Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 903 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp b/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61d8fcdb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,903 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "CertVerifier.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "CTKnownLogs.h"
+#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
+#include "MultiLogCTVerifier.h"
+#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
+#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
+#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
+#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+#include "pk11pub.h"
+#include "pkix/pkix.h"
+#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
+#include "prerror.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla::ct;
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+using namespace mozilla::psm;
+
+mozilla::LazyLogModule gCertVerifierLog("certverifier");
+
+namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
+
+const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY = 1;
+const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_MUST_BE_EV = 2;
+const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST = 4;
+
+CertVerifier::CertVerifier(OcspDownloadConfig odc,
+                           OcspStrictConfig osc,
+                           OcspGetConfig ogc,
+                           uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays,
+                           PinningMode pinningMode,
+                           SHA1Mode sha1Mode,
+                           BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode nameMatchingMode,
+                           NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy,
+                           CertificateTransparencyMode ctMode)
+  : mOCSPDownloadConfig(odc)
+  , mOCSPStrict(osc == ocspStrict)
+  , mOCSPGETEnabled(ogc == ocspGetEnabled)
+  , mCertShortLifetimeInDays(certShortLifetimeInDays)
+  , mPinningMode(pinningMode)
+  , mSHA1Mode(sha1Mode)
+  , mNameMatchingMode(nameMatchingMode)
+  , mNetscapeStepUpPolicy(netscapeStepUpPolicy)
+  , mCTMode(ctMode)
+{
+  LoadKnownCTLogs();
+}
+
+CertVerifier::~CertVerifier()
+{
+}
+
+Result
+IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(const UniqueCERTCertList& chain, bool& result)
+{
+  if (!chain || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(chain)) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(chain);
+  if (!rootNode) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  CERTCertificate* root = rootNode->cert;
+  if (!root) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  return IsCertBuiltInRoot(root, result);
+}
+
+Result
+IsCertBuiltInRoot(CERTCertificate* cert, bool& result)
+{
+  result = false;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+  nsCOMPtr<nsINSSComponent> component(do_GetService(PSM_COMPONENT_CONTRACTID));
+  if (!component) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  nsresult rv = component->IsCertTestBuiltInRoot(cert, result);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  if (result) {
+    return Success;
+  }
+#endif // DEBUG
+  AutoSECMODListReadLock lock;
+  for (SECMODModuleList* list = SECMOD_GetDefaultModuleList(); list;
+       list = list->next) {
+    for (int i = 0; i < list->module->slotCount; i++) {
+      PK11SlotInfo* slot = list->module->slots[i];
+      // PK11_HasRootCerts should return true if and only if the given slot has
+      // an object with a CKA_CLASS of CKO_NETSCAPE_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST, which
+      // should be true only of the builtin root list.
+      // If we can find a copy of the given certificate on the slot with the
+      // builtin root list, that certificate must be a builtin.
+      if (PK11_IsPresent(slot) && PK11_HasRootCerts(slot) &&
+          PK11_FindCertInSlot(slot, cert, nullptr) != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+        result = true;
+        return Success;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return Success;
+}
+
+static Result
+BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(NSSCertDBTrustDomain& trustDomain, Input certDER,
+                             Time time, KeyUsage ku1, KeyUsage ku2,
+                             KeyUsage ku3, KeyPurposeId eku,
+                             const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy,
+                             const Input* stapledOCSPResponse,
+                             /*optional out*/ CertVerifier::OCSPStaplingStatus*
+                                                ocspStaplingStatus)
+{
+  trustDomain.ResetAccumulatedState();
+  Result rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                             EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, ku1,
+                             eku, requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+  if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
+    trustDomain.ResetAccumulatedState();
+    rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                        EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, ku2,
+                        eku, requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+    if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
+      trustDomain.ResetAccumulatedState();
+      rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                          EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, ku3,
+                          eku, requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+      if (rv != Success) {
+        rv = Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (ocspStaplingStatus) {
+    *ocspStaplingStatus = trustDomain.GetOCSPStaplingStatus();
+  }
+  return rv;
+}
+
+void
+CertVerifier::LoadKnownCTLogs()
+{
+  mCTVerifier = MakeUnique<MultiLogCTVerifier>();
+  for (const CTLogInfo& log : kCTLogList) {
+    Input publicKey;
+    Result rv = publicKey.Init(
+      BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, const char*>(log.logKey), log.logKeyLength);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Failed reading a log key for a known CT Log");
+      continue;
+    }
+    rv = mCTVerifier->AddLog(publicKey);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Failed initializing a known CT Log");
+      continue;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+Result
+CertVerifier::VerifySignedCertificateTimestamps(
+  NSSCertDBTrustDomain& trustDomain, const UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain,
+  Input sctsFromTLS, Time time,
+  /*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo)
+{
+  if (ctInfo) {
+    ctInfo->Reset();
+  }
+  if (mCTMode == CertificateTransparencyMode::Disabled) {
+    return Success;
+  }
+  if (ctInfo) {
+    ctInfo->enabled = true;
+  }
+
+  if (!builtChain || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(builtChain)) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+
+  bool gotScts = false;
+  Input embeddedSCTs = trustDomain.GetSCTListFromCertificate();
+  if (embeddedSCTs.GetLength() > 0) {
+    gotScts = true;
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Got embedded SCT data of length %zu\n",
+              static_cast<size_t>(embeddedSCTs.GetLength())));
+  }
+  Input sctsFromOCSP = trustDomain.GetSCTListFromOCSPStapling();
+  if (sctsFromOCSP.GetLength() > 0) {
+    gotScts = true;
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Got OCSP SCT data of length %zu\n",
+              static_cast<size_t>(sctsFromOCSP.GetLength())));
+  }
+  if (sctsFromTLS.GetLength() > 0) {
+    gotScts = true;
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Got TLS SCT data of length %zu\n",
+              static_cast<size_t>(sctsFromTLS.GetLength())));
+  }
+  if (!gotScts) {
+    return Success;
+  }
+
+  CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain);
+  if (!endEntityNode || CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, builtChain)) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+  CERTCertListNode* issuerNode = CERT_LIST_NEXT(endEntityNode);
+  if (!issuerNode || CERT_LIST_END(issuerNode, builtChain)) {
+    // Issuer certificate is required for SCT verification.
+    // TODO(bug 1294580): change this to Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS
+    return Success;
+  }
+
+  CERTCertificate* endEntity = endEntityNode->cert;
+  CERTCertificate* issuer = issuerNode->cert;
+  if (!endEntity || !issuer) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+
+  Input endEntityDER;
+  Result rv = endEntityDER.Init(endEntity->derCert.data,
+                                endEntity->derCert.len);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  Input issuerPublicKeyDER;
+  rv = issuerPublicKeyDER.Init(issuer->derPublicKey.data,
+                               issuer->derPublicKey.len);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  CTVerifyResult result;
+  rv = mCTVerifier->Verify(endEntityDER, issuerPublicKeyDER,
+                           embeddedSCTs, sctsFromOCSP, sctsFromTLS, time,
+                           result);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("SCT verification failed with fatal error %i\n", rv));
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug)) {
+    size_t verifiedCount = 0;
+    size_t unknownLogCount = 0;
+    size_t invalidSignatureCount = 0;
+    size_t invalidTimestampCount = 0;
+    for (const SignedCertificateTimestamp& sct : result.scts) {
+      switch (sct.verificationStatus) {
+        case SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::OK:
+          verifiedCount++;
+          break;
+        case SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::UnknownLog:
+          unknownLogCount++;
+          break;
+        case SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::InvalidSignature:
+          invalidSignatureCount++;
+          break;
+        case SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::InvalidTimestamp:
+          invalidTimestampCount++;
+          break;
+        case SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::None:
+        default:
+          MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected SCT verificationStatus");
+      }
+    }
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("SCT verification result: "
+             "verified=%zu unknownLog=%zu "
+             "invalidSignature=%zu invalidTimestamp=%zu "
+             "decodingErrors=%zu\n",
+             verifiedCount, unknownLogCount,
+             invalidSignatureCount, invalidTimestampCount,
+             result.decodingErrors));
+  }
+
+  if (ctInfo) {
+    ctInfo->processedSCTs = true;
+    ctInfo->verifyResult = Move(result);
+  }
+  return Success;
+}
+
+bool
+CertVerifier::SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(SHA1Mode mode)
+{
+  switch (mSHA1Mode) {
+    case SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
+      return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden;
+    case SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot:
+      return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden && mode != SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot;
+    case SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016:
+      return mode == SHA1Mode::Allowed;
+    case SHA1Mode::Allowed:
+      return false;
+    // MSVC warns unless we explicitly handle this now-unused option.
+    case SHA1Mode::UsedToBeBefore2016ButNowIsForbidden:
+    default:
+      MOZ_ASSERT(false, "unexpected SHA1Mode type");
+      return true;
+  }
+}
+
+static const unsigned int MIN_RSA_BITS = 2048;
+static const unsigned int MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK = 1024;
+
+Result
+CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
+                         Time time, void* pinArg, const char* hostname,
+                 /*out*/ UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain,
+            /*optional*/ const Flags flags,
+            /*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponseSECItem,
+            /*optional*/ const SECItem* sctsFromTLSSECItem,
+            /*optional*/ const NeckoOriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+        /*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
+        /*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus,
+        /*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus,
+        /*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult,
+        /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo,
+        /*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo)
+{
+  MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Top of VerifyCert\n"));
+
+  PR_ASSERT(cert);
+  PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !(flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV));
+  PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !keySizeStatus);
+  PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !sha1ModeResult);
+
+  if (evOidPolicy) {
+    *evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+  }
+  if (ocspStaplingStatus) {
+    if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+    }
+    *ocspStaplingStatus = OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
+  }
+
+  if (keySizeStatus) {
+    if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+    }
+    *keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked;
+  }
+
+  if (sha1ModeResult) {
+    if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+    }
+    *sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked;
+  }
+
+  if (!cert ||
+      (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer && (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV))) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+
+  Input certDER;
+  Result rv = certDER.Init(cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // We configure the OCSP fetching modes separately for EV and non-EV
+  // verifications.
+  NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching defaultOCSPFetching
+    = (mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspOff) ||
+      (mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspEVOnly) ||
+      (flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY) ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP
+    : !mOCSPStrict              ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail
+                                : NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail;
+
+  OcspGetConfig ocspGETConfig = mOCSPGETEnabled ? ocspGetEnabled
+                                                : ocspGetDisabled;
+
+  Input stapledOCSPResponseInput;
+  const Input* stapledOCSPResponse = nullptr;
+  if (stapledOCSPResponseSECItem) {
+    rv = stapledOCSPResponseInput.Init(stapledOCSPResponseSECItem->data,
+                                       stapledOCSPResponseSECItem->len);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      // The stapled OCSP response was too big.
+      return Result::ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE;
+    }
+    stapledOCSPResponse = &stapledOCSPResponseInput;
+  }
+
+  Input sctsFromTLSInput;
+  if (sctsFromTLSSECItem) {
+    rv = sctsFromTLSInput.Init(sctsFromTLSSECItem->data,
+                               sctsFromTLSSECItem->len);
+    // Silently discard the error of the extension being too big,
+    // do not fail the verification.
+    MOZ_ASSERT(rv == Success);
+  }
+
+  switch (usage) {
+    case certificateUsageSSLClient: {
+      // XXX: We don't really have a trust bit for SSL client authentication so
+      // just use trustEmail as it is the closest alternative.
+      NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
+                                       mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                                       mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                       pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
+                                       ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                       SHA1Mode::Allowed,
+                                       NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch,
+                                       originAttributes,
+                                       builtChain, nullptr, nullptr);
+      rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                          EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
+                          KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
+                          KeyPurposeId::id_kp_clientAuth,
+                          CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case certificateUsageSSLServer: {
+      // TODO: When verifying a certificate in an SSL handshake, we should
+      // restrict the acceptable key usage based on the key exchange method
+      // chosen by the server.
+
+      // These configurations are in order of most restrictive to least
+      // restrictive. This enables us to gather telemetry on the expected
+      // results of setting the default policy to a particular configuration.
+      SHA1Mode sha1ModeConfigurations[] = {
+        SHA1Mode::Forbidden,
+        SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot,
+        SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016,
+        SHA1Mode::Allowed,
+      };
+
+      SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResults[] = {
+        SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithoutSHA1,
+        SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithImportedRoot,
+        SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithImportedRootOrSHA1Before2016,
+        SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithSHA1,
+      };
+
+      size_t sha1ModeConfigurationsCount = MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeConfigurations);
+
+      static_assert(MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeConfigurations) ==
+                    MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeResults),
+                    "digestAlgorithm array lengths differ");
+
+      rv = Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+
+      // Try to validate for EV first.
+      NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching evOCSPFetching
+        = (mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspOff) ||
+          (flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY) ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV
+                                    : NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV;
+
+      CertPolicyId evPolicy;
+      SECOidTag evPolicyOidTag;
+      SECStatus srv = GetFirstEVPolicy(cert, evPolicy, evPolicyOidTag);
+      for (size_t i = 0;
+           i < sha1ModeConfigurationsCount && rv != Success && srv == SECSuccess;
+           i++) {
+        // Don't attempt verification if the SHA1 mode set by preferences
+        // (mSHA1Mode) is more restrictive than the SHA1 mode option we're on.
+        // (To put it another way, only attempt verification if the SHA1 mode
+        // option we're on is as restrictive or more restrictive than
+        // mSHA1Mode.) This allows us to gather telemetry information while
+        // still enforcing the mode set by preferences.
+        if (SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(sha1ModeConfigurations[i])) {
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        // Because of the try-strict and fallback approach, we have to clear any
+        // previously noted telemetry information
+        if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
+          pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset();
+        }
+
+        NSSCertDBTrustDomain
+          trustDomain(trustSSL, evOCSPFetching,
+                      mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                      mCertShortLifetimeInDays, mPinningMode, MIN_RSA_BITS,
+                      ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV,
+                      sha1ModeConfigurations[i], mNetscapeStepUpPolicy,
+                      originAttributes, builtChain, pinningTelemetryInfo,
+                      hostname);
+        rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                                          KeyUsage::digitalSignature,// (EC)DHE
+                                          KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
+                                          KeyUsage::keyAgreement,    // (EC)DH
+                                          KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
+                                          evPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse,
+                                          ocspStaplingStatus);
+        if (rv == Success &&
+            sha1ModeConfigurations[i] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
+          bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
+          rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
+          if (rv != Success) {
+            break;
+          }
+          if (isBuiltInRoot) {
+            rv = Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
+          }
+        }
+        if (rv == Success) {
+          MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+                  ("cert is EV with status %i\n", sha1ModeResults[i]));
+          if (evOidPolicy) {
+            *evOidPolicy = evPolicyOidTag;
+          }
+          if (sha1ModeResult) {
+            *sha1ModeResult = sha1ModeResults[i];
+          }
+          rv = VerifySignedCertificateTimestamps(trustDomain, builtChain,
+                                                 sctsFromTLSInput, time,
+                                                 ctInfo);
+          if (rv != Success) {
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      if (rv == Success) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
+        rv = Result::ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED;
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // Now try non-EV.
+      unsigned int keySizeOptions[] = {
+        MIN_RSA_BITS,
+        MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK
+      };
+
+      KeySizeStatus keySizeStatuses[] = {
+        KeySizeStatus::LargeMinimumSucceeded,
+        KeySizeStatus::CompatibilityRisk
+      };
+
+      static_assert(MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeOptions) ==
+                    MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeStatuses),
+                    "keySize array lengths differ");
+
+      size_t keySizeOptionsCount = MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeStatuses);
+
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < keySizeOptionsCount && rv != Success; i++) {
+        for (size_t j = 0; j < sha1ModeConfigurationsCount && rv != Success;
+             j++) {
+          // Don't attempt verification if the SHA1 mode set by preferences
+          // (mSHA1Mode) is more restrictive than the SHA1 mode option we're on.
+          // (To put it another way, only attempt verification if the SHA1 mode
+          // option we're on is as restrictive or more restrictive than
+          // mSHA1Mode.) This allows us to gather telemetry information while
+          // still enforcing the mode set by preferences.
+          if (SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(sha1ModeConfigurations[j])) {
+            continue;
+          }
+
+          // invalidate any telemetry info relating to failed chains
+          if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
+            pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset();
+          }
+
+          NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching,
+                                           mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                                           mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                           mPinningMode, keySizeOptions[i],
+                                           ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                           sha1ModeConfigurations[j],
+                                           mNetscapeStepUpPolicy,
+                                           originAttributes, builtChain,
+                                           pinningTelemetryInfo, hostname);
+          rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                                            KeyUsage::digitalSignature,//(EC)DHE
+                                            KeyUsage::keyEncipherment,//RSA
+                                            KeyUsage::keyAgreement,//(EC)DH
+                                            KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
+                                            CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
+                                            stapledOCSPResponse,
+                                            ocspStaplingStatus);
+          if (rv == Success &&
+              sha1ModeConfigurations[j] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
+            bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
+            rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
+            if (rv != Success) {
+              break;
+            }
+            if (isBuiltInRoot) {
+              rv = Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
+            }
+          }
+          if (rv == Success) {
+            if (keySizeStatus) {
+              *keySizeStatus = keySizeStatuses[i];
+            }
+            if (sha1ModeResult) {
+              *sha1ModeResult = sha1ModeResults[j];
+            }
+            rv = VerifySignedCertificateTimestamps(trustDomain, builtChain,
+                                                   sctsFromTLSInput, time,
+                                                   ctInfo);
+            if (rv != Success) {
+              break;
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (rv == Success) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      if (keySizeStatus) {
+        *keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::AlreadyBad;
+      }
+      // The telemetry probe CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS gives us feedback on
+      // the result of setting a specific policy. However, we don't want noise
+      // from users who have manually set the policy to something other than the
+      // default, so we only collect for ImportedRoot (which is the default).
+      if (sha1ModeResult && mSHA1Mode == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
+        *sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::Failed;
+      }
+
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case certificateUsageSSLCA: {
+      NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching,
+                                       mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                                       mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                       pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
+                                       ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                       SHA1Mode::Allowed, mNetscapeStepUpPolicy,
+                                       originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr,
+                                       nullptr);
+      rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                          EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::keyCertSign,
+                          KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
+                          CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case certificateUsageEmailSigner: {
+      NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
+                                       mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                                       mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                       pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
+                                       ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                       SHA1Mode::Allowed,
+                                       NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch,
+                                       originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr,
+                                       nullptr);
+      rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                          EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
+                          KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
+                          KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
+                          CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+      if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
+        rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                            EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
+                            KeyUsage::nonRepudiation,
+                            KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
+                            CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case certificateUsageEmailRecipient: {
+      // TODO: The higher level S/MIME processing should pass in which key
+      // usage it is trying to verify for, and base its algorithm choices
+      // based on the result of the verification(s).
+      NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
+                                       mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                                       mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                       pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
+                                       ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                       SHA1Mode::Allowed,
+                                       NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch,
+                                       originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr,
+                                       nullptr);
+      rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                          EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
+                          KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
+                          KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
+                          CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+      if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
+        rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                            EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
+                            KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // ECDH/DH
+                            KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
+                            CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case certificateUsageObjectSigner: {
+      NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustObjectSigning, defaultOCSPFetching,
+                                       mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                                       mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                       pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
+                                       ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                       SHA1Mode::Allowed,
+                                       NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch,
+                                       originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr,
+                                       nullptr);
+      rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
+                          EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
+                          KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
+                          KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
+                          CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case certificateUsageVerifyCA:
+    case certificateUsageStatusResponder: {
+      // XXX This is a pretty useless way to verify a certificate. It is used
+      // by the certificate viewer UI. Because we don't know what trust bit is
+      // interesting, we just try them all.
+      mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA;
+      mozilla::pkix::KeyUsage keyUsage;
+      KeyPurposeId eku;
+      if (usage == certificateUsageVerifyCA) {
+        endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA;
+        keyUsage = KeyUsage::keyCertSign;
+        eku = KeyPurposeId::anyExtendedKeyUsage;
+      } else {
+        endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity;
+        keyUsage = KeyUsage::digitalSignature;
+        eku = KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning;
+      }
+
+      NSSCertDBTrustDomain sslTrust(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache,
+                                    pinArg, ocspGETConfig, mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                    pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
+                                    ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                    SHA1Mode::Allowed,
+                                    NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch,
+                                    originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr,
+                                    nullptr);
+      rv = BuildCertChain(sslTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA,
+                          keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
+                          stapledOCSPResponse);
+      if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
+        NSSCertDBTrustDomain emailTrust(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
+                                        mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                                        mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                        pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
+                                        ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                        SHA1Mode::Allowed,
+                                        NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch,
+                                        originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr,
+                                        nullptr);
+        rv = BuildCertChain(emailTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA,
+                            keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
+                            stapledOCSPResponse);
+        if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
+          NSSCertDBTrustDomain objectSigningTrust(trustObjectSigning,
+                                                  defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache,
+                                                  pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
+                                                  mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                                  pinningDisabled,
+                                                  MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
+                                                  ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
+                                                  SHA1Mode::Allowed,
+                                                  NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch,
+                                                  originAttributes, builtChain,
+                                                  nullptr, nullptr);
+          rv = BuildCertChain(objectSigningTrust, certDER, time,
+                              endEntityOrCA, keyUsage, eku,
+                              CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
+        }
+      }
+
+      break;
+    }
+
+    default:
+      rv = Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(const UniqueCERTCertificate& peerCert,
+                     /*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
+                     /*optional*/ const SECItem* sctsFromTLS,
+                                  Time time,
+                     /*optional*/ void* pinarg,
+                                  const char* hostname,
+                          /*out*/ UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain,
+                     /*optional*/ bool saveIntermediatesInPermanentDatabase,
+                     /*optional*/ Flags flags,
+                     /*optional*/ const NeckoOriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+                 /*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
+                 /*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus,
+                 /*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus,
+                 /*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult,
+                 /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo,
+                 /*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo)
+{
+  PR_ASSERT(peerCert);
+  // XXX: PR_ASSERT(pinarg)
+  PR_ASSERT(hostname);
+  PR_ASSERT(hostname[0]);
+
+  if (evOidPolicy) {
+    *evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+  }
+
+  if (!hostname || !hostname[0]) {
+    return Result::ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN;
+  }
+
+  // CreateCertErrorRunnable assumes that CheckCertHostname is only called
+  // if VerifyCert succeeded.
+  Result rv = VerifyCert(peerCert.get(), certificateUsageSSLServer, time,
+                         pinarg, hostname, builtChain, flags,
+                         stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLS, originAttributes,
+                         evOidPolicy, ocspStaplingStatus, keySizeStatus,
+                         sha1ModeResult, pinningTelemetryInfo, ctInfo);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  Input peerCertInput;
+  rv = peerCertInput.Init(peerCert->derCert.data, peerCert->derCert.len);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  Input stapledOCSPResponseInput;
+  Input* responseInputPtr = nullptr;
+  if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
+    rv = stapledOCSPResponseInput.Init(stapledOCSPResponse->data,
+                                       stapledOCSPResponse->len);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      // The stapled OCSP response was too big.
+      return Result::ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE;
+    }
+    responseInputPtr = &stapledOCSPResponseInput;
+  }
+
+  if (!(flags & FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST)) {
+    rv = CheckTLSFeaturesAreSatisfied(peerCertInput, responseInputPtr);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  Input hostnameInput;
+  rv = hostnameInput.Init(BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, const char*>(hostname),
+                          strlen(hostname));
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+  bool isBuiltInRoot;
+  rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(
+    isBuiltInRoot ? mNameMatchingMode
+                  : BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce);
+  rv = CheckCertHostname(peerCertInput, hostnameInput, nameMatchingPolicy);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    // Treat malformed name information as a domain mismatch.
+    if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_DER) {
+      return Result::ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (saveIntermediatesInPermanentDatabase) {
+    SaveIntermediateCerts(builtChain);
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+} } // namespace mozilla::psm