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author | wolfbeast <mcwerewolf@wolfbeast.com> | 2019-12-22 01:23:56 +0100 |
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committer | wolfbeast <mcwerewolf@wolfbeast.com> | 2019-12-22 01:26:49 +0100 |
commit | 54091ecab46c93c2e1b2c689e9179a980beaabe6 (patch) | |
tree | 5cead66d889007e1b06c5dbb8e3d37b2538d0557 /dom/security | |
parent | c1013e9122456b342d65e4eb4c38a7281d8d83d2 (diff) | |
parent | 492624a7106ecbc18994b465ca1dd23fa472bf7e (diff) | |
download | UXP-54091ecab46c93c2e1b2c689e9179a980beaabe6.tar UXP-54091ecab46c93c2e1b2c689e9179a980beaabe6.tar.gz UXP-54091ecab46c93c2e1b2c689e9179a980beaabe6.tar.lz UXP-54091ecab46c93c2e1b2c689e9179a980beaabe6.tar.xz UXP-54091ecab46c93c2e1b2c689e9179a980beaabe6.zip |
Forward to new tree structure.
Diffstat (limited to 'dom/security')
-rw-r--r-- | dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 5 |
3 files changed, 35 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp index 65be02809..56a119e1a 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp @@ -513,8 +513,19 @@ nsCSPContext::GetAllowsInline(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { bool allowed = mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, EmptyString(), aParserCreated) || - mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_NONCE, aNonce, aParserCreated) || - mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_HASH, aContent, aParserCreated); + mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_NONCE, aNonce, aParserCreated); + + // If the inlined script or style is allowed by either unsafe-inline or the + // nonce, go ahead and shortcut this loop. + if (allowed) { + continue; + } + + // Check if the csp-hash matches against the hash of the script. + // If we don't have any content to check, block the script. + if (!aContent.IsEmpty()) { + allowed = mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_HASH, aContent, aParserCreated); + } if (!allowed) { // policy is violoated: deny the load unless policy is report only and diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp index 71c8e3433..d07ad7945 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp @@ -641,13 +641,22 @@ nsCSPHostSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected // just a specific scheme, the parser should generate a nsCSPSchemeSource. NS_ASSERTION((!mHost.IsEmpty()), "host can not be the empty string"); + // Before we can check if the host matches, we have to + // extract the host part from aUri. + nsAutoCString uriHost; + nsresult rv = aUri->GetAsciiHost(uriHost); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + nsString decodedUriHost; + CSP_PercentDecodeStr(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost), decodedUriHost); + // 2) host matching: Enforce a single * if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*")) { // The single ASTERISK character (*) does not match a URI's scheme of a type // designating a globally unique identifier (such as blob:, data:, or filesystem:) - // At the moment firefox does not support filesystem; but for future compatibility + // At the moment UXP does not support "filesystem:" but for future compatibility // we support it in CSP according to the spec, see: 4.2.2 Matching Source Expressions - // Note, that whitelisting any of these schemes would call nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(). + // Note: whitelisting any of these schemes would call nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(). bool isBlobScheme = (NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("blob", &isBlobScheme)) && isBlobScheme); bool isDataScheme = @@ -658,20 +667,15 @@ nsCSPHostSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected if (isBlobScheme || isDataScheme || isFileScheme) { return false; } - return true; - } - - // Before we can check if the host matches, we have to - // extract the host part from aUri. - nsAutoCString uriHost; - nsresult rv = aUri->GetAsciiHost(uriHost); - NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); - - nsString decodedUriHost; - CSP_PercentDecodeStr(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost), decodedUriHost); + // If no scheme is present there also won't be a port and folder to check + // which means we can return early. + if (mScheme.IsEmpty()) { + return true; + } + } // 4.5) host matching: Check if the allowed host starts with a wilcard. - if (mHost.First() == '*') { + else if (mHost.First() == '*') { NS_ASSERTION(mHost[1] == '.', "Second character needs to be '.' whenever host starts with '*'"); // Eliminate leading "*", but keeping the FULL STOP (.) thereafter before checking diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp index 08fd9afd9..5c6701992 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include "nsIStreamListener.h" #include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h" #include "nsIURIFixup.h" +#include "nsIImageLoadingContent.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Element.h" #include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h" @@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(nsIChannel* aChannel) nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri)); - NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (!uri) { return NS_OK; } @@ -801,6 +802,8 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel) // within nsCorsListenerProxy rv = DoCheckLoadURIChecks(uri, loadInfo); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + // TODO: Bug 1371237 + // consider calling SetBlockedRequest in nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel } return NS_OK; |