Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

3 files changed, 363 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/dom/interfaces/security/moz.build b/dom/interfaces/security/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6796305f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/interfaces/security/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+XPIDL_SOURCES += [
+    'nsIContentSecurityManager.idl',
+    'nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl'
+]
+
+XPIDL_MODULE = 'dom_security'
+
diff --git a/dom/interfaces/security/nsIContentSecurityManager.idl b/dom/interfaces/security/nsIContentSecurityManager.idl
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1a1c91021
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/interfaces/security/nsIContentSecurityManager.idl
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsISupports.idl"
+
+interface nsIChannel;
+interface nsIPrincipal;
+interface nsIStreamListener;
+interface nsIURI;
+
+/**
+ * nsIContentSecurityManager
+ * Describes an XPCOM component used to perform security checks.
+ */
+
+[scriptable, uuid(3a9a1818-2ae8-4ec5-a340-8b29d31fca3b)]
+interface nsIContentSecurityManager : nsISupports
+{
+  /**
+   * Checks whether a channel is allowed to access the given URI and
+   * whether the channel should be openend or should be blocked consulting
+   * internal security checks like Same Origin Policy, Content Security
+   * Policy, Mixed Content Blocker, etc.
+   *
+   * If security checks within performSecurityCheck fail, the function
+   * throws an exception.
+   *
+   * @param aChannel
+   *     The channel about to be openend
+   * @param aStreamListener
+   *     The Streamlistener of the channel potentially wrapped
+   *     into CORSListenerProxy.
+   * @return
+   *     The StreamListener of the channel wrapped into CORSListenerProxy.
+   *
+   * @throws NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI
+   *     If accessing the URI is not allowed (e.g. prohibted by SOP)
+   * @throws NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED
+   *     If any of the security policies (CSP, Mixed content) is violated
+   */
+   nsIStreamListener performSecurityCheck(in nsIChannel aChannel,
+                                          in nsIStreamListener aStreamListener);
+
+  /**
+   * Implementation of
+   * https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy
+   *
+   * The value returned by this method feeds into the the Secure Context
+   * algorithm that determins the value of Window.isSecureContext and
+   * WorkerGlobalScope.isSecureContext.
+   *
+   * This method returns false instead of throwing upon errors.
+   */
+  boolean isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal);
+};
diff --git a/dom/interfaces/security/nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl b/dom/interfaces/security/nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ade5b1243
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/interfaces/security/nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsISerializable.idl"
+#include "nsIContentPolicy.idl"
+
+interface nsIURI;
+interface nsIChannel;
+interface nsIDocShell;
+interface nsIDOMDocument;
+interface nsIPrincipal;
+interface nsIURI;
+
+/**
+ * nsIContentSecurityPolicy
+ * Describes an XPCOM component used to model and enforce CSPs.  Instances of
+ * this class may have multiple policies within them, but there should only be
+ * one of these per document/principal.
+ */
+
+typedef unsigned short CSPDirective;
+
+%{C++
+class nsCSPPolicy;
+%}
+
+[ptr] native CSPPolicyPtr(const nsCSPPolicy);
+
+[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(b3c4c0ae-bd5e-4cad-87e0-8d210dbb3f9f)]
+interface nsIContentSecurityPolicy : nsISerializable
+{
+  /**
+   * Directives supported by Content Security Policy.  These are enums for
+   * the CSPDirective type.
+   * The NO_DIRECTIVE entry is  used for checking default permissions and
+   * returning failure when asking CSP which directive to check.
+   *
+   * NOTE: When implementing a new directive, you will need to add it here but also
+   * add it to the CSPStrDirectives array in nsCSPUtils.h.
+   */
+  const unsigned short NO_DIRECTIVE                   = 0;
+  const unsigned short DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE          = 1;
+  const unsigned short SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE           = 2;
+  const unsigned short OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE           = 3;
+  const unsigned short STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE            = 4;
+  const unsigned short IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE              = 5;
+  const unsigned short MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE            = 6;
+  const unsigned short FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE            = 7;
+  const unsigned short FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE             = 8;
+  const unsigned short CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE          = 9;
+  const unsigned short REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE           = 10;
+  const unsigned short FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE      = 11;
+  const unsigned short REFLECTED_XSS_DIRECTIVE        = 12;
+  const unsigned short BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE             = 13;
+  const unsigned short FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE          = 14;
+  const unsigned short REFERRER_DIRECTIVE             = 15;
+  const unsigned short WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE     = 16;
+  const unsigned short UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE  = 17;
+  const unsigned short CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE            = 18;
+  const unsigned short BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT        = 19;
+  const unsigned short REQUIRE_SRI_FOR                = 20;
+  const unsigned short SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE              = 21;
+
+  /**
+   * Accessor method for a read-only string version of the policy at a given
+   * index.
+   */
+  [binaryname(GetPolicyString)] AString getPolicy(in unsigned long index);
+
+  /**
+   * Accessor method for a read-only pointer the policy object at a given
+   * index. Returns a null pointer if the index is larger than the current
+   * policy count.
+   */
+  [noscript,notxpcom,nostdcall] CSPPolicyPtr GetPolicy(in unsigned long index);
+
+  /**
+   * Returns the number of policies attached to this CSP instance.  Useful with
+   * getPolicy().
+   */
+  readonly attribute unsigned long policyCount;
+
+  /**
+   * Returns whether this policy uses the directive upgrade-insecure-requests.
+   * Please note that upgrade-insecure-reqeusts also applies if the parent or
+   * including document (context) makes use of the directive.
+   */
+  readonly attribute bool upgradeInsecureRequests;
+
+  /**
+   * Returns whether this policy uses the directive block-all-mixed-content.
+   * Please note that block-all-mixed-content takes presedence in case the
+   * directive upgrade-insecure-requests is defined in the same policy and
+   * will therefore block all mixed content without even trying to perform
+   * an upgrade.
+   */
+  readonly attribute bool blockAllMixedContent;
+
+  /**
+   * Obtains the referrer policy (as integer) for this browsing context as
+   * specified in CSP.  If there are multiple policies and...
+   *  - only one sets a referrer policy: that policy is returned
+   *  - more than one sets different referrer policies: no-referrer is returned
+   *  - more than one set equivalent policies: that policy is returned
+   * For the enumeration of policies see ReferrerPolicy.h and nsIHttpChannel.
+   *
+   * @param aPolicy
+   *        The referrer policy to use for the protected resource.
+   * @return
+   *        true if a referrer policy is specified, false if it's unspecified.
+   */
+  bool getReferrerPolicy(out unsigned long policy);
+
+  /**
+   * Parse and install a CSP policy.
+   * @param aPolicy
+   *        String representation of the policy
+   *        (e.g., header value, meta content)
+   * @param reportOnly
+   *        Should this policy affect content, script and style processing or
+   *        just send reports if it is violated?
+   * @param deliveredViaMetaTag
+   *        Indicates whether the policy was delivered via the meta tag.
+   */
+  void appendPolicy(in AString policyString,
+                    in boolean reportOnly,
+                    in boolean deliveredViaMetaTag);
+
+  /*
+   * Whether this policy allows inline script or style.
+   * @param aContentPolicyType Either TYPE_SCRIPT or TYPE_STYLESHEET
+   * @param aNonce The nonce string to check against the policy
+   * @param aParserCreated If the script element was created by the HTML Parser
+   * @param aContent  The content of the inline resource to hash
+   *        (and compare to the hashes listed in the policy)
+   * @param aLineNumber The line number of the inline resource
+   *        (used for reporting)
+   * @return
+   *     Whether or not the effects of the inline style should be allowed
+   *     (block the rules if false).
+   */
+  boolean getAllowsInline(in nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
+                          in AString aNonce,
+                          in boolean aParserCreated,
+                          in AString aContent,
+                          in unsigned long aLineNumber);
+
+  /**
+   * whether this policy allows eval and eval-like functions
+   * such as setTimeout("code string", time).
+   * @param shouldReportViolations
+   *     Whether or not the use of eval should be reported.
+   *     This function returns "true" when violating report-only policies, but
+   *     when any policy (report-only or otherwise) is violated,
+   *     shouldReportViolations is true as well.
+   * @return
+   *     Whether or not the effects of the eval call should be allowed
+   *     (block the call if false).
+   */
+  boolean getAllowsEval(out boolean shouldReportViolations);
+
+  /**
+   * Delegate method called by the service when the protected document is loaded.
+   * Returns the union of all the sandbox flags contained in CSP policies. This is the most
+   * restrictive interpretation of flags set in multiple policies.
+   * See nsSandboxFlags.h for the possible flags.
+   *
+   * @return
+   *    sandbox flags or SANDBOXED_NONE if no sandbox directive exists
+   */
+  uint32_t getCSPSandboxFlags();
+
+  /**
+   * For each violated policy (of type violationType), log policy violation on
+   * the Error Console and send a report to report-uris present in the violated
+   * policies.
+   *
+   * @param violationType
+   *     one of the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constants, e.g. inline-script or eval
+   * @param sourceFile
+   *     name of the source file containing the violation (if available)
+   * @param contentSample
+   *     sample of the violating content (to aid debugging)
+   * @param lineNum
+   *     source line number of the violation (if available)
+   * @param aNonce
+   *     (optional) If this is a nonce violation, include the nonce so we can
+   *     recheck to determine which policies were violated and send the
+   *     appropriate reports.
+   * @param aContent
+   *     (optional) If this is a hash violation, include contents of the inline
+   *     resource in the question so we can recheck the hash in order to
+   *     determine which policies were violated and send the appropriate
+   *     reports.
+   */
+  void logViolationDetails(in unsigned short violationType,
+                           in AString sourceFile,
+                           in AString scriptSample,
+                           in int32_t lineNum,
+                           [optional] in AString nonce,
+                           [optional] in AString content);
+
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_SCRIPT          = 1;
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL                   = 2;
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_STYLE           = 3;
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_NONCE_SCRIPT           = 4;
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_NONCE_STYLE            = 5;
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_HASH_SCRIPT            = 6;
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_HASH_STYLE             = 7;
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR_STYLE  = 8;
+  const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR_SCRIPT = 9;
+
+  /**
+   * Called after the CSP object is created to fill in appropriate request
+   * context. Either use
+   *  * aDocument (preferred), or if no document is available, then provide
+   *  * aPrincipal
+   */
+  void setRequestContext(in nsIDOMDocument aDocument,
+                         in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal);
+
+
+  /*
+   * Checks if a CSP requires Subresource Integrity (SRI)
+   * for a given nsContentPolicyType.
+   */
+  bool requireSRIForType(in nsContentPolicyType aContentType);
+
+  /**
+   * Verifies ancestry as permitted by the policy.
+   *
+   * NOTE: Calls to this may trigger violation reports when queried, so this
+   * value should not be cached.
+   *
+   * @param docShell
+   *    containing the protected resource
+   * @return
+   *    true if the frame's ancestors are all allowed by policy (except for
+   *    report-only policies, which will send reports and then return true
+   *    here when violated).
+   */
+  boolean permitsAncestry(in nsIDocShell docShell);
+
+
+  /**
+   * Checks if a specific directive permits loading of a URI.
+   *
+   * NOTE: Calls to this may trigger violation reports when queried, so the
+   * return value should not be cached.
+   *
+   * @param aURI
+   *    The URI about to be loaded or used.
+   * @param aDir
+   *    The CSPDirective to query (see above constants *_DIRECTIVE).
+   * @param aSpecific
+   *    If "true" and the directive is specified to fall back to "default-src"
+   *    when it's not explicitly provided, directivePermits will NOT try
+   *    default-src when the specific directive is not used.  Setting this to
+   *    "false" allows CSP to fall back to default-src.  This function
+   *    behaves the same for both values of canUseDefault when querying
+   *    directives that don't fall-back.
+   * @return
+   *    Whether or not the provided URI is allowed by CSP under the given
+   *    directive. (block the pending operation if false).
+   */
+  boolean permits(in nsIURI aURI, in CSPDirective aDir, in boolean aSpecific);
+
+  /**
+   * Delegate method called by the service when sub-elements of the protected
+   * document are being loaded.  Given a bit of information about the request,
+   * decides whether or not the policy is satisfied.
+   *
+   * Calls to this may trigger violation reports when queried, so
+   * this value should not be cached.
+   */
+  short shouldLoad(in nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
+                   in nsIURI          aContentLocation,
+                   in nsIURI          aRequestOrigin,
+                   in nsISupports     aContext,
+                   in ACString        aMimeTypeGuess,
+                   in nsISupports     aExtra);
+
+%{ C++
+// nsIObserver topic to fire when the policy encounters a violation.
+#define CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC "csp-on-violate-policy"
+%}
+
+  /**
+   * Returns the CSP in JSON notation.
+   */
+  AString toJSON();
+
+};