reason = tlsIntoleranceTelemetryBucket(err);
- if (reason == 0) {
- return false;
- }
-
- Telemetry::ID pre;
- Telemetry::ID post;
switch (range.max) {
case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
- pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS13_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE;
- post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS13_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST;
break;
case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
- pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS12_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE;
- post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS12_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST;
break;
case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
- pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS11_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE;
- post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS11_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST;
break;
case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
- pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS10_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE;
- post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS10_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST;
break;
default:
MOZ_CRASH("impossible TLS version");
@@ -1187,34 +1126,6 @@ static_assert((PR_MAX_ERROR - PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) <= 128,
static_assert((mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE - mozilla::pkix::END_OF_LIST) < 31,
"too many moz::pkix errors");
-static void
-reportHandshakeResult(int32_t bytesTransferred, bool wasReading, PRErrorCode err)
-{
- uint32_t bucket;
-
- // A negative bytesTransferred or a 0 read are errors.
- if (bytesTransferred > 0) {
- bucket = 0;
- } else if ((bytesTransferred == 0) && !wasReading) {
- // PR_Write() is defined to never return 0, but let's make sure.
- // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_Write.
- MOZ_ASSERT(false);
- bucket = 671;
- } else if (IS_SSL_ERROR(err)) {
- bucket = err - SSL_ERROR_BASE;
- MOZ_ASSERT(bucket > 0); // SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_ONLY_SERVER isn't used.
- } else if (IS_SEC_ERROR(err)) {
- bucket = (err - SEC_ERROR_BASE) + 256;
- } else if ((err >= PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) && (err < PR_MAX_ERROR)) {
- bucket = (err - PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) + 512;
- } else if ((err >= mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE) &&
- (err < mozilla::pkix::ERROR_LIMIT)) {
- bucket = (err - mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE) + 640;
- } else {
- bucket = 671;
- }
-}
-
int32_t
checkHandshake(int32_t bytesTransfered, bool wasReading,
PRFileDesc* ssl_layer_fd, nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo)
@@ -1292,10 +1203,6 @@ checkHandshake(int32_t bytesTransfered, bool wasReading,
// set the HandshakePending attribute to false so that we don't try the logic
// above again in a subsequent transfer.
if (handleHandshakeResultNow) {
- // Report the result once for each handshake. Note that this does not
- // get handshakes which are cancelled before any reads or writes
- // happen.
- reportHandshakeResult(bytesTransfered, wasReading, originalError);
socketInfo->SetHandshakeNotPending();
}